Dan Drezner Owes Me $5 Bucks
The Leveretts (Flynt and Hillary Mann) have a NyTimes op-ed out on the Iranian situation in light of the revelation of the new nuclear site.
Dan Drezner it’s fair to say, he no likey the op-ed. His broadside against Team Leverett here.
I’ll start with Drezner’s critique.
You know how so many in the blogosphere bitch and moan about the ability of neoconservatives to get their policy proposals published even after screwing up on Iraq?
I’m kind of curious how these people feel about Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett’s op-ed in the New York Times today about Iran. I mean, this is a scant few months after they served as apologists for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the controversial June election. I guess the Leveretts know Gwen Pollard well.
The apologia for Ahmadinejad was indeed odious (and more importantly wrong). So no defense of the indefensible on that point. The Leveretts don’t help their own case by referring to the recent events in Iran as “hardly a cataclysmic event.” And accuse, falsely, the Obama administration of trying to use the elections to topple the Iranian regime (to which Drezner correctly gives a WTF?).
The brunt of Drezner’s claim is that they have taken this Ahmadi-apologetic stance to new highs (or lows I suppose) in regards to the upcoming talks with Iran. But then he goes on to say the article makes “no f***ing sense whatsoever.” Which while colorful is not true. In the process Drezner I think misses some really insightful thinking on this subject.
The Leverett article makes a great deal of sense IF one has a different frame of mind about who runs the shows in Iran than Drezner does.
Here’s a ‘graf from the Leverett piece that Dan quotes:
American officials tend to play down Iranian concerns about American intentions, citing public messages from President Obama to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, as proof of the administration’s diplomatic seriousness. But Tehran saw these messages as attempts to circumvent Iran’s president — another iteration, in a pattern dating from Ronald Reagan’s Iran-Contra scandal, of American administrations trying to create channels to Iranian “moderates” rather than dealing with the Islamic Republic as a system.
Drezner’s response:
Wow again. See, I would view these exchanges with Khamenei as attempts to talk to the person with actual control over Iran’s nuclear program, as opposed to the guy who rants on and on about how the Holocaust was just a big myth. Indeed, the Obama administration is “dealing with the Islamic Republic as a system” — and they are trying to talk to the people with genuine foreign policy power. The Leveretts, on the other hand, seem to be convinced that the only way to talk with Iran is through Ahmadinejad.
Now this notion that Khamenei is the man in charge was correct for a long time, but it is unclear that it is any longer the case. Since the (fraudulent) election, Khamenei may no longer be in power. The real power very likely now lies with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) whom Ahmadinejad is the mouthpiece for. At the very least if Supreme Leader (perhaps now ironically written) Khamenei is not a puppet then he has certainly hitched his political wagon completely to Ahmadinejad. He gave up any shred of neutrality/legitimacy he had remaining by so quickly pronouncing Mahmoud the winner of the Presidential election.
So the Leveretts’ contacts with Ahmadinejad–apologetic mouthpieces or not–are very likely giving us access to the actual thinking of the regime. Again can’t know that for sure, but it’s very probable (and certainly makes some f’in sense at the very least). If Ahmadinejad is the mouthpiece for the IRGC and the Leveretts are the mouthpiece for Ahmadinejad then you get the drift….(Socrates is mortal and it may actually help to listen to this point of view when deciding on a course of action).
What the Leveretts are ultimately arguing is that sanctions against Iran will not work. If you read Dan’s piece he’s more open to the idea that they will. I’m probably more in the Leverett camp on this one. The Leveretts are also correct that this upcoming meeting with Iran will not involve an actual diplomatic offer but rather an ultimatum. The ‘offer’ such as it is, is entirely based on the principle of “we’re in charge, if you follow our rules and play nice, then you’ll get some goodies.” We’ll see, but I have a hard time imagining that will work, new nuclear site revealed or no.
Meaning I think at this point continuing down the sanctions route (which I believe has little to no chance to succeed) will inevitably lead to one of two outcomes: war or a nuclear armed Iran. For a long time, I’ve thought the second option the likely one, but my fear is that by ratcheting up on the sanction and Axis of Evil path oh this last decade, and all the declarations about never being able to live with a nuclear-armed Iran is tipping the balance towards the first option.
