@chris I didn't read those comments as saying that "economics tells us that wages and average productivity are supposed to diverge" so much as they were saying that "economics doesn't purport to tell us anything about wages and average productivity, only wages and marginal productivity, and in any event it also tells us that wages are stagnating in the US primarily because they are increasing elsewhere in the world." They also claim that this is a good thing, but I don't think they're saying that it's a good thing because economics tells us it's normatively good. They're saying that most of us would agree that increasing wages in the rest of the world are a good thing, and that economics tells us there's a tradeoff between American (and really first world as a whole) wage increases and global wage increases.
They seem to think that this is a positive tradeoff as a normative matter. But more importantly, they assume that others agree that this is a positive tradeoff. Regardless, it is not economics that tell us that this is a positive tradeoff, although many economists would certainly agree on a personal level that it's a positive tradeoff - most economists are quite cosmopolitan in their outlook.
The rough equivalent would be if we said that climatology theory tells us that global warming is the biggest problem we face in the world and no expense should be spared to stop it. But of course climatology does not, in and of itself, say that, even though many climatologists would certainly say that. Climatology itself simply asserts that certain things will occur if global warming is not brought under control, and what would be required from an emissions standpoint to bring it "under control." It doesn't tell us what measures would actually reduce emissions to the target levels, and thus it can't tell us how to weigh the costs of those measures compared with the benefits of bringing global warming under control. It does, however, attempt to make us confront and recognize the costs of failing to bring it under control.
I read the comments in the other thread as doing essentially the same thing - they're saying that (1) economics tells us that wages are stagnating in the US because they're increasing elsewhere; and (2) attempting to reverse wage stagnation in the US would necessarily result in smaller wage growth (or perhaps even wage stagnation) in the developing world. They're saying that an attempt to reverse wage stagnation in the US needs to confront and acknowledge the potential effects of doing so on wages in the developing world if we are at all concerned with wages in the developing world as well.
That said, I think Tod still poses a really important and strong question to those interlocutors in his post here, regardless of whether it is economics or personal belief that tells them that the overall effects of this are good. Specifically, he asks why these same interlocutors are such advocates of blowing the whole damn system up.
I haven't seen that question answered here. I suspect the answer from two of the three would be, with a good amount of justification, that they're not advocates of blowing the system up, but instead are mostly advocates of preserving it with fairly modest changes. I don't know what the answer of the third would be, though.
Like Glyph, I don't have much of a dog in the specific fight that is the subject of the post. I will, however, say that the study of economics, in and of itself, tells us nothing - and purports to tell us nothing - about normative questions. In other words, whether the divergence between wages and average productivity (as opposed to marginal productivity) is a "problem" is entirely a normative question that economics does not purport to answer. Individual people with economics backgrounds may certainly claim that it is not a "problem" but they can only do so by referencing other normative values that others may weigh less than they. Indeed, there are surely plenty of economists that would view this divergence as a "problem" worthy of a solution (lest we forget, Paul Krugman is an economist, as was Milton Keynes, etc.).
So with respect to your original post, while economics teaches us that, all other things being equal, wages will track marginal productivity rather than average productivity, it does not teach us that they should do so. As importantly, it does not teach us that all other things are equal - in fact, it recognizes that all other things are not in fact equal, and thus that it is possible for even marginal productivity to diverge from wages.
Economics can then give us an understanding of why average and marginal productivity are diverging from each other and why one or both of them are diverging from wages. It can also give us a possible solution to that problem. It can also give us a range of possibilities for second order effects of that solution.
It is for policymakers and voters to determine how to weigh the likelihood of a proposed policy solving the problem against the likelihood of the possible second order effects, not only in terms of how likely those effects are, but most importantly in terms of how important those effects are as a normative matter.
But the key thing about economics is that it typically begins with the assumption of "all other things being equal" except perhaps for a small number of known variables. This means that its predictive value is very limited. It's probably an overstatement to say that economists don't do predictions; however, it's not an overstatement to say that they don't do predictions outside a limited range.
In other words, they can say that "policy type X" will tend to have effects "Y and Z," but they can't do much in the way of predicting the full extent of those effects and the specific time frame of those effects. About the most they can say is that a policy will have certain general effects in a vaguely defined "short run" and certain other effects in the vaguely defined "long run." One of the debates between economists of different ideological stripes is often between how much to value the "short run" and how much to value the "long run" as a normative matter.
At this point, as I say in my comment above, we have a very limited amount of knowledge, but that is a far cry from saying that we have no knowledge. It is far from the point that physics or astronomy has reached, in which there is quite a bit that can be predicted (but also still quite a bit that cannot be predicted - otherwise we'd have no further need for those areas of study).
In economics, there are some things that can be predicted. But we can't predict that one policy change will have a specific, measurable effect outside of a particular range of activities. There are just too many damn unknown and unknowable variables - the so-called "calculation problem."
There are also a good number of things that all or virtually all economists agree upon - for instance, that price ceilings (e.g., rent control) will create significant and artificial supply shortages of those products as compared to the demand for those products. Or that allowing competition between suppliers in a given market will increase consumer surplus in that market: http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7
Etc., etc.
But none of that tells us whether the other effects of those policies are good, nor does it much tell us about what the unintended consequences (or benefits) of those policies might be. Hell, it doesn't even tell us whether the primary objects of those policies is a normative good, although it is certainly safe to assume that most people would think that in most situations and all other things being equal, a greater supply of affordable housing is normatively good as is a greater consumer surplus (since everyone is a consumer).
