The Technocrat’s Burden
There’s been a lot of talk about democracy hereabouts during the past month or so. And I think that’s a really cool, good thing. It’s the kind of non-topical conversation that can be hard to find in the blogosphere that the League is often fond of delving into, to its credit. We in America (and this is true for the West more generally) live in a nominal republic that takes enormous, perhaps nearly spiritual, pride in the democratic ethos that permeates throughout both political and cultural spheres. But, somewhat paradoxically, that self-assurance can at times bleed into complacency or even thoughtlessness. We don’t always necessarily know what democracy is beyond knowing it’s us; and I don’t think I’d be shocking anyone reading this to claim that, often, we hardly even know ourselves.
It’s always important to have an intimate knowledge of what democracy means, what it doesn’t mean, what it provides, what it takes away, and its more general virtues and flaws alike. The writings that make up the intellectual foundations of Western democracy are littered with exhortations that a democratic or republican people must be educated, virtuous, self-aware, engaged. These are platitudes and even clichés, yes, but they’re also true; could anyone familiar with American politics during the last decade believe otherwise? As important as this kind of introspection is for undoing the mistakes of the past and avoiding the pitfalls of the present, though, I think it’s even more important as we look to the future during this strange, precarious, and transitional moment in time.
Without boring you by going Full Mustache, technology has radically changed the boundaries that separate one system, country, society, or people from another. (In fact, “changed” is probably not the right word. Obliterated? No, not quite — look to the Middle East for proof why. How about “severely diminished”?) With these traditional boundaries so severely diminished come myriad possibilities, many inspiring optimism, even utopianism. But one of the equally important consequences of globalization has been the increased ease with which geopolitics can be understood by looking at it through a lens of transnational class.
You don’t have to buy all the New World Order, Illuminati, Alex Jones bullshit to see this at play. Anyone who follows the Eurozone, or global finance in general, can’t deny that there is indeed a class of people who are no longer constrained by legal or cultural borders.(And, in truth, it’s not necessarily so new, either: recall that Europe, before the French Revolution, was largely run by a transnational nobility.) It’s logical, inevitable, and indeed carries with it enormous potential benefits.
For the human rights community, the increasing universality of politics has been utterly essential for attempts toward systematizing and canonizing baseline standards of behavior. The unsolved climate crisis, too, is another problem that simply cannot be solved with local or even regional solutions alone. As much work as there’s left to do, the world is less unequal, less miserable, less poor, less sick, and less uneducated than it was merely decades ago. For countless people in developed and developing countries both, the enormous reach of commerce has improved their lives, increased their opportunity, and broadened their intellectual understanding.
So I’m not trying to describe a pernicious, looming evil when I write that this kind of globalization, beside doing these many good things, also stands as a genuine and confounding threat to democracy. Not inherently, not unalterably — but still. We’ve touched on the negative repercussions of this threat when we’ve talked about the riots in Greece and elsewhere. But it’s important for us to remember that, as ugly, stupid, counter-productive, and regrettable as these acts of chaos and violence have been, they’re not solely the consequence of people throwing a tantrum of having their luxurious social services paired-down or taken away. It’s very much the case that not only what these changes are, but how they’ve come about has led to such enormous, unrestrained outrage.
And while the destruction it often inspires is irrational, I don’t think the fear is as well. A profound elitism and chauvinism has permeated so much of how political, economic, and media elites have managed the EU crisis. The constant appeals for a cabal of wise, “technocratic” problem-solvers to swoop in and clean up the mess would always strike me and many others as distasteful; but it would certainly be less insulting if not for the fact that, by and large, and for reasons good and bad, the EU is the product of elites. Tsk-tsking the citizens of various European states — be they Germans who don’t want to foot a bill they were promised they’d never have to pay; or Italians, Greeks, or Spaniards who were told that increased competition and lowered wages for their labor would be compensated with easy credit and the many amenities it brings — is buck-passing in the extreme.
But rather than inspire a greater appreciation on the part of many elites for democracy (needed if for no other reason than the necessity of creating a sense of public ownership of policies when they go bad) it seems to me like more than a few Masters of the Universe have responded to the events of this year, and indeed all of the years of the financial crisis, by imagining that whatever they were doing before, they’d have to simply do more of it, but better. Most of the time I feel like this is the subtext of various ostensible mea culpas or explanations for what’s gone wrong; but in a thread yesterday, bluntobject highlighted a Karl Smith post that was breathtakingly upfront in making this argument:
As I recently told a correspondent: if we are doing our jobs right then people shouldn’t even know that technocrats exist. They should never think about us. They should think about the things they care about; their children, their friends, their love interests, their dreams. If they know about the technocracy then the technocracy has failed.
There is no doubt that these movements – OWS and the Tea Party – are a glaring sign of technocratic failure. We shouldn’t forget that as long as these movements exist. Any moment that a citizen spends thinking about taxes, the economy, lobbyists, the capitalist system, etc is a moment of their lives that we have wasted and that they will never get back.
