Democracy, technocrats, and the EU
The European debt crisis is still threatening to engulf the world. But have no fear, the technocrats are here!
From yesterday’s New York Times:
The question now, in both Italy and Greece, is whether the technocrats can succeed where elected leaders failed — whether pressure from the European Union backed by the whip of the financial markets will be enough to dislodge the entrenched cultures of political patronage that experts largely blame for the slow growth and financial crises that plague both countries.
Some said there was cause for optimism. “First, the mere fact that they have been asked in such difficult circumstances means that they have a mandate,” said Iain Begg, an expert on the European monetary union at the London School of Economics. “Granted, it’s not a democratic one, but it flows from disaffection with the bickering political class.”
The elites recognize their means are inimical to democracy. They simply don’t care. This whole mess is quintessential neoliberalism. Take Greece. Here you have a cadre of unaccountable, unelected technocrats and other distant European leaders dictating the fiscal policies of a sovereign nation. The people of that nation have repeatedly risen up in opposition, to little avail. A large chunk of the electorate has registered its opposition to austerity in opinion polls. The embattled prime minister cynically proposes a public referendum, and international leaders and financial markets blanch. His (realpolitik) ends satisfied—the opposition has assented to the debt deal—the prime minister then agrees to step aside for an elite technocrat ostensibly “above politics.”
Whatever the European Union’s economic merits, the debt crisis should disabuse anyone of the notion that most supporters are committed to democracy. Part of this, to be sure, is inherent in a system with a unified monetary policy and disparate fiscal policy. If once latent or covert, though, the antidemocratic proclivities of the European elite have now been catapulted to the fore. The tension at the heart of democratic capitalism has also been laid bare, as Wolfgang Steeck noted in a flawed but insightful essay:
As we now read almost every day in the papers, ‘the markets’ have begun to dictate in unprecedented ways what presumably sovereign and democratic states may still do for their citizens and what they must refuse them. The same Manhattan-based ratings agencies that were instrumental in bringing about the disaster of the global money industry are now threatening to downgrade the bonds of states that accepted a previously unimaginable level of new debt to rescue that industry and the capitalist economy as a whole… In countries like Greece and Ireland, anything resembling democracy will be effectively suspended for many years; in order to behave ‘responsibly’, as defined by international markets and institutions, national governments will have to impose strict austerity, at the price of becoming increasingly unresponsive to their citizens.
Simultaneously admonished by financial markets and elites to get in line or have their democratic authority circumvented, citizen agency is increasingly an anachronism, an obsolesence present in a previous world dominated by nation states—not the new, flat world of multinational corporations and their elite enablers. Those in the developing world have been at the receiving end of this cudgel for years, of course. Structural adjustment was the euphemism, authoritarian imposition the means: Sell off state assets, cut the social safety net, and slash subsidies to the poor.
All of this relates to our recent discussions on democracy, in which most League denizens expressed a “pragmatic” commitment to democracy (if that): Popular rule is desirable insofar as it legitimates the coercion necessary in a modern, heterogeneous society. Romanticizing democracy is dangerous because it blinds one to its many pitfalls. Democracy isn’t an end in itself.
These misgivings are legitimate— democracy isn’t always a leavening force. Unchecked by institutional rules or a pervasive “constitutional conscience,” democracy can be used to eviscerate individual rights and, ultimately, itself. Opponents of popular rule overstate their case, though. The current threat to freedom isn’t democratic overreach, but elite hubris. Average Greeks have little control over their country’s fiscal and economic future. The forces and decisions that shape their lives are elusive and unaccountable.
There is freedom in delegation. But not on the wholesale scale the Greeks and others are experiencing.
It appears to me that the Greek people, like the people of many other nations, got the interventionist government they wanted which could give them the goodies they wanted. The failure to limit government power and what goodies can legitimately, and realistically, be provided caught up with the Greeks and now the government is dependent on the help of Germany, which now calls the shots. This seems to be the result of too much unlimited democracy, not the lack of democracy. Has there been a strong limited government movement in Greece which has been repressed?Report
Strangely, Greece’s welfare state is smaller, relatively, than most other western European nations. It seems instead that the Greeks got a government that tailored to their super-rich, allowing them to, among other things, get away with massive amounts of tax evasion, and it’s now coming back to bite them in the ass.
