Iranian Election Update
As an update to what I said yesterday, what might be happening in Iran is the first time that the President (on the democratic side of the country’s main power poles) is going for a full out naked power grab of this magnitude. It is unclear whether this is in collusion with members of the clerical establishment or not. I would tend to think not–certainly not the Rafsanjani types who’ve backed Moussavi. Ahmadinejad has previously militarized the parliamentary side of Iranian politics as no president before has done with his close alliance with the Revolutionary Guard, and now he appears to be using his Interior Ministry to declare himself the winner. This is a direct challenge to the Supreme Leader. If he gets away with it, then the democratic culture that has existed in Iran will likely go into a permanent state of hibernation. The country will become Egypt overnight: large scale anger mixed with despair, cynicism, and apathy.
—
Update I: An alternate theory that Khamenei was in on it from the beginning via the very smart Karim Sadjapour. (h/t Andrew Sullivan, who you should keep checking for all kinds of updates on this story).
Update II: (E.D.)
I just wanted to add to Chris’s post that this whole thing is extremely disheartening (though not surprising, I suppose). I had gotten myself fairly hopeful over the past couple weeks, and this pretty obvious election fraud is terrible. I’ve been watching the riots and videos of the civil unrest and so forth and I wonder which way this will go? More brutal suppression or a possible sea change toward a more open government in Tehran?
The New York Times has more on this and photos.
Update III: (E.D.)
Abbas Barzegar disagrees with allegations of voter fraud:
Of course, the rather real possibility of voter fraud exists and one must wait in the coming weeks to see how these allegations unfold. But one should recall that in three decades of presidential elections, the accusations of rigging have rarely been levied against the vote count. Elections here are typically controlled by banning candidates from the start or closing opposition newspapers in advance.
In this election moreover, there were two separate governmental election monitors in addition to observers from each camp to prevent mass voter fraud. The sentimental implausibility of Ahmedinejad’s victory that Mousavi’s supporters set forth as the evidence of state corruption must be met by the equal implausibility that such widespread corruption could take place under clear daylight. So, until hard evidence emerges that can substantiate the claims of the opposition camp we need to look to other reasons to explain why so many are stunned by the day’s events….
…
Perhaps from the start Mousavi was destined to fail as he hoped to combine the articulate energies of the liberal upper class with the business interests of the bazaar merchants. The Facebook campaigns and text-messaging were perfectly irrelevant for the rural and working classes who struggle to make a day’s ends meet, much less have the time to review the week’s blogs in an internet cafe. Although Mousavi tried to appeal to such classes by addressing the problems of inflation and poverty, they voted otherwise.
In the future, observers would do us a favour by taking a deeper look into Iranian society, giving us a more accurate picture of the very organic religious structures of the country, and dispensing with the narrative of liberal inevitability. It is the religious aspects of enigmatic Persia that helped put an 80-year-old exiled ascetic at the head of state 30 years ago, then the charismatic cleric Khatami in office 12 years ago, the honest son of a blacksmith – Ahmedinejad – four years ago, and the same yesterday.
Go here for tons of photos of the aftermath of these elections.
Go here for live-blogging, updates, videos and more.
Update IV (Chris 3:30 pm EST Sat.):
Trita Parsi, another excellent Iranian-American analyst, makes an argumet that supports my original guess. That this is in some sense a coup against Khamenei. Everybody’s guessing at this point of course. Khamenei has a long-standing feud with Mousavi. It could be as simple as that.
Or perhaps (elements of?) the Revolutionary Guards have initiated a late Roman Empire-like moment where they force the hand of the Emperor. The Revolutionary Guard in this scenario are playing the part of a Praetorian Guard fixing elections with puppet rulers. This is my guess–but it’s just that a guess.
The regime has now lost whatever shred of legitimacy it once had. Remember Iran is an Islamic Republic and while it’s now a full republic in the liberal democratic sense of the term there were republican elements (including by the standards of the Middle East generally more or less legitimate elections). They clearly didn’t try to rig this vote, they just nullified a likely Mousavi win and declared Ahmadinejad the winner.
If they cancel the results and re-run the election, Mousavi wins in a landslide. I wonder if we are headed to the go/no-go point at which either the hardliners relent a bit (and lose face) and have to make concessions or they go full on in which case all legitimacy will be gone and they will have to rule by pure fear/force alone.
