Book Notes: “The Enlightenment on Trial” (2017)
The Enlightenment continues to fascinate us and I think there are a few reasons for this. The first is that the philosophes saw themselves as engaging in a coherent project, which they propagandized for as something significant and world-altering. They saw themselves, that is, as making history and they were self-consciously historical actors. Secondly, their project feels somehow particularly modern. Even the debates of the Renaissance can seem abstruse and distant at this point, but the Enlightenment writers are hashing out issues like free speech, the natural rights of man, religious minorities, and how we recognize and establish truth- those things that still bedevil us, in other words. And finally the Enlightenment seems incomplete and ongoing, like something that began in the 1700s, in European cafes, libraries, salons, and printing houses, but will never be quite finished, touching as it does on how we understand ourselves, both collectively and individually.
The historian Bianca Premo would argue, I suspect, that we need to rethink those origin myths starting with our image of the Enlightenment as the work of caffeinated, hyper-literate European men, and a few women. Premo’s recent study The Enlightenment on Trial focuses, instead, on the “lived” or “practiced” Enlightenment of forgotten, subordinate, or marginal “ordinary people, even those who could not read or write.” Using the records of poor, unlettered, and enslaved people in the Spanish American colonies who took on their superiors in civil courts, she shows how they used concepts like rights, merit, and freedom in ways that broadened the definition of Enlightenment simply by seeing themselves as “juridicial actors possessing a natural right to litigate.” Jorge Canizares-Esguerra’s blurb, “To understand Enlightenment, go to Peru, don’t read Voltaire” is a bit hyperbolic. But, at the very least, Premo has made a very strong case for an overlooked battlefield in the larger war.
How did an ordinary peasant file a civil suit in the first place? First, the litigant needed to find an “agent” to write the complaint, preferably on paper with a royal seal. They often had to track down a petition writer in “the back alleys of the ‘lettered city’.” Here, I imagined a peasant wandering into a saloon in a spaghetti western, but looking for a writer-for-hire instead of a gunman. Premo does a solid job of reading deeply into the written record to show how the litigants were active participants in a process that was often handled largely in text. This is important groundwork for what comes later, however the first three chapters- on the process of filing suits, the new legal philosophies that moved away from ideas of justice to ideas of rights, and why the volume of suits increased across the colonies while declining in Spain- might be of varying interest to general readers. Historians will likely find them of deeper interest.
However, I was a bit impatient for the actual case histories, which come in the second half of the book. Here, we learn about colonial women who took their husbands and lovers to civil court for divorces, alimony, or better treatment, where they would previously have gone to priests. As Premo notes, “they practiced the Enlightenment in the very act of going to civil court.” They also “employed arguments about the natural right to self-preservation to advocate for the freedom to live independently from men…” In some cases, they shopped around, appealing to religious and secular criminal and civil courts depending on which was more sympathetic. In general, these litigants were moving away from a traditional culture of religious mediation towards a legal culture of rights.
Next, we learn about native litigants. Indigenous legal customs had, similarly, “favored conciliation, community adjudication, moral balance, and the multi-centricity of legal authority…” But in the second half of the 1700s, cracks appeared; there was a new “tendency to challenge birthright with arguments about merit and new articulations of custom and history.” The number of cases brought increased significantly at the same time as elite status based in lineage declined. Commoners argued that leadership should be based, instead, in skills and experience. Their critics, meanwhile, “lamented the coming-of-age of a generation of troublemakers.”
When slaves took on their masters they shaped the laws while “they were also making Enlightenment thought.” Critically, they posited freedom as a state of becoming, a state that could be reached by a slave. This recalls Kant’s notion that Enlightenment is a process of liberation from forms of unfreedom as well as Foucault’s idea of an Enlightenment ethos around human agency. But here, in the cases of slaves, freedom is not something abstract or theoretical. “In the end”, Premo writes, “slaves themselves were instrumental in plotting out the liberation theology that so dominates Western thought.” She compares this to the Haitian Revolution, in which slaves fought and died for notions of freedom and revolution inspired by Europe, but in a revolution which was treated for so long by western historians as something unthinkable… which nevertheless occurred.
Perhaps, the most important merit of the book is in demonstrating that many things unthinkable actually happened. Given that we see the Enlightenment as a process of liberation from traditional customs and rules, it’s surprising that we so often forget those marginal figures who most needed to be unshackled from the past and who, thus, fought with greater vigor than many of their more renowned counterparts. Premo’s book is a very worthwhile collection of battle stories from the front lines of the Enlightenment.
Next Up: A related recent book, “Litigating Across the Color Line: Civil Cases Between Black and White Southerners from the End of Slavery to Civl Rights” by Melissa Milewski.
Thanks again to Oxford University Press. Interested publishers can contact me about review copies at rufus138@gmail.com.