The Leverett alternative–which Flynt wrote about years ago–was a comprehensive deal a la Nixon goes to China.
To my mind, this is the central ‘graf in the Leverett op-ed, one which suggests that the US has, whatever its outreach to Khamenei (and the Iranian people generally) not really dealt with the Iranian system’s interests:
Absent some agreement with Washington on its long-term goals, Iran’s national security strategy will continue emphasizing “asymmetric” defense against perceived American encirclement. Over several years, officials in both the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami and the conservative Ahmadinejad administration have told us that this defensive strategy includes cultivating ties to political forces and militias in other states in the region, developing Iran’s missile capacity (as underscored by this weekend’s tests of medium-range missiles), and pushing the limits of Tehran’s nonproliferation obligations to the point where it would be seen as having the ability and ingredients to make fission weapons. It seems hardly a coincidence that Iran is accused of having started the Qum lab in 2005 — precisely when Tehran had concluded that suspending enrichment had failed to diminish American hostility.
You can read this as an apologia/defense of terrorism and Iranian totalitarianism or you could read it (as I do) as fundamentally correct in its analytic assessment regardless of one’s like/dislike of the regime. And from that point of view, from the point of view of those in power wanting to stay in power then their approach has tactically (and I would argue strategically) been quite shrewd. That’s admittedly a more cold-blooded political calculation but there it is. It has come at the cost of economic hardship and sanctions–which absent its crushing dissent and oppression of its own people–nearly toppled the regime. But my guess at this point is that they are more heavily embedded/locked into power than they were before.
Both reformist and hardliner camps have the same basic attitude towards current US policy (which is perceived by both parties as encirclement and seeking regime change). That someone like Mousavi wanted Ahmadinejad to shut his mouth concerning his appalling views on the Holocaust doesn’t change this fundamental calculus however.
Attacks on Iran will certainly continue the shelf life of this otherwise dying regime. It will rally the populace behind the administration. Whether would or not is not clear. But sanctions would have to come from everyone–including China and Russia. And I have a hard time imagining China, who gets its oil from Iran, wanting to risk its entire economic, political, and social future, on some US promises of a better world future without the current Iranian leadership.
In that light listen to Bob Baer on Hardball (basically ignore Michael Rubin) about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran. [Ed: For some reason I can’t get the video to embed properly sorry].
Baer says the Iranian asymmetrical options are ones that the Israelis and the US (and the world) are not really prepared for and would be seriously destructive. They can close off the Straits of Hormuz, have proxies attack Israel (Hezbollah and Hamas), attack US soldiers next door in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s an ugly scenario.
The Leverett counter-proposal may ultimately be wrong. It may be, as even Bob Baer thinks, that a nuclear armed Iran is an existential threat to Israel. But it does make sense. Drezner, where’s my money man?
Dierkes –
I know you’re a de facto Canuck by now, so I won’t hold this against you. But the $ sign and “bucks” are redundant.Report
I guess the 5 dollars needs to go to an editor.Report
What a minute, I take back my previous admission of mistake. Your comment is just another in the line of American politico-monetaryo-hegemonic thought processes. The “bucks” there is functioning like a (USD) after the $5. Because in Canada $5 means $5 (CAD).
Can I get a heh?Report
Part of the problem with bombing Iran, which too few of the war mongers neo cons people who take an aggressive stance get, is that success would be difficult if not impossible. And even if an attack was successful it would delay their nuke program, not stop it. I think Gates said it would only delay their program by 1-3 years.