Update V: (Chris 5:30 pm EST Sat)
Andrew just posted this comment from a reader. It reads, in part:
Unless there is a popular uprising in favor of Mousavi and democratic legitimacy, the fascist coup will succeed. In that case, matters will be far worse. Bear this in mind: Hewitt and Krauthammer are correct [ed: that Israel will bomb Iran]. If the coup d’etat is successful, the Israeli Defense Forces will have no choice but to act in the defense of the survival of the Jewish people and act to reduce the mortal danger to the State of Israel. Ali-Khameini and his stooge, Ahmadhi-Nejad and the Revolutionary Guards Corps clique are Islamic fascists, who will do anything to hang on to power. The Israeli Government cannot countenance such a group of people with deliverable Atomic Weapons. There will be war. Bet on this and take that bet to that bank.
Let’s assume the fascist coup succeeds (I’m not sure fascist is exactly the right term, but totalitarians of some sort. No need for hairsplitting here). Let’s assume the regime gets nuclear weapons–or at least as I think might be as (more?) likely they get to the point of a Japan or Canada where they have everything set just but just haven’t turned on the coffee pot to boil as it were.
Let’s assume all that. Why does Israel have to attack in this scenario? The Soviets cracked down on their own people and on the Czech and Hungarians democratic movements. They had nukes. Did the US have to bomb them?
I can imagine that there very well could be war between Iran and Israel. I hope to God not, but it’s always out there. But the Israelis will not be in the position where “they will have no choice” but to bomb Iran. Why do we assume MAD and basic nuclear deterrence that has held for 60 years all of a sudden doesn’t apply? Because the Iranian regime is totalitarian and nutso? Uh, well so were the Soviets, Communist China under Mao, and Kim Jong Il currently. All possessed of nuclear capacity and none attacked. In either sense: A)were not attacked and B)did not attack.
So why is Iran different? Because Ahmadinejad said he would wipe Israel off the map? Mao, Khruschev, and Kim Jong Il said equally inflammatory things, threatening total annihilation. The question is really: why do we really think Iran’s leadership would spend this much time and blood-stained effort to crack down on its own people in order to hold power—as the reader him (her?)self notes–only to then to turn around and destroy their entire country including themselves as would surely be the case if they ever dared attack Israel? Doesn’t the fact that, as the reader argues, all they care about is holding onto power, suggest that they want to continue to hold onto power and they know that attacking Israel would be the end of their lives much less their power? Aren’t those two charges mutually contradictory?
Update VI: (Chris, Sun 9:00 am)
As a possible answer to my own question (in Update V) here goes.
While not completely accurate, a simplified (simplistic?) way of categorizing this is that all of Iran is divided into three parts: Reformers, Conservatives, and Revolutionaries. All three of those mind you are still part of the Khomenist vision–which is why there are others who call for secularization in the country but largely they have no organized political power.
The revolutionaries–the last ones standing like Ahmadinejad and company–believe that the conservatives sold out the Revolution in which they took part in order to conservative-ly hold onto their own power and amass their own oligarchic fortune.
What Ahmadinejad did (or was used to do?) was militarize Iranian politics in a way never before seen. There were always the Basij (the paramilitaries, “morality police”, etc.) but they generally were up above the political process and answered to the Supreme Leader. Ahmad. is the first Iranian pol to gain a large share of his power base from this group. Remember in the election in which Ahmadin. won, Supreme Leader Khameni had originally backed Rafsanjani (the arch-conservative).
After Ahmadinjead’s election, a conservative-reform alliance took place. Mousavi, while he received the backing of the Reformist crew, is more technically a Conservative. Mousavi fought in the Iran-Iraq War, former Prime Minister of Iran.
So the question becomes whither Khamenei? Did he see Rafsanjani and the Conservatives back the Reformers and became freaked by the big crowds and joined the Revolutionaries in a last desperate attempt to hold power? Or have the Revolutionaries pulled a coup and left him basically as a puppet in their hands?
Ahmadinejad I think was always just a mouthpiece for other players, mostly in The Revolutionary Guards, who wanted to stay themselves in the shadows. This is my praetorian guard thesis of what may have just happened.