We can predict at least some vaguely defined unintended consequences as well - for instance, we can predict that price ceilings and floors will result in black markets or will result in people trying to find ways of otherwise evading those ceilings and floors - for instance, it should have been entirely predictable that the result of a generalized wage freeze would be that at least some workers would be paid under the table for wages above or below the ceiling (black market) and that firms would try to find other forms of compensation and benefits to compete with each other for labor. What would have perhaps been comparatively unpredictable would have been the full extent of those effects, particularly on the black market side.
Similarly, it is almost impossible, based on what is currently known and knowable, to predict with any kind of specificity and reliability how a broad-based measure such as GDP or unemployment will look a year from now, much less a decade from now.* For the most part, we cannot generally forecast that a particular policy will cause a widespread recession within a short period of time - there are just too many other variables at play. We can say that the policy makes a recession somewhat more or less likely, and we can aggregate policies as a whole to say that they are likely to cause a recession - or even economic ruin - at some unknown point down the line.
For instance, we can predict that economy-wide wage and price ceilings (floors are usually less problematic) will eventually cause economic ruin, but we can't predict exactly when that will happen - the country, for instance, may experience a natural resources boom (I'm looking at you, Venezuela) that creates enough wealth to mitigate these effects for an extended period of time through black markets, subsidized imports of controlled goods, etc. Or commodities prices in the global market may remain unexpectedly stable for an extended period of time such that the price controls are relatively close to the "invisible hand" price. But eventually you're going to wind up with a drastic undersupply of needed goods and workers, an oversupply of shit no one wants or needs and, without economic reforms, you're going to need a pretty totalitarian government to keep things afloat.
So it would be foolish to predict that, say, "within five years of instituting these price controls/regulations, the economy will collapse and GDP will contract by at least X%." It would equally be foolish to predict that "within five years of instituting these tax cuts, the economy will boom and GDP will increase by at least X%." Now there may or may not be some predictive value in aggregating such predictions, but no one person's or ideological group's formula is likely to be consistently reliable - there's just too many variables for any formula or group of like-minded people to account for. And that's before we even get to the issue of true "Black Swan" events.
So we're never going to have perfect knowledge in the field of economics, nor would we want to, frankly - such perfect knowledge would mean that people had become automotons whose needs and desires never changed or were at least entirely predictable. Indeed, in just about every instance where a true centrally planned economy was attempted (ie, an economy in which it was assumed that economists could at least approach perfect knowledge), there has been an attempt to turn people into exactly that through pretty totalitarian measures.
But that hardly makes economics useless - that we can make vague but narrow predictions is certainly valuable to informing policy debates, and as time goes on and knowledge increases, those predictions can eventually become more specific and less narrow. As importantly, economics can give us an idea of how, if at all possible, to achieve specific policy goals without undermining other specific policy goals. Economists just shouldn't be expected to define what those goals should be.
*One thing I find interesting in this thread, by the way, is that it's the more liberal commenters who have tended to take the harshest stand against economics even though it is liberal economists who are vastly more likely to view the economy as predictable and manageable.
@rtod Here is an article explaining both how forecasting is foolish and not something to be engaged in by people serious about financial and economic analysis, as well as why they're about all you hear on the airwaves: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-11/my-prediction-your-forecast-is-wrong
Specifically, "the media loves them." And the media loves economic forecasters because they're good for ratings and subscription sales and pageviews.
The difference between economic forecasting and actual economics is roughly equivalent to the difference between astrology and astronomy. Simply put, people have always been obsessed with trying to know the future - about what will happen - far more than they are interested in understanding what is happening or did happen, and why.
That hardly makes economics useless, though - understanding why things are working or are failing (or did either in the past) is important for understanding what policies are most likely to be useful or harmful going forward.
To go back to the astrology/astronomy analogy, the study of economics has only really been around for about 250 years. It's probably not much further along than astronomy was around, say, the time of Galileo.
A more modern equivalent might be seismology - it's important and helps provide us with an understanding of why things happen when they do happen and perhaps what policies/building codes can help minimize the damage and mitigate the risks, but it's still poorly situated to predict earthquakes and eruptions with any kind of certainty and period of forewarning.
Almost everyone seems to think that Employer-based healthcare was wrong and a historical accident and bad policy.
FDR's insistence on wage freezes was not an historical accident. It was, however, most definitely bad policy. But I suppose this is one of those "building blocks" of modern America that I'm supposed to celebrate as proof of the superiority of single party dominance.
The ACA would seemingly be a compromise between the two sides
Which is why it doubles down on employer-based health insurance?
You'll notice that according to this data, black voters overall supported Democrats 89-11, well in line with the trends of the last couple of decades.
But then look at the numbers for "Race by Age," including but not limited to the 49-49 calculation referred to here. You'll see that in no age cohort do the statistics show Democrats receiving more than 49 percent of the black vote.
Obviously it's not possible for 89 percent of black voters to vote for the Democrat, but less than 50% of black voters to do so in any age cohort.
The "Race by Age" figures also indicate that black voters between 45-64 made up 32 percent of the electorate and voted 62-36 for Republicans. Needless to say, that's not even remotely possible on any level.