Time is all that they have, to burn it is to burn their lives away. It is to destroy the very thing we are supposed to protect. If you keep in mind that your ultimate goal is to induce a rational blissful ignorance in your citizens then you I think your ship will always be straight.
I think this is an amazing comment in a few ways, and though I find it disturbing — even horrifying — in nearly as many, I’m also sort of inclined to commend Smith for his honesty. But while it’s clear that Smith undergirds this worldview with good intentions, the above still reads like something from an especially feverish Glenn Beck “exposé”; all of the hoary clichés of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and the various half-remembered sins of the Progressive Era’s social engineers immediately rush to the front of my mind. What strikes me most, though, is Smith’s sense that engagement in the political system, that the running of our lives is, for the most of us, time “wasted.”
The implication is that Smith and his ilk — the self-styled technocrats — are little short of martyrs. Citizens are people, after all; and technocrats are people, too. If to care about the economy, taxes, capitalism, and all the sundry aspects of democratic self-governance is to waste our lives, whose lives are more wasted than the technocrats’? To Smith, it must be all the more tragic for the fact that they’re not even doing an especially good job of it! Designated as Protectors of Time, Stewards of Rational Blissful Ignorance (definition: unknown), the technocrats find themselves shipwrecked and surrounded by a crew on the verge of mutiny.
It says something that a very intelligent, generally inoffensive, and somewhat influential intellectual like Smith not only holds these beliefs in 2011, but is so comfortable expressing them in a public forum and draping them in the rhetorical garments of altruism and self-sacrifice. What it says might in some cases vary, depending on the listener; but it’s clear to me that, among other things, it proves that there’s good reason for us to talk about democracy. Those who can’t do teach — and those who can’t teach (and some who can) blog.
Great Post!
I think one of the interesting aspects of the technocrats’ attitudes that often goes overlooked is generational. I like to read http://www.generationaldynamics.com for insight on this. (The site is a little over the top, but he does a great daily post on foreign news items). The author argues that it is no coincidence that much of our financial and economic problems started at the same time that those of the greatest generation retired and left the top management positions of industry and government to be replaced by boomers (whose middle management positions, in turn, became dominated by gen Xers). Having never lived through a real depression or global war and having gone through decades of relatively incredible economic growth, the boomers convinced themselves (and us) that ‘this time is different’, that they knew how to handle the business cycle, etc.
I don’t buy that generational differences explain everything (as the site author seems to) but I think it is an interesting piece of the societal puzzle when looking at this.Report
though I find it disturbing — even horrifying — in nearly as many
is it the mere fact that the sentiment is anti-democratic that horrifies you?
The implication is that Smith and his ilk — the self-styled technocrats — are little short of martyrs. Citizens are people, after all; and technocrats are people, too. If to care about the economy, taxes, capitalism, and all the sundry aspects of democratic self-governance is to waste our lives, whose lives are more wasted than the technocrats’?
I didnt interpret his statement that way. Rather, what I think he is getting at is that people only think of economic issues when there are widespread economic problems. If there were no economic problems, then people would not be thinking about the economy all the time. Even though we think we have gained from thinking about economic problems today, that we wouldnt think about it if we didnt have problems indicates that there are better things to think about and do. The mea culpa then is just this. As a technocrat, my failure to do my job has caused you to spend time in less than optimal ways. (Also since most lay persons do not get economics, their thinking about it is all wrong and a waste of time anyway. But that’s just me not Smith)Report
It’s the paternalistic more than the anti-democratic nature of his comment that’s creepy.
But as to things being “better” for people to think about — you’ll have to do an extraordinary amount of work, I think, to convincingly construct a hierarchy of Things We Think About.Report
There’s a similar analog to systems administration.
If I’m doing my job, you don’t realize it (indeed, if I’m doing my job correctly, in the long run, you generally think I don’t do anything for most of the day).Report
Yeah, I work in a communications dept. Often, the only time anyone notices your work is when you’ve fucked up.Report
I think the question is, though, about whether we want invisible government. Do we want a society where the government has done such a good job constraining our behaviors to the point that crime is quite literally unthinkable?Report
Yeah, but who gets to decide what counts as a problem? For example, income inequality might or might not be–and whether or not it is is a political issue that should be subject to democratic deliberation, not settled by unelected men in gray flannel suits.Report
I’m not seeing the link between the democratic delegation of policy formulation to subject matter experts (“technocrats” in Smith’s parlance) and the rise of the transnational elite. These seem to me to be different, and generally unjuxtaposed, groups of people.
I do see that both have a significant effect on how democracies function. The rise of technocracy is a century-old phenomenon tracing back to figures like Chancellor Bismarck and President Wilson. It takes day-to-day decision-making out of the hands of the democratic process. There is in theory a democratic override and balancing of competing policies effected by representatives accountable to the electorate, but at the end of the day it’s government by regulation rather than government by legislation.