If that scenario I just laid out is at all what is going on–or even if Khamenei has switched his allegiance from Consv. to Revolutionaries–then there is a serious chance that Iran is headed towards some (mis)adventurism in the reegion. They’ve already done some, but the scale and scope could increae drastically. If so, this would partially a result of the fact that the Bush administration (twice!!! at least) had the chance fora buy-in for Iran as regaional power at a much lower level and stupidly played into the hands of The Radicals by adding them to the Axis of Evil. The sanctions may be now putting the squeeze on and perversely causing the revolutionary edge to be leaking out in all directions through the region.
I hi-jacked your post, Chris. I figure things like this – teamwork makes sense…Report
How sure can we be that this is a case of fraud? Barzegar has a point.
Tehran, which the Western media covering the election has reported almost exclusively on, contains about 20% of the population of Iran including suburban areas. Seeking to predict the Iranian election based on events in the city would be like trying to predict an American election based on the results in Washington DC or New York, or those of a Canadian election based on voter preferences in Toronto.
There is also the possibility that Ahmedinejad won, but the government still changed the results to make the victory appear stronger than it was.Report
Fair enough, Katherine. I would say that the numbers indicate something very, very fishy. But it could be true that they were inflated and that Ahmadenijad would have won regardless – if less confidently. Then again, why bother with that? Why make it appear even more like fraud?Report
Chris is right, though – stay tuned to the Dish because Andrew’s got update after update there… Sounds like Moussavi is under house arrest.Report
Katherine,
If you check Juan Cole’s post I think he makes a very strong case as to the fraud charge. Ahmadinejad ‘officially’ has won by large majorities in Tehran and Tabriz. Those are the heartlands of Mousavi’s support. There’s no way Ahmadinejad wins in the cities. Not with the increased woman vote, the urban educated vote. No chance.
The cover-up at this point looks very ham-fisted to me.Report
Thanks, Chris. That’s a very convincing analysis.
There’s supposed to be some sort of statistical method for determining if fraud occurred, where apparently certain numbers turn up more often in falsified as opposed to real data. I’d like to see that applied to the Iranian results.Report
Hi Chris,
With regards to your most recent update (#5), the idea that Iran won’t use nuclear weapons because other similarly bombastic regimes haven’t is pretty weak induction. I’m not Israeli and I wouldn’t bet my life, country, millions of lives on that.
I think the only area where your analysis falls short is in addressing the fact that the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas link simply has no analogue among nuclear capable states/powers. Remember how nervous the world was about Pakistani involvement in supporting terror attacks in India last fall?
That we can only presume that Iran wouldn’t be so foolish as to release nuclear weapons or material for a dirty bomb to terror organizations, is what makes intelligence penetration of Iran so key. If the Israelis and Gulf states are as blind as we are, uncertainty of intent makes conflict more likely.
I think your analysis about Iran’s motivations to not use a bomb make absolute sense. I think we have more to be concerned about regarding actions based on fear of the Iranians than we do regarding the actions of the Iranians themselves.Report
Doesn’t the asymmetry factor into the thinking here, even just a bit? Is there really a reason we expect Iran to “bet [its] life, country, millions of lives” on Israel’s indefinite forbearance, absent any dterrent? No matter what happens, Israel has a deterrent of its own (backed up at least potentially by that of the global hegemon). Iran’s rhetoric is undeniably bombastic, but is their behavior in fact much short of rational? Do we expect states to act irrationally on our simple request?Report
michael,
some good points. i think Iran’s behavior in the region has been fairly rational–from the standpoint of the maintenance of their regime.Report
Nukes aren’t what they’ll use to put down the revolution.Report
Meaning, yes the regime wants to sustain itself in power, and for this one that increasingly looks like it involves violent (though obviously conventional) suppression of domestic dissent. But any government can be expected to look to take rational steps to deter or repel violent intervention from without. And when the most likely suspects for intervention are all nuclear powers, well…Report
I agree with the points you’re saying, Michael. In theory, a non-nuclear Iran has nothing to fear from the Israelis, except maybe interdiction efforts to stop the Iranians from resupplying anti-Israeli terrorists. All in all, a fairly low risk, low key exchange.
