Constructing the Original Position from Scratch 0: Introduction
This is the Introductory post in a series of posts on Constructing the original position. Look here for the rest of the posts in this series
Hi all. I have finished the first draft of what is currently the third chapter of my thesis. Some time ago, in the comment threads, I proposed to Stillwater that once I finished my third chapter I would try to show how we could do moral and political philosophy by building a practicality requirement deeply into the premises. I also told James that I would show him an objectively true theory of Justice. Well, my third chapter basically does both (or so I claim). So, I have decided to post the first draft here on this site. Some of you guys expressed an interest in this project, and I hope that there is continuing interest in this. However, my chapter is 15000 words. If I were to post the whole chunk, most of you would lose interest before the very end. Now, even if I break up the chapter into 1000 word long posts, this will still take 15 weeks if I posted it once a week, by which time I probably would have to submit my thesis. I propose instead, that once people have finished with one post, even if they find that they have nothing to discuss, if they want to see the next post in the series, they send in a comment saying “next”. If I don’t hear any “next”s that means either that people are still digesting or not interested anymore. Each “next” comment brings the next post in the series one day closer. Otherwise, they are posted a week apart.
Before I start the series of posts, I would like to provide some background to the whole project. The original position,very roughly, is a kind of contract situation in which rational parties choose principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance. Whichever principles are chosen in that situation are supposed to be the principles of justice. Much ink has been spilled over what exactly will be chosen in the original position. That topic, while interesting in its own right, is not the one of concern to us. What we want to know is: why would we think that the principles that are generated by the original position (OP) are the principles of justice? Why not some other contract situation? There are various feature of the OP that stand in need of justification. Let me list them out:
1. The OP is a contract/choice situation
2. There is a veil of ignorance which
a) obscures personal identity
b) obscures the contracting parties’ personal features like their race, religion, sexual orientation, preferences, beliefs, talents, virtues, proclivities, gender, wealth and socio-economic position
c) obscures particular features of the society like
i) Demographic information such as the proportion of people possessing the personal features as described in 2b)
ii) Historical information such as whether there had been a history of racism, whether land was stolen, and even whether there is ongoing racism, what the particular institutions that have operated in the society are etc
d) does not obscure general information about the world such as what kinds of claims are generally speaking made against ech other, and other facts and theories which are the subject of consensus among the various social sciences
e) but does in fact prevent the parties behind the veil from knowing if any controversial doctrine is true
3.The parties behind the veil are:
a) mutually disinterested. i.e. indifferent to the fate of other parties behind the veil
b) maximisers – provided that they care about some x, they will ceteris paribus prefer more x to less.
4. People are conceived as possessing two moral powers:
a) A capcity for a conception of the good
b) A sense of justice
5. There is a list of primary goods consisting of various liberties, wealth, social position, opportunities, powers and the social bases of self respect
6. The parties behind the veil do not care (or care significantly less compared to how much they care for the primary goods required for survival) for gains to the primary goods beyond the minimum required for survival. They always prefer a gain to the minimum than a gain to the top.
My task will be to justify the various features so listed. Insofar as I justify all these features, I have justified the OP. If these features, as stated cannot be justified, what can be justified? How close is what can be justified to the OP?
How does Rawls actually go about defending the OP? He uses 2 approaches. The first approach is reflective equilibrium. The original position is ultimately justified because it eventually yields principles which cohere with our considered judgments about particular cases. These judgments are things like slavery is wrong, or that men and women should stand as political equals. Now, there are a number of reasons why I consider such an approach to be problematic. To go into the details would be for me to rehash the first chapter of of my thesis, which I don’t want to do here. It suffices for me to say that since I do consider such an approach to be mistaken, I will not resort to such appeals to intuitions or considered judgments in my argument. The second approach is to provide independent arguments for the original position. Rawls himself admits that his arguments are not deductive. A careful appraisal of his arguments show that the arguments are incomplete rely on implausible premises or fail to yield the conclusions he wants. Efforts by other philosophers to shore up the argument for the original position often fail because they make appeals to highly arcane and comprehensive theories most often some deep and arcane aspect of Kantian theory. However, Kant’s theory is arcane, and appreciating it is difficult. Even if it eventually turns out that Kant was right about the relevant things, because they are so difficult to appreciate, we cannot convince the non-Kantians among us that the theory was true. Rawls, especially in his later years deeply desired a theory that was based on premises that were acceptable to everyone. Again, here, I do not wish to argue this point in detail because that will require me to rehash the second chapter of my thesis. It is sufficient for me to just say that I will make no deep appeals to any comprehensive doctrines.
If you want to see the first post say Next.
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Actually, I have some advice.
Instead of posting pieces of a dissertation chapter, why not distill the important elements from the chapter down to something more accessible, state in, say, 2-4 longish blog posts.?
One of the things you need to think about with your dissertation (as my advisors explained to me) is how to turn some of the chapters into publishable pieces. This requires removing some of the “review of the literature” that inevitably sneaks into dissertation chapters that is considered “bloat” by the journals.
Another you need to do is to figure out how to ask the question -that you are sure to get at job interviews and the god awful “smoker” at the APA- “How would you explain your ideas to into/lower division philosophy students. (This is often a trap to make you seem like you don’t know how to present your ideas in a way that is accessible to non-experts, which is a big no-no for schools where you will do a lot of undergrad teaching.)
I wouldn’t do this unless you have free time. First write the dissertation, then do these bloggy posts. (Which I am excited to read!)