The only conclusion is that the "Race by Age" calculations are totally wrong. Looking more closely, my guess is that they severely mixed up the "Race by Age" calculations - the numbers for black voters between 45-64 are almost certainly the numbers for white voters 45-64. The numbers for Latino voters 45-64 are almost certainly the numbers for black voters 45-64. The numbers for black voters 30-44 are almost certainly the numbers for white voters 30-44, and the numbers for white voters 30-44 are probably for Latino 30-44, with Latino 30-44 being black 30-44. Etc., etc.
About the only "Race by Age" number that looks accurate is the number for whites 18-29.
@james-hanley Yup. I might not like that those "building blocks" were implemented (or at the very least, that they were implemented in the way they were implemented), but I also recognize that they exist and that people rely on them. Additionally, I know well the problems my own state has experienced after an extended period of single party dominance, have no desire to move to Texas, and long for the days when I got to deal with Virginia's then-divided government (see wistfulness for Mark Warner, above.).
@morat20 That's definitely a good chunk of it, probably even the bulk of it - that over 60 set is roughly synonymous with people who were between "30 and 44" when Reagan was elected, a group that Reagan won by 17 points, and in which Carter only got 38 percent of the vote.
I will add that there's two other potential factors: 1. Obamacare is most unpopular amongst that cohort, and not just because of partisanship - "keep your damn government hands off my Medicare" might have been a silly statement, but the sentiment behind it was real: Obamacare's ability to cut costs relies heavily on Medicare cost controls; and 2. anecdotally, I know of a number of elderly lifelong working class Democrats with....certain views, for whom McCain was the first Republican they'd ever voted in a Presidential election. Statistically, I don't know how much of a factor this latter is for purposes of this discussion, though - I haven't seen much evidence that those. . . . views . . . transferred to their votes for Congress.
I wouldn't read much into this. First, it's only white voters under 30 that Democrats lost by that margin, which is still better than they did with white voters as a whole. Second, Democrats still won voters under 30 overall by 13 points. This is only slightly less than their margin in 2010 - around 16 points - amongst younger voters, even as it's substantially less than their margins in 2006 and 2008. It's still a lot better than their margins between 1996 and 2004, during which Democrats never won under 30 voters by more than 10 points, and functionally tied the GOP (2 point margin or less) in all but one election. If we go back to '94, the Democrats actually lost the youth vote that year.
Especially given that this was a midterm, I don't think there's anything to read into other than that the Democrats' unprecedented dominance in the youth demographic between 2006 and 2012 is returning to more historical levels.
I'm mostly apathetic, if that helps. I'll be marginally annoyed if Mark Warner winds up losing in Virginia, because I liked the job he did as governor when I lived down there, but I won't lose any sleep over it.
I've long been a general believer in divided government as well, so on the whole this probably makes me slightly happier. But I don't care much about even that, since the GOP already had the House, which makes control of the Senate of little relevance from the standpoint of a dividist.
My only concern is that this will encourage the Ted Cruz wing of the House and Senate to do something dumb again, especially since a couple of the new faces seem to be from his school of thought. But my suspicion is that they won't - the Cruz wing lost most of their primary battles, so I don't think this does much to help them recover the clout they lost in the shutdown last year.
Beyond that, I'm not much sure what there is to really freak out about here from any standpoint - neither party has much in the way of a coherent national agenda at the moment. I mean....what exactly were Democrats hoping to accomplish legislatively in the next two years if they kept control of the Senate? Similarly, what exactly are Republicans hoping to accomplish legislatively in the next two years now that they have a slight majority in the Senate? The filibuster still exists, after all. Looking at Ted Cruz' agenda . . . it's basically a joke, little more than platitudes with little relevance.
That agenda? 1. "No amnesty for illegal aliens." Well, that's been DOA for awhile, with or without GOP control of the Senate. And an agenda item that starts with the word "no" isn't an agenda item at all - it has no ability to effect change, only prevent it. And since this was already being prevented....
2. Stopping Obamacare. I'm not sure how you "stop" something that's already in place, but this is just unrealistic to expect that Obamacare will be repealed so long as Obama himself is in office. Also - see above.
3. "Defending our Constitutional rights." I don't even know what the hell this means because it's such vague gobbledegook, but again it's a fundamentally reflexive item, and control of the Senate is thus irrelevant.
4. Finally, "restoring America's leadership in the world." Again, what the hell does this vague gobbledegook mean? Either way, foreign policy is the domain of the President, not the Senate.
To supplement @morat20 's point, it's pretty much always been the case that the older you are, the more likely you are to vote, particularly in off-year elections. What's changed the last few cycles is that the older demographic has gone from being very much a swing group in its votes for Congress, almonst never giving more than 55% of its votes to either party in any one election, to a group that is reliably Republican in its votes for Congress. The older demographic was the least friendly age group for Democrats in Obama's initial election in 2008, and was also their least friendly age group in 2006, 2004, and 2002. But they were not decisively Republican, with Democrats winning a slight majority of their votes in 2 of those 4 elections (2006 and 2008). Before that, that older demographic was a true swing constituency, sometimes being middle of the road, sometimes being more Democratic-friendly than other age groups, and sometimes being more Republican friendly than other age groups.
And in the '80s and early '90s, they were (with the notable exception of '84) reliably more Democratic than any other age group. I'd go so far as to wager that the Democratic advantage amongst the elderly is why the Democrats held the House in all but two elections between 1932 and 1994.