I’ve heard that the very notion of the Enlightenment was created as anti-Catholic propaganda – a distinctly inclusive and rational, Protestant culture, free from the papist yoke. I’m curious what your thoughts on this are.Report
There was a lot of Enlightment in 18th century France, which was definitely anti-clerical and anti ‘Big Church’, but in no way pro-Protestant.Report
From my study of the American Founding, Protestantism and Enlightenment really seriously bled together and anti-Papism was one of the threads that connected them.
You have a figure like Ezra Stiles who was a hard core orthodox Protestant at the time of the French Revolution and he supported the revolution when it started to get really out of hand and made rationalizations for it.
You also had Enlightenment oriented unitarians — Richard Price and Joseph Priestley — who believed in sacred scripture and prophesies like Daniel and Book of Revelation which they predicted the success of the French Revolution would usher in a millennial republic of liberty, equality and fraternity.Report
Thank you. Super interesting!Report
I have some issues with Jonathan Israel, but I am increasingly sympathetic to his idea that what he calls “radical enlightenment” basically begins with Spinoza and is much more strongly skeptical about religion than the “moderate enlightenment”, which even tended towards a sort of Puritanism in some of the Rousseauian wings. One of the things I found interesting in this particular book is that, even where they were more inclined to use the secular law courts, most of these colonial people still seemed fairly loyal to the Church.Report
I am massively heartened by the notion that the act of pursuing one’s rights in a civil court has been identified as the defining act of the average person experiencing and making real the ideals of the Enlightenment.
I am also massively heartened by the cognate notion that the kings and queens of the late Renaissance were persuaded to open the courts thus. A debt we owe not just to the philosophes of the Enlightenment, but to their predecessors the Humanists in those same Renaissance royal courts.
An open, independent, unbiased, and transparent judicial system, affording fair process and an opportunity to be heard to all, is at the bedrock of that concert of notions made real — the rule of law, a fair society, governmental legitimacy — which make up the greatest legacy our ancestors could possibly have left us and which we must consider it among our highest of duties to pass on, intact and strengthened if possible, to future generations.Report
@burt-likko
Well said.Report
Here here!Report
I’m going with Burt on this because I think all of those things were perhaps more secular while not being as anti-clerical as has been told. But my work rush ends at noon tomorrow, so I will be back with more detail.Report
You establish an ideal of universal rights, blind justice, and Enlightenment and, next thing you know, you’ve got the riff-raff arguing that this crap should apply to them too.
I’m almost scared to go back and re-read what Nietzsche said was likely to happen after this part. I’m pretty sure it wasn’t good.Report
The people at the time advocating those ideals *did* want it to apply to the riff raff.
There were just a whole bunch of people that didn’t believe in those ideals, and they had access to a lot of dudes with swords and early guns. (Until, eventually, guns became easy and reliable enough – and the riff raff became numerous enough – that the aters had to listen to the riff raff)Report
Other people’s riff-raff, though!Report
This will largely depend on whether you’re reading the actual Nietzsche or divining the reactionary Nietzsche of the popular imagination.Report
He knew there was no going back. It’s part of what drove him nuts.Report
No, that was syphilis.Report
There were multiple factors.Report
I’m skeptical about the notion that slaves in Spanish colonies were instrumental in whatever is meant by “liberation theology that so dominates Western thought,” particularly if that is supposed to mean abolition.
I think the history of slave liberation contains fundamental ironies. While slavery in some form or another has existed in all parts of the world, it died of apparent natural causes in Northwestern Europe (France and England) by the fifteenth century. Due to constant friction with the Islamic world, slavery remained a constant reality in the Mediterranean sphere regulated by a legal framework supplied by Roman civil law. The English did not recognize any such continuity with Roman civil law, had no laws regarding slavery, and none of its eminent jurists set out to even discuss the matter.
None of this prevented England from becoming a major actor in the transatlantic slave trade, but as the only such power that did not create an imperial slave code, the blank space remained open for continuous debate. This leads to the simple observation by Lords Mansfield in the Sommerset case (1772) that there is no law authorizing slavery, and the first state to pass a law to abolish slavery, Vermont (1775). And eventually to British Imperialism ending the legal recognition of that from most countries other than Haiti and the U.S.
When I think of the concept of Enlightenment, I don’t think about tinkering within the framework of millennia-old laws, but of something more revolutionary, like there will be no slavery.
Recommended reading: Seymour Drescher, “Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery.”Report
Thanks, I’ll check that out!Report
“An open, independent, unbiased, and transparent judicial system, affording fair process and an opportunity to be heard to all, is at the bedrock of that concert of notions made real — the rule of law, a fair society, governmental legitimacy”
Bares repeating.
the rule of law, a fair society, governmental legitimacy
lotta people don’t see that
Not who ya think though…
Great piece Rufas.Report