The Spanish Civil War: A Product of Appeasement
The Spanish Civil War was a product of appeasement. The policies of Britain and other European powers that lead to Hitler’s rise and eventual expansion come to fruition. Appeasement also conveniently played to the interests of the capitalist class who preferred the fascists to the Spanish republic’s socialist policies. The democratically elected left-leaning Republican government was subsequently left to fend off its fascist usurpers without aid.
Although not an illustration in the graphic sense, Paul Preston’s “The Spanish Civil War: An Illustrated Chronicle 1936-39” outlines the factors that led to the eventual victory of Franco and his fascist compatriots.
As a new student to the history of the Spanish Civil War, Preston’s book was an excellent introduction. The length, digestible format, photographic documentation, and combo of extensive details coupled with broad themes culminated in an exhilarating read. If the growth of fascism pre-WWII interests you, then this is a worthwhile read.
It did surprise me how much I did not know about the Spanish Civil War. It’s as if all trace of it is scrubbed from historical summaries of the leadup to WWII. As mentioned already, the far-right military coup factored into policies of appeasement. Policies that allowed Hitler and Mussolini to gain traction and strength also applied to the rising fascist movement in Spain, and Francisco Franco specifically. Britain and France spearheaded non-intervention in the civil war, along with twenty-seven other nations. Britain’s conservative party, elites, and media advocated neutrality, militantly. Warships were sent to intercept arms shipments, and volunteering to fight in the Civil War was considered a crime. Although, that didn’t stop around four-thousand volunteers from going anyway. France, on the other hand was a little more fluid with its stance. Conflict between French Prime Minister Léon Blum, the leftist “popular front” government, and right-wing politicians over possible intervention in the civil war was a constant. Despite signing the non-intervention agreement with Britain in August of 1936, Blum would send military aircraft and pilots from August through December of that year. Spanish Nationalists would be continually wary about the possibility of French intervention, even after French supplies ended.
The Soviet Union, despite signing the non-intervention agreement (along with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy) disregarded it in favor of arming the republican forces (Both Germany and Italy disregarded the agreement too, to support the nationalists). Communist organizations made up a large part of the republican war effort. In fact, communist (and socialist) involvement was routinely used by various European powers as an excuse for neutrality, and subtle support for nationalist forces.
The USSR’s support for the republicans was moderated by Stalin’s wish not to anger European nations into action. Painting the governmental force as chiefly democratic and republican was viewed as essential in Stalin’s eyes to encourage European support. Liberal politicians, and their capitalist backers, were cautious of the spread of communism and Stalin did not wish to exacerbate their fear. Stalin ordered the Spanish communist party to aim for solidarity across ideological aisles. Both to increase the front against the fascist uprising, and to downplay the role of communists and the USSR in the republican war effort.
Preston breaks down the various ideological movements and individuals, and the interplay between them, that made up both sides. Compared to other national conflicts, the Spanish Civil War seemed uniquely diverse in its number of actors and movements. Could be my personal perception. But regardless, the nuance was welcoming.
The Spanish communist party’s internal conflicts played into international communist ideological evolutions. It was during the Spanish Civil War that Trotskyist and Stalinist factions battled for control. The Worker’s Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) represented the anti-Stalinist, former Trotskyist communists. It was POUM that began to doubt moderating the revolutionary to paint the loyalist cause as mainly a bourgeoisie republic front to gain Western favor. Foreign business and political interests, they argued, knew Franco was a superior option no matter what the republic became. Limiting the revolutionary imagery only hurt the war effort against the fascists (the fascists were not moderating themselves to appear more attractive).
The Communist Party of Spain (PCE) was the official Moscow-oriented faction in the Popular Front. And as expected, led the charge against the POUM. Labeling POUM “enemies of the USSR,” “fascist spies,” and “Trotskyist agents,” the PCE began its campaign to silence the communist dissidents. POUM units were sent to the front with old weaponry, ragged uniforms, and inadequate supplies. George Orwell, commenting on the infighting said that “a government which sends boys of fifteen to the front with rifles forty years old and keeps the biggest men and the newest weapons in the rear is manifestly more afraid of the revolution than of the fascists.”