But the last 3 cycles, for the first time in at least the last 32 years (I don't have data before then), the oldest demographic has gone overwhelmingly (ie, by an 8 point margin or more) for one party in three consecutive elections. The closest comparison would be the stretch between 1988 and 1992 when Democrats one this group by 10, 6, and 12 points, respectively. But in the last three cycles, Republicans have won it by 16, 10, and 16 points.* That's an absolutely massive margin. It's not a big problem in a Presidential election year, when younger voters are more likely to vote and are as or more decisively united behind the Democrats. But in off-year elections, having a decisive advantage amongst older voters is a guaranteed way to take and keep control of the legislative branch.
Here's my primary source through 2010: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/07/weekinreview/20101107-detailed-exitpolls.html?_r=0
*For 2012 and 2014, I can't find data for the 60+ group, so I'm using the data for 65+ as a proxy. This shouldn't result in a variance of more than a point or two, though. In all cases, I'm referring to Congressional exit polls, even in Presidential election years.
@james-hanley Chris' claim on that comported with my own recollection, actually. Wikipedia agrees: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism#Etymology
For what it's worth, this notion of people roughly described as "libertarian" seeking to reclaim the phrase "classical liberal" is hardly new and actually has a rather proud history that in many ways stems immediately from the very foundation of what we term modern libertarianism.
Indeed, that foundation almost certainly can be dated to Hayek's Road to Serfdom, which came out well before the word "libertarian" was a meaningfully useful word to describe a particular set of political beliefs. I'm going by memory here, but I'm pretty sure I discussed this at length in the early days of this site; in any event, as I recall, one of Hayek's continuing themes throughout RTS is that a large chunk of the socialists of the first half of the 20th century were largely just impatient classical liberals who had grown frustrated that the social change promised by classical liberalism was occurring too slow and, as a consequence, had been seduced by socialism as a sort of accelerant. IIRC, he argues that the result of this was the abandonment of critical aspects of liberalism even as the moniker "liberal" was kept. He's quite explicit that he views this abandonment as highly illiberal and IIRC is quite insistent that part of his goal in writing the book was to.....reclaim the word "liberal" to again describe something equivalent to what we would now view as a socially liberal form of libertarianism.
The meaning of a "liberal" has changed quite a bit over the years, and in some ways has become more classically "liberal" than it was back then - for the most part (though by no means entirely), the types of economic interventionism advocated by American liberals in recent years is nowhere near the type of interventionism that most concerned Hayek. On the other hand, I think there are some other areas where the American left has become less classically liberal in more recent years - and those are actually on issues that aren't really economic issues, but instead are probably best described as social issues, to wit: a weaker position on freedom of religion, and a weaker commitment to free speech.
A question on the ISIS campaign - at this point, it doesn't seem we're doing much more than bombing them, but so far it looks like that's largely working, slowly perhaps, but still largely working. ISIS is still strong, but it seems like particularly in Iraq their advance has stalled and has even started to be reversed ever so slightly, while they're having a much more difficult time in Kobani than was generally expected, and may even wind up losing there.
I'm very much thinking aloud here, but in Syria, is it also possible that the convoluted situation makes ground forces less useful? It seems like it would make it harder to get them in and out in any kind of significant numbers, and would potentially serve as a rallying point that could unite ISIS, al-Nusra, and even Assad. By more or less sticking with an air campaign, it seems to me like we're maybe better positioned to limit our mission to just "stop fishing around with the Kurds, but kill each other all you want."
For starters, though, he could certainly re-nominate Hagel. Also, I've long gotten the impression that there is a surprisingly large contingent of people in the uniformed services and perhaps even some elements of the CIA and diplomatic corps that pretty much subscribes to these views.
@alan-scott Not at all. First, it's theoretically possible that any unconstitutional portions can be severable from the rest of the statute. Second, there's a general rule of construction that requires that courts interpret statutes in a manner that would avoid a constitutional conflict if it is at all possible to do so, and it's not difficult at all to interpret "sincere religious belief" as referring only to the individual's sincerity rather than the religious propriety. Third, it's absolutely essential to remember that the RFRA standard is an explicit attempt to restore pretty much verbatim the Sherbert test, which of course was a preexisting Court doctrine that the courts themselves had long interpreted in more or less this manner, so I think it's hard to argue that Congress intended the sincere religious belief language to have a different meaning.
Finally, any constitutional problems with inquiring into sincerity of belief would probably be "as applied" problems rather than facial problems. If the government accepts the sincerity of belief without question and grants a given exemption, no problem of constitutionality ever arises. The problem only arises if the government refuses to grant the exemption and, when challenged in court, then insists on challenging the sincerity of belief, and specifically insists on doing so by purporting to show an inconsistency with some sort of official church doctrine.
@kim I'm just ambivalent about the notion of a limited quarantine - not supportive, but not passionately opposed either. Additionally, the problem isn't about what they do while they're asymptomatic. The problem is about where they are if they do become symptomatic. The NY doctor was not symptomatic when he went to the bowling alley, but he became symptomatic the next day, right? Well, what if he had become symptomatic a few hours earlier, while he was at the bowling alley?
Sure, the risk of transmission at that time would be incredibly small, which is why I'm not really supportive of this, but can we really say that it would be zero?
Again, MSF's protocol itself indicates that returning volunteers should not go back to work within the incubation period, which means that if they follow the protocol, they're time away from work is the same either way. And I'm sure everyone here is fully in favor of ensuring that they get reimbursed for that time away.
While it may not be the best policy, requiring that they stay at home for that period strikes me as being far from outrageous.