“You can read this as an apologia/defense of terrorism and Iranian totalitarianism or you could read it (as I do) as fundamentally correct in its analytic assessment regardless of one’s like/dislike of the regime. “
You’re read is correct. What is amazing is that people let their dislike of a regime get in the way of doing an accurate analysis of their tactics and strategy. Which leads to the frequent mention of Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of the Holocaust. Yes that makes him ignorant by our standards, but unsurprisingly , the Holocaust is not the most important historical event for people to learn about in the mid-east. But it’s also really freaking screwy that people use ignorance of the Holocaust as a sign of irrationality and dangerousness in a country where a significant percentage of people don’t understand evolution.Report
The difficulty in succeeding in hitting the target is definitely real. But a lot of Israelis don’t take as seriously the fact that it would only be a “setback.” They point to Osirak, and the more recent strike in Syria — two cases which were thought to produce only setbacks, but in actuality functionally ended the nuclear programs for both countries. (I don’t agree with this assessment, and I think Iran is a very different animal — but that’s where the Israeli govt have their heads.)Report
I don’t see the Israelis actually following through. They like things planned out and they like big payoffs when they operate any further than next door from Israel proper. The Iranians have buried their bomb developments under mountains of stone and the stuck high quality anti-air defenses on top of it.
On top of that you’ve got the green movement rocking the regime from inside, you know the Israeli moderates are terrified of doing anything that would cause the populace to rally back to the regime.
The cost benefit calculation can’t possibly appeal to even the crackpots on Netanyahus’ right wing. They’re going to make a lot of noise about it but I don’t see them actually making a move. And of course there’s no doubt at all that the Americans’ won’t be doing it.Report
Not to beat a dead horse, but ask yourself — when was the last time Israel operated farther away than next door? Osirak — extremely high-risk aerial mission to disable nuclear facilities in an enemy state. Done secretly and after the express refusal of the US to give the green light. Sound familiar?Report
Max is er on target. (pun not intended). I’ve got to think after having seen the Iraqi and Syrian versions, that the Iranians have more sites, spread out. I mean they did admit (sorta sheepishly) that they had this site. That has to be a cover for other sites doesn’t it?Report
My understanding was that they admitted it because they had already realized that American/Euro/Israeli intelligence had uncovered it and were sitting on the intel for a good release date. (Which they certainly located.) But the real question is less about what the admission signals, and more about the fact that a “secret site” was ever able to exist in the first place. Discussion questions we should be having right now:
-How long was the lag time between that site getting operational and our awareness of it? If the answer is more than a year, we have a major problem.
-How large and how well defended are secret sites compared to those already uncovered? If the answer is as well defended, and as large, that’s another major problem.Report
Your understanding is right and the questions are very good ones.
In the Leverett piece they mention 2005 as I believe the start up date for the facility. That would be after the tail end of the Khatami regime was given a chance to make an overture to the US which the US declined. I think at that point (plus Axis of Evil designation) they went full on for asymmetric warfare.
Did you see the NyTimes on the differences between Israeli, Euro., and American spy agencies on whether the Iranians are weaponizing?
If not, here it is. It’s a very good (and scary) piece.Report
Max I your position but I think you’re underestimating the ability of the Israelis to calculate their costs and benefits. Everything I’ve read and every expert I’ve read quoted (as opposed to right wing idealogues) are generally of the opinion that Iran has located its nuclear assets under too much rock and in too many places for any air strike to do serious damage (and that damage would be paid for dearly in lost planes and pilots). This isn’t Osirak, where the Iraqi’s had no clue that the Israelis were coming nor is it Syria where they couldn’t have done squat even had they known. Iran would know if the Israelis came and they are fully capable of making their airspace very hot. We’re talking advanced radar and bristling anti air defenses. I’m really skeptical that the Israelis would consider it worth the effort.Report
your description of Iran is perfectly on point. but i think you may be outsmarting yourself when you talk about “right-wing ideologues” in opposition to experts. in Israel, at least, at this political moment there is not such a clear distinction. netanyahu was for a long time the leader of the center-right in israel, but he was pushed much farther right by the political developments of the last decade. his cabinet — the people with whom he will ultimately make a decision on how to move forward with iran — reflects his new political positioning.
like i said, i am in agreement with assessments that emphasize the extreme differences in difficulty between iran and iraq. i’m just not sure whether netanyahu’s cabinet is weighing them the same way that we are. what i am sure of is that he has not made up his mind one way or the other, and it would be a mistake to think he could not go in either direction, given the right circumstances.Report