His words would continue to ring true as the PCE breakdown of anti-Stalinist groups ramped up. POUM fighters were rounded up by Communist secret police, as tensions between anarchists, Communists, and anti-Stalinists increased. Violence erupted after a National Confederation of Labor (CNT: a confederation of anarchist-syndicalist trade unions) central telephone exchange was raided by the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC: a PCE controlled alliance of various socialist movements). The CNT, POUM, and an extreme anarchist group known as the Friends of Durruti, fought the Communists for several days. Eventually the CNT laid down their arms once they realized victory would cost the war for the Republic. But to fully dissolve the POUM, the Communists had to go through the Prime Minister, Largo Caballero. He refused, triggering a vote that resulted in his resigning and the appointment of the Finance Minister and socialist, Dr. Juan Negrin to Prime Minister. According to Preston, this marked the end of the power struggle between the revolutionary forces and the Communists. It left the war effort in the hands of the Republicans and moderate Socialists.
It’s odd describing the Communists as opposing the revolutionary factions. It’s usually assumed the Communists are the revolution. Yet, the approach Stalin took toward the USSR and international Communist movements effectively neutered them. Stalin’s first priority was the safety of the USSR both domestically and diplomatically. Inciting revolutionary fervor was not conducive to cultivating happy neighbors. As a result, Stalin played chaperone (or a cautious father-figure) to international Communist movements.
The potential course of the revolution if it weren’t for Stalin’s suffocating grip is up for discussion. The role Western powers played in letting a fascist rebellion take place against a democratically elected government is undeniable. Fearful of communist infiltration coupled with a policy of appeasement and business interests led Spanish Fascists to receive aid, eventually overcoming the Spanish Republic, instilling a dictatorship that wouldn’t end until the early 70s.
Another great book about the Spanish Civil War, which focuses on Stalin’s betrayal of the Loyalists, is Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia.Report
Just finished it, and I loved it!Report
I don’t think the history has been consciously scrubbed. It’s just something that no “side” wants to talk about, and from which there aren’t many lessons to be learned. The primary lesson is the nearly-universal truth than in any alliance of movements, the one with the worst morals is going to become the most powerful during a conflict. (The American Revolution is one of the rare exceptions, which I think is why Americans are naive about wartime and post-war politics.) The Spanish Civil War had decent people with palatable beliefs on both sides, but the factions that exploited it for their own sakes were the kind of factions who would do something like that.Report
I have been thinking on something similar to this for several days. As absolute power is created in a state, absolute corruption arises. The absolute corruption of morals, truth, etc. I suppose this is because absolute power only manifests as the highest stakes condition that no one can afford to lose.
The current question I have is if the corruption leads or follows the march toward absolute power.Report
I guess looking at how/when the gold was moved out of the Bank of Spain, it happens before.Report
I think it is rare for the obviously evil to be capable of leading. Even the worst ideologies that manage to catch on do so for a reason, and usually there is at least some kernal of truth or a legitimately identified problem fueling the movement.
My own view is therefore that the path to hell is paved with good intentions and corruption tends to follow rather than lead. Of course I’m sure someone can point out exceptions.Report
I used to think that way also, and as I look back into history, it may have been true in the case of some monarchs, and some constructs of classical liberalism (the good intention was first, then came the corruption). I don’t think it continues to the modern world.
The democides that have taken place, and the current strategies. The one I find most in contempt is:
“to create a environment in society where the only solution will be (insert ideology)”
This some what creates the initial absolute corruptions before the march into absolute power.
I offer that, but I really hope I’m wrong on this one.Report
I wouldn’t limit it to “absolute” power. In the case of revolutions and civil wars, there are often multiple contenders, but it’s almost always guys like the Muslim Brotherhood or Lenin who make it down to the last two. I see it as a kind of natural selection. If there’s one seat on the life raft, and you have two monks and a convict on the sinking boat, odds are not in the monks’ favor. But any power is going to both attract exploiters and tempt those who hold it to become more exploitative. In fairness, there’s probably something like nostalgia that goes on, where you assume that the guys who didn’t get the power would have been more decent rulers.Report
Well said.Report
US policy in Africa went through a great many decades of supporting some freedom-fighting rebel movement, or supporting an embattled democrat who was fighting a communist rebel movement. It was always good guys (social reformers, true democrats, enlightened Western inspired generals) vs bad guys.
Then “our” guy would turn out to be a tyrannical autocrat or divisive and quasi-genocidal corrupt nutcase, which fired up a revolutionary movement to overthrow him, often led by a “true reformer”, who we then support, who wins and turns out to be as bad as the guy he deposed.
Our conclusion is that strong and successful leaders who rise to the top during a period of chaos and intense and brutal war have the wrong skill set and mindset to do anything but cause more trouble.