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No, relatively it’s about the same as the rest of Europe, 27% of government expenditures, with 90% of that going to pensions. I said Greece faces the same problem as other nations spending so much on government interventions in the economy. Greece’s system is particularly flawed and favors the self-employed. But my point is that they have so many unproductive workers on the government payroll, it’s not as simple as looking at the size of the welfare state, all of Europe and America are too high, and each will hit their own wall.. Greece is not creating enough new wealth — their problem is not low taxe revenues.Report
taxe is the Old English spelling. I left out a dash in one sentence. I am so sloppy.Report
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/welfare_chart_40.html
This chart shows where we’re headed. But we can print our own money, so there’s nothing to worry about.Report
When the Greeks (both elite and rank&file) start paying their taxes, I’ll have more sympathy for the “Poor Ol’ Sovereign Democractic Citizens vs the Big Bad Market”. The Greeks could have also used their democracy to state a preference for not joining the Eurozone 10 years ago. (I’ll blame the lying to get into the Euro on the elites, though)
The Greeks are perfectly free to go their own way. They are perfectly free to default and go cold turkey (so to speak), to get out of the cycle of debt and debt maintenance.Report
I pretty much agree with Kolohe. The reason the debt markets and ratings agencies have so much power over Greece is that the Greek people demanded government services without accepting commensurate taxes. The reason the EU officials have so much power over Greece is that the Greek people voted themselves into a fiscal crisis and are now begging for help.
Democracy got Greece into this mess, and I don’t see that there’s a democratic way out of it.Report
Well there are several. The Greeks could vote to leave the monetary union (and suffer for it) or they could vote to enact heavy austerity and tax regimes that are not easily evaded (and suffer for that instead). Or, they could vote to keep the monetary union but refuse to accept the austerity and less evadable taxes required and thus empower technocrats by default. They appear to be embracing option C.Report
If you don’t find a doctor who will prescribe you pain meds, you just go to another doctor?
I think Greece might be out of doctors.Report
At some point, however, the underlying cause of your pain lays you out cold on a street or other public place whereupon people without your democratic consent will cart you off to a hospital where they will endevor to treat the underlying issue.Report
By “democratic solution” I mean a solution that is workable taking voter preferences as given. In my estimation this rules out options A and B. And option C is really a technocratic solution, not a democratic one.Report
My point was that voters are generally incoherent, eagerly willing to dismiss options A or B and thus, by default, causing option C to occur.Report
I fail to see how there’s anything they can do that avoids some period of austerity and higher taxes. If they pursue either A or C, no one is going to lend them the money they’ve been using for current expenses. Granted that if they choose A, they could simply print drachmas (or whatever), but the resulting devaluation relative to other currencies makes imported energy enormously more expensive, producing at least the austerity part, if not the taxes.Report
Besides which the bond markets aren’t stupid. If you start inflating your interest rates will rise so devaluation won’t solve the problem.Report
Yeah, but you meet your pension obligations. “What’s the problem? You signed a contract that said you’d get 50000 drachma a month. There you go. 50000 drachma a month.”Report
Yeah, but the pension beneficiaries will demand the government top them up, and if the Greek government could say no to these people they wouldn’t be where they are now.Report
Reason is the province of technocrats. Voters don’t have to worry about such things.Report
It’s pretty easy to say that something is “quintessential” Thing X, when “Thing X” is a term with an at-best contested meaning that you yourself happen to be prepared to apply to the thing that you believe is quintessentially Thing X, since you know there’s no one who can authoritatively challenge that assertion (given that the definition is unsettled), and anyone who does will be jumping down a semantic rabbit hole in which there will be no clarity to be found. It could equally be that a case in which the only workable solution is a neoliberal solution (whatever that might mean) that requires democratically elected governments to defer to it despite the will of their electorates is not “quintessentially” anything, but rather an extreme case in which whatever works is what has to be implemented, which shouldn’t be seen as typical or ideal in any particular ideological or policy viewpoint. But then, who can say?Report
This whole mess is quintessential neoliberalism. Take Greece. Here you have a cadre of unaccountable, unelected technocrats and other distant European leaders dictating the fiscal policies of a sovereign nation. The people of that nation have repeatedly risen up in opposition, to little avail.
I think this is fundamentally wrong. The “whole mess” is a consequence of, as others above have said, people democratically demanding more benefits than they’re willing to pay for.. That’s not neoliberalism, but populism.
Essentially they kept trying to charge future generations for current benefits, and are angry that now they’re going to have to pay for their current benefits instead of foisting the cost on their grandchildren.Report
I think this is fundamentally wrong. The “whole mess” is a consequence of, as others above have said, people democratically demanding more benefits than they’re willing to pay for.
