Revisiting Munich
With hawks pulling out the Munich analogy every time the US or UK makes a concession to some regime deemed sufficiently evil in the court of public opinion, Alex Massie revisits Neville Chamberlain’s actions at Munich* and wonders how clear it is that those actions were wrong. It’s good stuff, and a perspective I had never much thought about before.
While it is certainly possible, and in hindsight likely, that war in 1938 would have stopped the Nazis before they had the capacity to overrun the continent and engage in a prolonged war, this is by no means guaranteed. American neutrality laws at the time of Munich made it questionable at best whether the US would have been able to even offer the type of assistance that it offered the UK between 1939 and 1941, and it was only after Munich that talks between the US and France began on exporting aircraft to France (aircraft that did not arrive until 1940, at which time they were redirected to Britain). Moreover, the RAF had only 5 Spitfires and not a single Hurricane in service at the time of Munich. By comparison, the Germans already had well over 1000 Messerschmitt Bf 109s in service.
It’s also worth remembering how quickly France and the Low Countries fell to Germany in 1940 despite the presence of British troops. It seems difficult to conclude that a declaration of war upon Germany in 1938 instead of 1939 would have not only prevented this but would have clearly ensured a relatively quick victory for the allies. And what if war in 1938 changed nothing about how quickly France and the Low Countries would have fallen? Without the full strength of the Spitfires and Hurricanes, would Britain have been able to withstand the Nazi air campaign?
This, of course, also says nothing about the fact that the killing fields of the First World War were no more a distant memory for Britain and France in 1938 than the Cold War is a distant memory for the US in 2009.
None of this is to say that Chamberlain’s actions at Munich were ultimately correct – in hindsight, the fact of the Holocaust makes just about anything that would have at least had the possibility of preventing it the correct course of action, and more hawkish action by Britain and France prior to the invasion of Poland fits this bill. It is, however, to say that the notion that Munich somehow proves that appeasement is always and everywhere a wrong decision is an extremely dubious notion.
Finally, Massie throws in a quote from a WWII-era leader about Munich that brilliantly warns against using Munich as a lesson that a hawkish approach to conflict with other nations is the right approach:
“No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. … Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances, they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. … How many wars have been precipitated by fire brands!”
That leader? Winston Churchill.
*Massie makes clear that criticism of Chamberlain’s failure to do anything in 1936 is an entirely different issue altogether.
UPDATE: Relatedly, I see that Will has made a similar point about the claim that the decision to pull back on missile defense is equivalent to doing nothing to save the Hungarian Spring uprising in 1956, noting that the decision to do nothing in 1956 was the right decision. This claim seems to be the perfect example of what I was referring to here in noting that the Cold War is just as fresh in our minds today as WWI was in 1938. If hawks wish to claim that Chamblerlain’s actions at Munich were overly influenced by the fear of another WWI, then they should be willing to recognize that they may be overly influenced by the fear of another Cold War.
I think one needs to look at British finances as well, which had been decimated after the Great War, and restoring the strength of the Pound was essential to a British economy that could fight another war. The Depression didn’t help, nor IIRC did Americans in refusing to flex loan terms.
So my own quick brush of the history is the British were involved in substantial drawdowns on government expenses, including some fairly unpopular military reductions that Churchill participated in after 1919. After Munich, Britain ramped up for war. I think Chamberlain is portrayed as more naive than he really was.Report
Thanks for reminding us about that, I probably should have noted that in more detail above. Although Churchill was pushing for much bigger increases, it’s worth noting that British military expenditures didn’t start increasing at all until, IIRC, 1936-1937, more than tripling between 1935/36 and 1938/39. Those expenditures, of course, take time to work their way through the system, so their effects were probably just beginning to be felt at the time of Munich.Report
At the very least, strategically Munich bought the UK a fair amount of time to modernize the RAF, which is a fairly significant matter. And as horrible as the Holocaust was, it does pale before the actual human cost of the first World War as an overall matter. It effectively destroyed Western Europe as the center of power in the world, helped ignite the Spanish Flu Pandemic, and all sorts of other nasty things. The ex-Entente was in no mood to sacrifice ten million more people (a figure which would probably have seemed low to them given the advances in military technology in the intervening 20 years) especially over territory that to them was rather peripheral to their own interests.Report
This Munich business has very little to do with whether WWII would have been less catastrophic. It’s all about the neoconservative hero narrative in which it’s always 1939, your average think tanker/columnist gets to dress up as Churchill and the other guys play Holocaust-causing appeasers.
From Team B inveighing against non-existent Soviet weaponry in the ’70s through PNAC and others inveighing against non-existent Iraqi weaponry in ’02-’03, the one constant is the self-image of a lonely voice protecting civilization. Thinking of yourself this way feels good, even if it has very little connection to reality.Report
Sorry to beat a dead steppe pony but there was no “Hungarian Spring.” The Hungarian uprising took place in October; the Townhall keyboard whacker conflated Hungary and the 1968 Prague Spring.Report
That was really stupid of me to repeat that phrase. I should have known better.Report
Wow, great post. I love the all-out assault on anti-appeasement argumentation. I think it’s quite obviously far and away the most destructive viewpoint in political discourse.
Just to add to this:
1. Given that what ultimately transpired dwarfed the Great War in carnage, wasn’t Chamberlain of course justified even in hindsight in being quite heedful of that fear.
2. Given that we won the Cold War and earned a huge peace dividend in the process, and could have done so with minimal casualties (barring Armageddon, of course) if not for bungled applications of sound geostrategic insights that lead to tragic loss of life in tangentially-related elective conflicts, really, what’s so, so scary about a new Cold War in the first place? I mean, when you bottom line it, the Ruskies could still nuke us out of existence any damn day they felt like it (and we them). The Cold War never ended, it just warmed over.Report