It seems worth mentioning that Sen. Paul is actually trying to expand voting rights: http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/rand-paul-voting-rights-ex-felons-108156.html
So there's that.
There's also this: http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/rand-pauls-civil-rights-pitch
Thanks for this, Nob! I need to digest, but in my own way, I'm not sure I disagree very strongly with anything you've written here. My only critique would be that I think you probably underestimate the potential import of this vision for steering the GOP towards a sane foreign policy. While a lot of the criticism of the Administration does seem to be on optics, I don't have any problem with that given that his intended audience was Republicans, and it would be very difficult to attempt to move the GOP without differentiating himself from Obama.
I don't have much of a problem with mandating a limited quarantine for health workers returning after having treated Ebola patients in Africa - indeed, it seems worth mentioning that MSF itself discourages its staff from returning to work within the 21 day period even though they take issue with the need for a complete quarantine. Where I take serious umbrage is the insistence that they essentially be arrested upon setting foot in the US and forced to go to a hospital. Especially given what we know about the epidemiology, why not allow them to at least stay at home and see family members provided that they be subjected to mandatory monitoring?
I'm pretty much with you, here, Mike, to the point that I'm unlikely to have any criticism of Notre Dame at all if they act in a manner consistent with their policy here. I might find Notre Dame's restrictions on sex to be prudish and puritanical, but they're a private university, there's plenty of other universities to choose from out there, and I don't think it my place to criticize a religiously-affiliated entity for its beliefs about what is and is not moral conduct for individuals to engage in. Where I draw the line is where the punishments for allegedly immoral, but otherwise largely victimless, acts would seek to do real, longlasting harm to the alleged perpetrator.
But that's not what's going to happen here, at least not unless Brent has a really extensive disciplinary record. As ND's policies read, having consensual sex is not amongst the list of offenses that will "call into question a student’s continued full participation in the University community." In other words, it's not something for which suspension or expulsion is deemed an appropriate punishment. Punishments short of suspension or expulsion at ND seem pretty reasonable - things like mandatory workshops, apologies, etc. The most severe punishments are just loss of extra-curricular privileges (a big deal for a football player, but athletes can lose those privileges for far more trivial "violations of team rules," ie, contempt of coach), as well as bans from particular areas of campus and bans from university housing, neither of which seem like it is going to be particularly applicable here and both of which are probably punishments that constitute a reduction of the student's "full participation in the University community."
The types of things that ND says will trigger the potential for the more severe punishments are entirely understandable and appropriate - they're all things that either involve serious harm or threat of harm to others or academic dishonesty.
Where I would have a problem would be if ND took the approach that BYU takes (used to take?), where it had no problem expelling students for these types of violations, but in the case of a certain former QB for the Chicago Bears, only after the student's eligibility had been used up and he was just a few months from graduation.
Good post, Vikram. I think this does a great job of showing how little politics often has to do with principle and how much instead it has to do with serving the narrowly defined interests of constituent interest groups even as we deceive ourselves into thinking and talking as if we're really serving a set of broad, coherent, and universal ideals.
On “Talk to Me Like I’m Stupid: “The sky is (not) falling!” Edition”
@chris I didn't read those comments as saying that "economics tells us that wages and average productivity are supposed to diverge" so much as they were saying that "economics doesn't purport to tell us anything about wages and average productivity, only wages and marginal productivity, and in any event it also tells us that wages are stagnating in the US primarily because they are increasing elsewhere in the world." They also claim that this is a good thing, but I don't think they're saying that it's a good thing because economics tells us it's normatively good. They're saying that most of us would agree that increasing wages in the rest of the world are a good thing, and that economics tells us there's a tradeoff between American (and really first world as a whole) wage increases and global wage increases.
They seem to think that this is a positive tradeoff as a normative matter. But more importantly, they assume that others agree that this is a positive tradeoff. Regardless, it is not economics that tell us that this is a positive tradeoff, although many economists would certainly agree on a personal level that it's a positive tradeoff - most economists are quite cosmopolitan in their outlook.
The rough equivalent would be if we said that climatology theory tells us that global warming is the biggest problem we face in the world and no expense should be spared to stop it. But of course climatology does not, in and of itself, say that, even though many climatologists would certainly say that. Climatology itself simply asserts that certain things will occur if global warming is not brought under control, and what would be required from an emissions standpoint to bring it "under control." It doesn't tell us what measures would actually reduce emissions to the target levels, and thus it can't tell us how to weigh the costs of those measures compared with the benefits of bringing global warming under control. It does, however, attempt to make us confront and recognize the costs of failing to bring it under control.
I read the comments in the other thread as doing essentially the same thing - they're saying that (1) economics tells us that wages are stagnating in the US because they're increasing elsewhere; and (2) attempting to reverse wage stagnation in the US would necessarily result in smaller wage growth (or perhaps even wage stagnation) in the developing world. They're saying that an attempt to reverse wage stagnation in the US needs to confront and acknowledge the potential effects of doing so on wages in the developing world if we are at all concerned with wages in the developing world as well.
That said, I think Tod still poses a really important and strong question to those interlocutors in his post here, regardless of whether it is economics or personal belief that tells them that the overall effects of this are good. Specifically, he asks why these same interlocutors are such advocates of blowing the whole damn system up.
I haven't seen that question answered here. I suspect the answer from two of the three would be, with a good amount of justification, that they're not advocates of blowing the system up, but instead are mostly advocates of preserving it with fairly modest changes. I don't know what the answer of the third would be, though.