If only they’d behaved responsibly, say by starting two wars while cutting taxes, then we’d have no need to lecture them about responsibility.Report
What was the tax policy that followed the two wars that Europe started?Report
Oh, the US government is also being irresponsible, just not as irresponsible as Greece so it will be longer before the US hits the point Greece has reached. Only when it does there won’t be a bailout because no one has the kind money you need to bail out the US.Report
I’m not sure how to take that, Mike. If you’re just riffing off my comment and mocking American democratic policies, I’m with you. If you’re thinking I was making any suggestion that U.S. policies were better, I can only note that starting multiple wars while cutting taxes isn’t at all well characterized as neoliberal.Report
I’m making the point (which you’re probably getting tired of) that the budget problems in the US don’t stem from hoi polloi voting themselves benefits, but from neocon recklessness and the complete divorce between revenue and expenditures that’s the legacy of the Reagan administration.Report
Mike,
I half agree with you. The U.S.’s budget problems are only partially, and that the smaller part I think, caused by generous social spending because the U.S. is stingier on those programs than a Greece has been. The larger part of the problem has been excessively high military spending and an unwillingness to set taxes at rates that cover our spending.
But I don’t fully agree for two reasons. One is simply that this says nothing about Greece’s case, and that is what I was responding to. Neoliberalism did not cause Greece’s problems. Second, it’s misleading to suggest that the taxing/spending policies of the U.S. government aren’t in fact supported by large elements of the hoi polloi. That is to say, it’s a mistake to think that our problems haven’t been democratically inflicted just as Greece’s have. It’s just that our differing political culture led to a different set of unsustainable taxing and spending policies.Report
Second, it’s misleading to suggest that the taxing/spending policies of the U.S. government aren’t in fact supported by large elements of the hoi polloi.
True enough. The combination of
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The “whole mess” is a consequence of, as others above have said, people democratically demanding more benefits than they’re willing to pay for..
Given Greece’s unwillingness to collects taxes, I’m not sure the lack of funding for social programs can be pinned on poor people demanding too much. I think focusing on the behavior of a different class might lead to a better answer.Report
Nice post shawn! And you’re right that democracy isnt an end in itself. But if that is the case, then the mere fact that neoliberal policies often go against the “will of the people” does not count against it.
And as the above commenters have said, the current greek crisis is brought about entirely (or at least primarily) because the greek populace demanded lots of social services but refused to pay he taxes necessary to finance it. This would have created problems with or without Greece jooining the EU. their lack of control over monetary policy just closed off some of the ways in which Greece could have pushed the problem further down the road.
I also notice you are doing two things. You are conflating neoliberalism’s technocratic bent with the eurozone’s partial loss of sovereignty. Would you have as much an objection if the same policies were advocated by local technocrats?
PS. My first post has some things to say on this.Report
We need a new, real world Marvel superhero.
SuperTechnocrat!
or Progresso Man!
He could manage all the handouts, privileges, rents and subsidies in a fair and enlightened matter. He’d be the perfect blend of Superman, Robin Hood and Obama — but with a French accent. I get excited just thinking about it.
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Super Technocrat will be a libertarian (just ask James K) All the best policy solutions are libertarian-ishReport
I’m certainly an aficionado of a libertarian technocrat outlook. I trust the average person to run their own life, I just don’t think the average person is anywhere knowledgeable or domain-rational to direct public policy. That’s what experts are for.Report
Not all of them mind. Even most libertarians (except anarchists) endorse state involvement in things like externalities, the commons, force and fraud.Report
But I don’t think those policies are inconsistent with libertarianism.Report
“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves largesse from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a dictatorship.” – Alexis de Tocqueville
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In practice this tend snot to be the case. New Zealand’s government went broke due to to loose fiscal policy in the early ’80s. The subsequent reforms were controversial (to say the least), but we remained a democracy.Report
For the record, that’s not a Tocqueville quote, altho perhaps true.
http://www.lorencollins.net/tytler.html
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That’s the first time I’ve ever seen that quote attributed to Tocqueville. I wonder where you got it.
Also, you left off the last part of the quote.Report
Raising taxes would have stalled the collapse, but the government system Greece created which suppressed wealth creation made collapse inevitable. They could raise taxes now, and it wouldn’t help that much. Greece needs a free, innovative, business-friendly, vibrant economy which creates new wealth. Then if they all decide they want a rational safety net, they could afford it, but what they created set collapse in motion. If they default, Germany and everyone else invested in this system will deserve the loss.Report
The Presidents of the European Council, European Commission, and European Central Bank are not dictators issuing edicts from on high. They are indirectly accountable to the peoples of Europe, including the Greeks. Having agreed to the European project of pooling sovereignty, the Greek people have made a commitment to follow the rules of the organizations of which they are members – a project with both intergovernmental and supranational features. A project that at multiple points in time, in the past and in the future, requires democratic institutions’ assent. Indeed there is no path for the EU to proceed without democratic input at multiple levels (for instance, the European Parliament has become increasingly powerful in successive treaties). Thus “unaccountable” is inapt. Also, to call the EU supporters uncommitted to democracy is to ignore quite a few treaty ratifications over several decades, Lisbon being one.