However, what happened to Iraq is about as a big a foreign-focused argument there is for why the Iranians want to/should rationally pursue nuclear weapons.
Domestically, I don’t think we can discount the potential payoffs in terms of pride and nationhood. Becoming a nuclear power is an expression of Iranian technological and intellectual capacity. Which, I also think is why the Iranians chaff at what we view as compromises, a nuclear power program with inspections.
The American capacity to demand the unreasonable and irrational from foreign powers never ceases to astound me, that is until I realize that it’s about 90% motivated to assuage domestic and allied constituencies and about 10% actual foreign policy (see: China)Report
Straight-up, Kyle. Although I actually don’t really have a problem with us making the requests (hypocrisy is one of our best colors, after all). It’s just when we actually pretend to ourselves that they have a reason to oblige that I start to get a little woozy.Report
Kyle,
Hey. I think you are definitely right that the fear of what we think they are up to–like our paranoid fantasies in the Cold War–could easily lead to some horrible results.
Also, the Iranian regime’s connection to Hezb., Hamas, etc. is definitely a factor. But Hezbollah has now accepted a parliamentary loss. Javier Solana just met with one of their guys. They stayed out of the Hamas-Israel war.
But anyway I think the point remains. If there were ever an attack on Israel it doesn’t exactly matter if it were smuggled via Syria into some Islamic Jihad terrorist cell or something. Everybody would know and blame Iran and they would receive the retaliation.
In which case the question I still think is why mutually assured destruction does not hold? Because undoubtedly the US, post an attack on Israel situation, would let loose a barrage the likes of which humanity has never seen before. It would involve destruction on a level I don’t even want to contemplate.
If some like Khamenei in the clerical elite have pulled a coup against other clerics, then the conservative element factors in. The more dangerous possibility is that this is a military coup. In that case, I think the region could get very roiled easily, even minus the nuclear question.Report
Hmmm…I guess what I’m having a hard time with is figuring out whether MAD is some sort of static strategic point between nuclear powers or just one that lends itself well to describing the tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as between Pakistan and India. Which of course may falsely presume that MAD worked in the first place.
I also have a lot of faith in McNamara’s Lesson #2: Rationality Will Not Save Us.
-Bob McNamara in Fog of War
There is a second question – I didn’t mention in my earlier comment but it’s just as important as will Iran or won’t they. That is, what will command and control of any Iranian nukes look like and who will control them. I’d be willing to bet that the Iranians don’t even know the answer to that question.Report
Kyle,
Excellent points.
1. I wouldn’t trust McNamara that the aforementioned individuals were particularly rational. You can read Arsenals of Folly by Richard Rhodes to see that one. The Cold War was suffused in irrationality, paranoia, and the like. On both sides. So this gets back to your point about the Iranian regime not having a clear sense of what the West is up to and vice versa. And of course India and Pakistan came to the brink as well. So undoubtedly you’re right it could get dicey.
That is assuming they acquire a nuclear weapon. I still wonder if they would deal for everything but the nuke (but we could get one tomorrow if you threaten us) kinda situation. That would obviate your second point. Nevertheless if they do, then certainly protections/fail safes and all the rest come into play. It could be dealt with–maybe through the Russians or Chinese?Report
My thoughts on Iran have been swirling all weekend. Broadly, I have been reflecting on the way this spectacle renews the lesson I seem to have to relearn periodically about the importance for us here in ‘the city on the hill’ of managing our expectations for the rest world. Hard realities and so on.
If it is not clear yet, it suspect it will be clear by noon tomorrow (Monday) that this weekend has dealt a severe blow to the Obama program of engagement with Iran, and potentially even to his broader vision of engagement toward ‘the Muslim world’ outlined last week. Not on the merits but in terms of the swing of conventional and elite opinion on the question. I hope I am proved wrong about that, but I think it is likely that the narrative of a young president displaying hope and optimism only to be presented with a response such as this will be too much for a cynical media to pass up. Should that happen, it will be worth asking oursleves whther it had to be the case.