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BTW, never, ever, ever let anyone in a job interview know that you are a poster here. IMO, philosophers don’t have a lot of respect for the TVD’s of the world. If there were fewer posters here over the years, who were more careful in what they posted, it would be a badge of honor that you posted here. I really don’t mean this as an insult. I love this blog, but philosophy job interviews are an awful thing where lots of unfair stuff can hurt you. And this could hurt you, I think.Report
I’ll second Shaz on summaries rather than excerpts if you can swing it time-wise. I think the overly technical nature of a dissertation may disincline folks to read and participate, so summaries embedded with links to the expanded argument might lead to more participation.
I also realize you’re probably not sitting on a lot of free time, of course…Report
This is still the first draft, so it is still bloggy (at least to the extent that most of my longer posts here sound bloggy). Also, this chapter is basically one extended original argument. Most of the lit review stuff is for the previous two chapters. The reason why I wanted to present this was because while I was writing it, except for the length and perhaps subject matter I found that the chapter was very amenable to being made a blogpost. In fact, the kernel of the chapter began right hereReport
Good. Post away!Report
But, if it starts getting too technical, (and I may not notice that it does) do tell me. I will see to what extent I can adjust accordingly.Report
Do you mean philosophers dislike blogs in general or is the League actually widely known in academia? The first is only to be expected but the second would be pretty cool.Report
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Quick question about 2b and 2c. Do you mean to say that from behind the veil, we can see society, but we can’t see whether the people in society are black, white, gay, straight, etc.? I always took Rawls to mean that the veil of ignorance only obscured you from knowing anything about yourself, not anything about what society was like. In other words, I thought the veil prevented you from knowing whether you were gay or straight, not from knowing that people in society have a disposition towards homophobia.
Also, a question about 4. I thought that the veil (in TOJ anyway, maybe not JAF) obscured people from knowing their own individual conception of goodness. No? Would a neo-nazi, for example, under the veil of ignorance, take his conception of race hatred as intrinsically good (or whatever) into his decisions about what he views as in his self-interest? I’d say no; the veil takes everything but reason and self-interest away. That is why the basic structure we all would choose from behind the veil is “a rational choice” that is, in a sense, in all of our interests. This is fairness.Report
Quick question about 2b and 2c. Do you mean to say that from behind the veil, we can see society, but we can’t see whether the people in society are black, white, gay, straight, etc.?
So, people will know that there are black people and white people in society, but will not know what proportion of people will be black or white.
In other words, I thought the veil prevented you from knowing whether you were gay or straight, not from knowing that people in society have a disposition towards homophobia.
I’ll have to search for the Rawls quote, but IIRC it should be there. He wants to abstract away from the specific circumstancs of society in the OP. But, during the constitutional convention, he wants to put it back in. In my understanding of Rawls, he does this bit about ideal theory where the people in society are assumed to have the correct attitutdes (which are still within the boundaries of human nature). I doubt that he would have wanted the idea that the people happen to be racist or homophobes to affect what counts as a just society.Report
Interesting.
Why can’t someone behind the veil know that blacks are a minority, compromising X percentage of the population? (According to you or Rawls?)
Indeed, wouldn’t it be relevant to know that there are persecuted minorities (i.e. composing less than 50% of the vote) when deciding how to structure the basic structure of society? You still wouldn’t know whether you were part of the minority or not, so you would still take the intetests of the minority (on the chance that you were one of the minority when the veil is lifted) even if you knew the proportion of the total population that they composed.
I like the requirement about not knowing the proportions because it helps with the “what if I’m not risk-averse?” objection to the claim that we would worry about the worst off from behind the veil. But I think lack of knowledge about society, including facts about populations, is relevant to how we should create the basic structure.Report
So, Rawls is a bit skimpy in his justification.
***spoiler alert***
For me, the answer is that before we decide what to do about a particular group of historically persecuted minorities, we need to find out what to do about historically persecuted minorities in general.
You are right in that it does seem that certain kinds of specific information are relevant. So, you need at least two iterations. One where you lack the knowledge so as to develop a small set of absolute constraints. Then, building those constraints in and revealing this preveiously hidden knowledge, you run the contract again. So, we actually start developing what looks like part of Rawls’s four stage procedureReport
Murali,
It will be a couple of days until I can spare the time to actually give this thought. Please don’t take my non-responsiveness me ignoring you.Report
Is your Rawlsekianism post a precursor to this?Report
Yup, in that my current series will replace that first post, not that you have to read that to know what is going on in my current seriesReport
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Next, too.
One note, you posit these two assumptions:
3.The parties behind the veil are:
a) mutually disinterested. i.e. indifferent to the fate of other parties behind the veil
4. People are conceived as possessing two moral powers:
… (snip)
b) A sense of justice
I’ll note that while this is a perfectly logical set of assumptions, you’ve defined “justice” in a way that is necessarily not linked with mutual interest, by definition. While it’s all fine and dandy to do so in your definition of terms, I can imagine that anyone who discards this as a possible definition of “justice” will find the resulting argument compelling.Report
This is not part of my assumptions, but what I will be trying to prove.Report
Next.
Although you may need to convince me:
(a) That a “sense of justice” can be constituted without “beliefs” or “virtues.” This strikes me as implausible.
(b) That the participants will not acquire a sense of personal identity during the course of deliberations. Or that if they do, it will be one that somehow presents no difficulties to the argument.
(c) That demographic information is indeed irrelevant. Abstract political theory of course would like it to be, but in practice, it rarely is. What then is gained by treating it as irrelevant? And what is lost? And isn’t that a bad bargain?
(d) That participants lacking a sense of personal identity are nonetheless human enough to craft a system that would be found acceptable to those of us who, try as they might, are unable to efface their own sense of identity.
Some of these are standard objections to Rawls. Not (b), I don’t think, but anyway I’m fairly sure that the rest are, and I would be interested in seeing your answers.Report
Okay, we’ve got 6 “Nexts” The first post is going up now.Report