"
Like Glyph, I don't have much of a dog in the specific fight that is the subject of the post. I will, however, say that the study of economics, in and of itself, tells us nothing - and purports to tell us nothing - about normative questions. In other words, whether the divergence between wages and average productivity (as opposed to marginal productivity) is a "problem" is entirely a normative question that economics does not purport to answer. Individual people with economics backgrounds may certainly claim that it is not a "problem" but they can only do so by referencing other normative values that others may weigh less than they. Indeed, there are surely plenty of economists that would view this divergence as a "problem" worthy of a solution (lest we forget, Paul Krugman is an economist, as was Milton Keynes, etc.).
So with respect to your original post, while economics teaches us that, all other things being equal, wages will track marginal productivity rather than average productivity, it does not teach us that they should do so. As importantly, it does not teach us that all other things are equal - in fact, it recognizes that all other things are not in fact equal, and thus that it is possible for even marginal productivity to diverge from wages.
Economics can then give us an understanding of why average and marginal productivity are diverging from each other and why one or both of them are diverging from wages. It can also give us a possible solution to that problem. It can also give us a range of possibilities for second order effects of that solution.
It is for policymakers and voters to determine how to weigh the likelihood of a proposed policy solving the problem against the likelihood of the possible second order effects, not only in terms of how likely those effects are, but most importantly in terms of how important those effects are as a normative matter.
But the key thing about economics is that it typically begins with the assumption of "all other things being equal" except perhaps for a small number of known variables. This means that its predictive value is very limited. It's probably an overstatement to say that economists don't do predictions; however, it's not an overstatement to say that they don't do predictions outside a limited range.
In other words, they can say that "policy type X" will tend to have effects "Y and Z," but they can't do much in the way of predicting the full extent of those effects and the specific time frame of those effects. About the most they can say is that a policy will have certain general effects in a vaguely defined "short run" and certain other effects in the vaguely defined "long run." One of the debates between economists of different ideological stripes is often between how much to value the "short run" and how much to value the "long run" as a normative matter.
At this point, as I say in my comment above, we have a very limited amount of knowledge, but that is a far cry from saying that we have no knowledge. It is far from the point that physics or astronomy has reached, in which there is quite a bit that can be predicted (but also still quite a bit that cannot be predicted - otherwise we'd have no further need for those areas of study).
In economics, there are some things that can be predicted. But we can't predict that one policy change will have a specific, measurable effect outside of a particular range of activities. There are just too many damn unknown and unknowable variables - the so-called "calculation problem."
There are also a good number of things that all or virtually all economists agree upon - for instance, that price ceilings (e.g., rent control) will create significant and artificial supply shortages of those products as compared to the demand for those products. Or that allowing competition between suppliers in a given market will increase consumer surplus in that market: http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7
Etc., etc.
But none of that tells us whether the other effects of those policies are good, nor does it much tell us about what the unintended consequences (or benefits) of those policies might be. Hell, it doesn't even tell us whether the primary objects of those policies is a normative good, although it is certainly safe to assume that most people would think that in most situations and all other things being equal, a greater supply of affordable housing is normatively good as is a greater consumer surplus (since everyone is a consumer).
We can predict at least some vaguely defined unintended consequences as well - for instance, we can predict that price ceilings and floors will result in black markets or will result in people trying to find ways of otherwise evading those ceilings and floors - for instance, it should have been entirely predictable that the result of a generalized wage freeze would be that at least some workers would be paid under the table for wages above or below the ceiling (black market) and that firms would try to find other forms of compensation and benefits to compete with each other for labor. What would have perhaps been comparatively unpredictable would have been the full extent of those effects, particularly on the black market side.
Similarly, it is almost impossible, based on what is currently known and knowable, to predict with any kind of specificity and reliability how a broad-based measure such as GDP or unemployment will look a year from now, much less a decade from now.* For the most part, we cannot generally forecast that a particular policy will cause a widespread recession within a short period of time - there are just too many other variables at play. We can say that the policy makes a recession somewhat more or less likely, and we can aggregate policies as a whole to say that they are likely to cause a recession - or even economic ruin - at some unknown point down the line.
For instance, we can predict that economy-wide wage and price ceilings (floors are usually less problematic) will eventually cause economic ruin, but we can't predict exactly when that will happen - the country, for instance, may experience a natural resources boom (I'm looking at you, Venezuela) that creates enough wealth to mitigate these effects for an extended period of time through black markets, subsidized imports of controlled goods, etc. Or commodities prices in the global market may remain unexpectedly stable for an extended period of time such that the price controls are relatively close to the "invisible hand" price. But eventually you're going to wind up with a drastic undersupply of needed goods and workers, an oversupply of shit no one wants or needs and, without economic reforms, you're going to need a pretty totalitarian government to keep things afloat.
So it would be foolish to predict that, say, "within five years of instituting these price controls/regulations, the economy will collapse and GDP will contract by at least X%." It would equally be foolish to predict that "within five years of instituting these tax cuts, the economy will boom and GDP will increase by at least X%." Now there may or may not be some predictive value in aggregating such predictions, but no one person's or ideological group's formula is likely to be consistently reliable - there's just too many variables for any formula or group of like-minded people to account for. And that's before we even get to the issue of true "Black Swan" events.