The rise of a globalistic class represents a migration of economic elites away from nationalism. Really, how could a class of transationals arise amongst any stratum of society but economic elites? But while these people may not feel any loyalty to any particular nation, they retain citizenship within at least one nation, and therefore will exercise political power there both as voters and as economic elites. This will steer the democratic portion of the policy-making process towards advancing the interests of the transnational elites, meanng that the (economic) world will flatten.
But these are confluences of events, events which have been a long time coming and which are not done playing out. Not all economic elites are transnational in their loyalties even if they explore money-making opportunities beyond their own countries’ borders. Nation-states aren’t going to go away and neither is democracy. Democracy remains a bedrock principle of governmental legitimacy, even in a heavily technocratic regime and even when the elites of a particular society are visibly cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic.Report
I don’t think there’s much distance, on the whole, between the highly educated and the highly affluent — certainly not in politics. To that point, the only stratum I could see becoming transnational the way the superrich are is the intellectual class — and, again, I think you see this playing out as technology flattens the academic world just the same as it does the economic.
As to the idea that things are as they are and as they’ve been and as they always will be: I guess. The question to me isn’t whether or not “democracy” will go away; I don’t think we need to get into such sweeping and definitive rhetorical territory. The question worth asking though is whether the democracy of the near-future will be commensurate with what we imagine democracy to be. I doubt Smith fashions himself an anti-democrat.Report
I don’t think there’s much distance, on the whole, between the highly educated and the highly affluent — certainly not in politics.
You need to spend more time among the highly educated.
Hm; this might be a function of how one defines “highly educated”.Report
Yes, yes, I know that if you have a PhD youre more likely to be a hippie.
But to have a BA or MD or JD or MB is to be highly educated, too.Report
But it does not follow that one is going to be of the highly affluent, as you define the term. (Affluent, yes, for the most part).
Moreover, these people in fact *are* the technocratic rank and file that run things in a society – and always have. (Back in the day they were they were the various scribes and astrologers that could tell when the Nile would flood)
And when they fish up, (which they always will eventually, because they are humans in human institutions) and it causes a populist revolt against the existing order – that’s when civilizations collapse. And that is what Smith is concerned about.
Sometimes it’s the witches, sometimes it’s the Jews, in the future its may be technocrats. Scapegoating, *that’s* Smith’s worry, because it always happens eventually.Report
The affluent tend to be better-educated than the financially distressed, it is true; and in politics, power does seem to coincide with affluence. I suspect that a correlation-causation confusion is very easy to make given only those facts. Education does not necessarily lead to affluence or power — part of the frustration that seems to fuel #OWS.
Speaking for myself, I’m well-educated, as I hold a graduate degree. But while I’m financially comfortable, I’m hardly part of “the 1%.” If I am, no one’s been inviting me to the meetings. I suspect that’s true for a lot of people here, both the credentialed and the autodidacts.Report
Speaking for myself, I’m well-educated, as I hold a graduate degree. But while I’m financially comfortable, I’m hardly part of “the 1%.” If I am, no one’s been inviting me to the meetings. I suspect that’s true for a lot of people here
That’s what makes it the 1%, no?Report
I can’t tell if you honestly think a plutocratic elite actually runs everything, rather than being one faction of the myriad of social, poltiical and economic forces that makes the world go round.Report
Well, I certainly don’t think they’re just one of the many players!
There’s not a secret order that decides everything; but I think power exists and it’s not dispersed equally.Report
It started in earnest in the 20s with Benjamin Strong, Montagu Norman, Emile Moreau and Hjaldar Schacht — the central bankers from the US, Britain, France and Germany — who controlled behind the scenes. A great book to read is Lords of Finance by Liaquat Ahamed. The book shines a bright light on what’s happening today.Report
My problem with technocrats is expressed most eloquently here:
Technocratic discourse ‘ventriloquates’ scientific discourse [15, 77] to claim
rational objectivity and to promote action supposedly based on reason and fact:
‘economists, political scientists and sociologists in particular have attempted to imitate
scientific analysis through the accumulation of circumstantial evidence, but, above all,
through their parodies of the worst of the scientific dialects…
The language of technocracy is a closed discourse that treats opposition as
incorrect propaganda [16, 80]. Because “incorrect” oppositional discourses are often cast as naïve “common sense”, they are pervasively denigrated by technocrats, and are tacitly supposed to defer to the more intelligent scientific knowledge generated by the technical elite [15, 71]. In this way, the pseudo-scientific language of technocracy legitimises its claims to power in matters that are uniquely social in nature, simultaneously silencing “common-sense” opposition by their claims to expertise.Report
I perceived Smith on a different angle, nearly appliance based. When you hit the on button on the coffee maker you expect it to work as advertised. There is nearly a appliance cultural phenomena of expecting an unwatched pot to boil.
Complacency to the point of being mechanical. Strange daysReport