First of all a counterfactual: a legitimate Ahmadinejad victory. Would it have backlashed against the engagement initiaive as much as I expect the events that did transpire will? It is true that this is rather moot, as it appears such a victory was utterly out of the question. But had it appeared less clear that Ahmadinejad would lose (or conversely less likely that Mousavi was going to win, or at least force a run-off), would a legit Ahmad. win in fact have been a more desirable outcome for those of us hoping for engagement than what we have seen? On balance I think it would. Of course, we didn’t know what was in store. But in retrospect, it appears to me that the spectacle of the ‘green wave’ served primarily to bring greater Western media and chatteringclass attention to Iran’s elections than had a landslide Ahmadinejad victory been both expected and observed. Western hopes and expectations for major change in Iran were only heightened due that attention, and it seems that we have arrived at the worst of all possible outcomes: maximum international attention to a horrendous, anti-democratic spectacle of tyranny. (The coup language is curious, as a coup is something that happens to a paty in power, not that is done by one. This is an anti-constitutional — depending on Iran’s constitution — act of tyranny.)
Greater attention would also have magnified the effects in the West of a legitimate Ahmadinejad victory, of course. But I think what we have witnessed instead lends a special kind of (let me be clear: public relations) rebuke to Obama’s approach, an approach which I still unequivocally approach.
Expectation games are very difficult to win (though the Republicans seem to have little problem winning them consistently). I probably sound preachy: I should make clear I was not on the right side of my own 20/20-hindsight advice here. I was, with E.D., quite (expectantly) hopeful. (The ‘expectant’ part being key; simply having a preference and hoping for it to carry the day is of course part and parcel of any democratic process.) But I can say that as I observed my optimism rising, I made a note of wondering whether my experience was unique (it wasn’t, of course), and what the consequences of my (our) rising expectations, relative to unchanged or diminished ones, might be should the hoped-for outcome not come to pass? The standard fare from the usual suspects, I predicted. I certainly didn’t foresee a coup-in-reverse. But I did note, along with my rising expectations and foreboding about what they might entail, that I had absolutely no idea how much confidence to place in the transparency of any part of Iran’s election system: vote, vote-count, reporting, official deferrence to results, etc. So the question is, tomorrow morning, are we looking at the usual carping from the usual quarters, as we might have had had Ahmad. won outright (even with raised expectations), or are we looking at a changed foreign-policy-opinion landscape? We’ll know in a few hours.
Either way, given the above, and given the fact that a change in the office of president of Iran is to begin with rather less significant an event than we might think it is or wish it were, it seems clear that this is a case of a learning tough lesson the hard (we know not yet how hard) way.
Oh well, so it goes.Report
One last thing: I was initially very skeptical about reports of fraud on this scale. Not because I doubted it as unlikely, but merely because therre seemed to be just no way to confirm any facts at all, and absent that there’s nothing to conclude beyond that what is being announced is being announced. So I waited and thougth about what a stolen election might mean if it were true. I finally came to accept that the election was stolen after hearing about Mousavi’s having been informed of his victory before the announcemt to the contrary, which was apparently corroborated by dissident Interior Ministry employees. Fair enough, I thought — and eventually arrived at the above.
Well, not so fast perhaps? Here are two American pollsters writing in the Washington Post that the results are consistent with their surveys:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061401757.html?hpid=opinionsbox1.
Whatever the true facts, we can certainly count of the usual excuses for continued standoffishness from those bent on war. At this point, I think it is no longer particularly important for U.S. purporses what actually went down (to the Iranians it is life and death, of course). The spectacle is the spectacle, and will have the impact it will have. We shall see.Report
…and then again, Prof. Cole is having none of it:
http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/terror-free-tomorro-poll-did-not.html#comments.Report
Michael,
Events are very fluid at this point. As of this morning the Revolution is starting to gain. If they can pull off the mass strike that Mousavi’s wife called for that could be it.
There had been talk before all this of what happens after Khamenei–he’s getting up there and is apparently sick. The main theory was that there would be something like the Guardian Council or a Council of Clerics. I could imagine this result coming to pass.Report
Chris, thanks. My background doesn’t allow me to quickly interpret what little info we are getting, so I appreciate your providing that. It does seem that my questioning whether we are seeing a coup take place is a decidedly minority viewpoint this morning. I read all your updates, but the notion that this was a movement by the IRGC against Khamenei’s authority somehow didn’t sink in. If that’s happening, that would obviously qualify as a coup d’etat to the extent it fully moves authority from one faction to another.Report