So we're never going to have perfect knowledge in the field of economics, nor would we want to, frankly - such perfect knowledge would mean that people had become automotons whose needs and desires never changed or were at least entirely predictable. Indeed, in just about every instance where a true centrally planned economy was attempted (ie, an economy in which it was assumed that economists could at least approach perfect knowledge), there has been an attempt to turn people into exactly that through pretty totalitarian measures.
But that hardly makes economics useless - that we can make vague but narrow predictions is certainly valuable to informing policy debates, and as time goes on and knowledge increases, those predictions can eventually become more specific and less narrow. As importantly, economics can give us an idea of how, if at all possible, to achieve specific policy goals without undermining other specific policy goals. Economists just shouldn't be expected to define what those goals should be.
*One thing I find interesting in this thread, by the way, is that it's the more liberal commenters who have tended to take the harshest stand against economics even though it is liberal economists who are vastly more likely to view the economy as predictable and manageable.
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@rtod Here is an article explaining both how forecasting is foolish and not something to be engaged in by people serious about financial and economic analysis, as well as why they're about all you hear on the airwaves: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-11/my-prediction-your-forecast-is-wrong
Specifically, "the media loves them." And the media loves economic forecasters because they're good for ratings and subscription sales and pageviews.
The difference between economic forecasting and actual economics is roughly equivalent to the difference between astrology and astronomy. Simply put, people have always been obsessed with trying to know the future - about what will happen - far more than they are interested in understanding what is happening or did happen, and why.
That hardly makes economics useless, though - understanding why things are working or are failing (or did either in the past) is important for understanding what policies are most likely to be useful or harmful going forward.
To go back to the astrology/astronomy analogy, the study of economics has only really been around for about 250 years. It's probably not much further along than astronomy was around, say, the time of Galileo.
A more modern equivalent might be seismology - it's important and helps provide us with an understanding of why things happen when they do happen and perhaps what policies/building codes can help minimize the damage and mitigate the risks, but it's still poorly situated to predict earthquakes and eruptions with any kind of certainty and period of forewarning.
On “Never Say Die: Why We Can’t Have Nice Things”
FDR's insistence on wage freezes was not an historical accident. It was, however, most definitely bad policy. But I suppose this is one of those "building blocks" of modern America that I'm supposed to celebrate as proof of the superiority of single party dominance.
Which is why it doubles down on employer-based health insurance?
On “History as Determing Ideology”
This data can't possibly be right. I don't mean "can't be right because it doesn't conform to my assumptions." I mean "doesn't work mathematically."
Here's the full tally from which this number is originally pulled:
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/2014/US/house/exitpoll
You'll notice that according to this data, black voters overall supported Democrats 89-11, well in line with the trends of the last couple of decades.
But then look at the numbers for "Race by Age," including but not limited to the 49-49 calculation referred to here. You'll see that in no age cohort do the statistics show Democrats receiving more than 49 percent of the black vote.
Obviously it's not possible for 89 percent of black voters to vote for the Democrat, but less than 50% of black voters to do so in any age cohort.
The "Race by Age" figures also indicate that black voters between 45-64 made up 32 percent of the electorate and voted 62-36 for Republicans. Needless to say, that's not even remotely possible on any level.
The only conclusion is that the "Race by Age" calculations are totally wrong. Looking more closely, my guess is that they severely mixed up the "Race by Age" calculations - the numbers for black voters between 45-64 are almost certainly the numbers for white voters 45-64. The numbers for Latino voters 45-64 are almost certainly the numbers for black voters 45-64. The numbers for black voters 30-44 are almost certainly the numbers for white voters 30-44, and the numbers for white voters 30-44 are probably for Latino 30-44, with Latino 30-44 being black 30-44. Etc., etc.
About the only "Race by Age" number that looks accurate is the number for whites 18-29.
On “Thoughts on the 2014 Midterm Elections and Liberalism’s Future”
@james-hanley Yup. I might not like that those "building blocks" were implemented (or at the very least, that they were implemented in the way they were implemented), but I also recognize that they exist and that people rely on them. Additionally, I know well the problems my own state has experienced after an extended period of single party dominance, have no desire to move to Texas, and long for the days when I got to deal with Virginia's then-divided government (see wistfulness for Mark Warner, above.).
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@morat20 That's definitely a good chunk of it, probably even the bulk of it - that over 60 set is roughly synonymous with people who were between "30 and 44" when Reagan was elected, a group that Reagan won by 17 points, and in which Carter only got 38 percent of the vote.
I will add that there's two other potential factors: 1. Obamacare is most unpopular amongst that cohort, and not just because of partisanship - "keep your damn government hands off my Medicare" might have been a silly statement, but the sentiment behind it was real: Obamacare's ability to cut costs relies heavily on Medicare cost controls; and 2. anecdotally, I know of a number of elderly lifelong working class Democrats with....certain views, for whom McCain was the first Republican they'd ever voted in a Presidential election. Statistically, I don't know how much of a factor this latter is for purposes of this discussion, though - I haven't seen much evidence that those. . . . views . . . transferred to their votes for Congress.
On “History as Determing Ideology”
I wouldn't read much into this. First, it's only white voters under 30 that Democrats lost by that margin, which is still better than they did with white voters as a whole. Second, Democrats still won voters under 30 overall by 13 points. This is only slightly less than their margin in 2010 - around 16 points - amongst younger voters, even as it's substantially less than their margins in 2006 and 2008. It's still a lot better than their margins between 1996 and 2004, during which Democrats never won under 30 voters by more than 10 points, and functionally tied the GOP (2 point margin or less) in all but one election. If we go back to '94, the Democrats actually lost the youth vote that year.