They rise because they’re good at motivating large numbers of people to engage in violence. They’re well supplied because they’re good at squeezing every last drop of money and food out of the locals they control, or at arranging black market deals with international arms merchants, and causing mayhem among their enemies. They’re in charge of their faction because they’re good at sidelining or killing their rivals.
The leaders who are the most successful in chaotic environments are optimized for at creating and maximally exploiting chaos. Poorly organized grass-roots civil wars with rampant street violence are extremely poor types of contests for choosing peacetime leaders, since the choice comes down to selecting among thugs. The winner will either be the Crips, the Bloods, Latin Kings, MS-13, Hell’s Angels, or the Sicilian mafia, and those are your choices.Report
To be fair, the Spanish Civil War is more multifaceted than “evil always wins” or simple conceptions of power and corruption.
Would Stalin have influenced the war so much if France and other ally nations had contributed support to the Republicans? Would the crackdowns happened?
Stalin was playing a double faced game of courting western favor by suffocating the revolutionary anarchist and various communist forces, AND expunging those revolutionary groups who threatened the disguise. To make it worse, Soviet Russia was the only nation who would support the Republicans.
A lot of the preceding comments are approaching Stalin’s influence and related power plays as inevitable. A mindset of “this is how it always happens” because of some invisible rule of the universe is dangerous. I see the lesson of the Spanish Civil War as this: economic and diplomatic interests will trump moral guidance, even when the smallest of action would’ve altered the war.
The Spanish Civil War luckily enough, for the allies, didn’t turn into a WWII. Yet the same positioning was taken toward Hitler, and that did end in one.Report
I agree that it’s way more multifaceted. I mean, it’s the last major war with significant factions of monarchists. No easy lessons, but really interesting, and neglected.Report
“The American Revolution is one of the rare exceptions[…]”
If you’re white, sure.Report
Not really. I mean, I understand your point. The Founders could have done better, if they’d been willing to push on slavery (which was, at the time, not solely an issue of race). And the Indians weren’t going to fare well no matter what. But in both the cases of the black and the Indian, treatment got worse as the Revolutionary generation passed.
I just don’t think you can claim that the Founders were thugs. Once they gained power, their main priority was creating a limited government which stuck to their original principles. That’s a rare thing.Report
I’m inclined to say that the limited government option worked very much in favor to the slave owners. But that’s tangential to the point I made below, and you could offer a good argument that the system set up, eventually, in 1787-1789 constituted something like a challenge to slavery and set the course for its eventual abolition in North America.
I do believe, however, the founders were thugs and succeeded through thuggery. The Theirs was a might makes right mentality, in my opinion. They (with some help from the French) had the might, and they were therefore “right,” however much they tried to dress their willingness to go against prior oaths of allegiance to the king as something else.Report
I get what you’re saying but I think this analysis itself suffers from a similar present-ism as pithy, and ultimately quite shallow statements like Zac’s. We need to be clear eyed about the founding. There were ideals in there that I think are still useful and worth cherishing but there was also opportunism, gross hypocrisy, and it was done by people with life experiences and moral compasses quite different from ours.
The way to understand history isn’t picking an arbitrary point in time (the late 18th century) and assessing it through the sensibilities of another arbitrary point in time (our own). History is a vector, and the path to the founding of the United States as we know it really starts in the Renaissance. Determining whether it constitutes progress requires assing it from those times immediately preceding it, and the world that existed then.
We can and should acknowledge what the founding didn’t do, and I’m not into hagiography or the cult of the founders. Hell we can even wring our hands a bit about the destruction of native populations wrought as much by the introduction of old world pathogens as anything else. But it was also an important step on the path to introducing civil liberties, modern conceptions of government, and the benefits of rapid technological advancements to more and more people.
So what to do with the founders and their dirty hands and hypocrisy? I say appreciate them for taking a step forward within the bounds of what was possible in their place in time,. Don’t pretend that they were saints or that there were no warts or compromises, but remember the virtues too. Anything else strikes me as at best childish and at worst totally lacking in perspective sadly typical of modern American culture.Report
While I wouldn’t characterize the “patriot,” so-called, side of the American Revolution as having the “worst” morals ever, I think their morals were suspect.
Their cause was, I admit, principled, in a sense, just not in a way that I’m willing to endorse.Report
The Spanish people were badly divided over the legitimacy of the Republic. The devote Catholics in the population didn’t like how Republican leaders went after the Church. There were lots of devote Spanish Catholics. The Republican leaders saw the Church as part of the bad old regime, they had to go after it. Allowing it to exist and function as it did under the Monarchy would be impossible to them.Report
Man. That’s about as riven as a nation can be, huh?Report