If the EU or the eurozone apparatus conduct themselves in a manner wildly at variance with Greeks’ desires, they are free to denounce the Lisbon Treaty and/or withdraw from the eurozone. That would be an exercise of sovereignty. Having agreed to be part of the club, the Greeks may withdraw if they do not like the terms. But they may not simultaneously be members of the club and dictate to other club members new exceptionally favorable rules tilted towards themselves; lend us money on favorable terms, pay off our debts, finance our unsustainable fiscal position, these are all demands Greece is not empowered to make. The euro-crisis has demonstrated that this is a (protracted) negotiation and all sides (debtors, creditors, treasuries) have leverage.
The fact is that the Greek people have a mix of desires that European and Greek institutions try to reconcile into a coherent policy. You mention polling on the austerity measures running against, but there is also polling on membership in the eurozone running in favor – 70% wanting to stay in the euro (Economist). Altogether, the history of the EU, the requirements for democratic input, and the various (sometimes irreconcilable) desires of the Greek people do not align with the picture painted of unaccountable technocrats run amuck trampling the demos.Report
Sovereignty only goes so far. Technocrats and bankers have always had the final say. King John and the barons worked out their own deal, resulting the Magna Carta, not because those barons had any interest in democracy, though that’s how it’s taught these days. King John needed money to pay the ransom for Richard the Lionhearted and to finance his wars in France. But the barons needed King John, too. Without his unifying authority, England would descend into civil war. The farther the barons, especially Fitzwalter pushed King John, the hotter that civil war became.
King John died a few months later and the Magna Carta became a historical curiosity. Elites we will always have with us: the monarchy returned to absolutism and the barons continued to demand (and get) various preferments. The merchants became bankers and rose to power, holding sway over kings and nations. The Medici bankers followed the Pope around to collect his taxes and put a tenth of every collection into their own pockets. The Medici didn’t loan to royalty, knowing those debts could be stricken out by royal decree. The Bardi and Perucchi loaned to royalty and went bankrupt.
I’m not sure we can blame Greece’s problems on neoliberalism. The EU was stupidly predicated on two mutually exclusive concepts: national sovereignty and confederated economies. Here in the USA, the various states play beggar-thy-neighbor attempting to lure business from other states with tax abatement and other goodies. Some states receive more from the federal government then they put into the common pot and other states pay more. While times were good, the poorer citizens of the EU went to the more-prosperous states to do the plumbing and the gardening and the house cleaning. It was all a mirage, an ignis fatuus. The good times could never last.
The EU was based on wishful thinking. As long as some countries were able to foot the bill and make the loans, others were well-content things should always remain that way. Like the greedy bankers of Florence who loaned to royalty and came to ruin thereby, the banks and trading houses of our day have extended vast amounts of credit to government where they might have been better served to follow the example set by the Medici, who never did. Now the EU must foot the bill for their profligate neighbors or their whole silly scheme will fall to ruin.
To survive, the nations of the EU must accept reductions of sovereignty, electing financial overlords to govern and tax them all. There is no other option. Imposing crushing privations on the weaker nations will not solve their problems. A new Medici class may arise in Europe but I doubt it. There is no Pope or King or class of barons strong enough to hold the mess together.Report
Blaise, allow me sir, to change from previous post, ill-tempered to well-tempered. Um Himmels Villen! And here is part the Art of the Fugue played by the inestimable, once in a hundred years comet, Glenn Gould. I was so smitten by the ’55 recording of the Goldbergs that at age 14 I stole a car and drove it to his house in Toronto–a long story short, I ended up in jail, and then was expelled from school. I just wanted to see the visage and hear the voice of God. Doesn’t every 14 year-old?
By the way, this IS a true story.Report
King John needed money to pay the ransom for Richard the Lionhearted
The ransom was paid in 1194. John did not become king until 1199, and the Magna Carta was signed in 1215. Moreover, the ransom was raised by Richard and John’s mother Katharine Hepburn Eleanor of Aquitaine, while John was intriguing with Phillip of France to keep Richard imprisoned.Report
Before I read comments or comment myself I just want to say this is a hell of a post Shawn. Good work!Report