Especially given that this was a midterm, I don't think there's anything to read into other than that the Democrats' unprecedented dominance in the youth demographic between 2006 and 2012 is returning to more historical levels.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/07/weekinreview/20101107-detailed-exitpolls.html?_r=0
On “Thoughts on the 2014 Midterm Elections and Liberalism’s Future”
I'm mostly apathetic, if that helps. I'll be marginally annoyed if Mark Warner winds up losing in Virginia, because I liked the job he did as governor when I lived down there, but I won't lose any sleep over it.
I've long been a general believer in divided government as well, so on the whole this probably makes me slightly happier. But I don't care much about even that, since the GOP already had the House, which makes control of the Senate of little relevance from the standpoint of a dividist.
My only concern is that this will encourage the Ted Cruz wing of the House and Senate to do something dumb again, especially since a couple of the new faces seem to be from his school of thought. But my suspicion is that they won't - the Cruz wing lost most of their primary battles, so I don't think this does much to help them recover the clout they lost in the shutdown last year.
Beyond that, I'm not much sure what there is to really freak out about here from any standpoint - neither party has much in the way of a coherent national agenda at the moment. I mean....what exactly were Democrats hoping to accomplish legislatively in the next two years if they kept control of the Senate? Similarly, what exactly are Republicans hoping to accomplish legislatively in the next two years now that they have a slight majority in the Senate? The filibuster still exists, after all. Looking at Ted Cruz' agenda . . . it's basically a joke, little more than platitudes with little relevance.
http://www.ijreview.com/2014/09/173099-ted-cruz-concert-highlights-americans-prosperity-speech/
That agenda? 1. "No amnesty for illegal aliens." Well, that's been DOA for awhile, with or without GOP control of the Senate. And an agenda item that starts with the word "no" isn't an agenda item at all - it has no ability to effect change, only prevent it. And since this was already being prevented....
2. Stopping Obamacare. I'm not sure how you "stop" something that's already in place, but this is just unrealistic to expect that Obamacare will be repealed so long as Obama himself is in office. Also - see above.
3. "Defending our Constitutional rights." I don't even know what the hell this means because it's such vague gobbledegook, but again it's a fundamentally reflexive item, and control of the Senate is thus irrelevant.
4. Finally, "restoring America's leadership in the world." Again, what the hell does this vague gobbledegook mean? Either way, foreign policy is the domain of the President, not the Senate.
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To supplement @morat20 's point, it's pretty much always been the case that the older you are, the more likely you are to vote, particularly in off-year elections. What's changed the last few cycles is that the older demographic has gone from being very much a swing group in its votes for Congress, almonst never giving more than 55% of its votes to either party in any one election, to a group that is reliably Republican in its votes for Congress. The older demographic was the least friendly age group for Democrats in Obama's initial election in 2008, and was also their least friendly age group in 2006, 2004, and 2002. But they were not decisively Republican, with Democrats winning a slight majority of their votes in 2 of those 4 elections (2006 and 2008). Before that, that older demographic was a true swing constituency, sometimes being middle of the road, sometimes being more Democratic-friendly than other age groups, and sometimes being more Republican friendly than other age groups.
And in the '80s and early '90s, they were (with the notable exception of '84) reliably more Democratic than any other age group. I'd go so far as to wager that the Democratic advantage amongst the elderly is why the Democrats held the House in all but two elections between 1932 and 1994.
But the last 3 cycles, for the first time in at least the last 32 years (I don't have data before then), the oldest demographic has gone overwhelmingly (ie, by an 8 point margin or more) for one party in three consecutive elections. The closest comparison would be the stretch between 1988 and 1992 when Democrats one this group by 10, 6, and 12 points, respectively. But in the last three cycles, Republicans have won it by 16, 10, and 16 points.* That's an absolutely massive margin. It's not a big problem in a Presidential election year, when younger voters are more likely to vote and are as or more decisively united behind the Democrats. But in off-year elections, having a decisive advantage amongst older voters is a guaranteed way to take and keep control of the legislative branch.
Here's my primary source through 2010: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/07/weekinreview/20101107-detailed-exitpolls.html?_r=0
*For 2012 and 2014, I can't find data for the 60+ group, so I'm using the data for 65+ as a proxy. This shouldn't result in a variance of more than a point or two, though. In all cases, I'm referring to Congressional exit polls, even in Presidential election years.
On “The Rise of Partyism and What to do about the Big Sort?”
not to mention with you all when I’m around.
Which is not nearly enough. ;)
On “A Study in Partisanship”
@james-hanley Chris' claim on that comported with my own recollection, actually. Wikipedia agrees: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism#Etymology
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For what it's worth, this notion of people roughly described as "libertarian" seeking to reclaim the phrase "classical liberal" is hardly new and actually has a rather proud history that in many ways stems immediately from the very foundation of what we term modern libertarianism.
Indeed, that foundation almost certainly can be dated to Hayek's Road to Serfdom, which came out well before the word "libertarian" was a meaningfully useful word to describe a particular set of political beliefs. I'm going by memory here, but I'm pretty sure I discussed this at length in the early days of this site; in any event, as I recall, one of Hayek's continuing themes throughout RTS is that a large chunk of the socialists of the first half of the 20th century were largely just impatient classical liberals who had grown frustrated that the social change promised by classical liberalism was occurring too slow and, as a consequence, had been seduced by socialism as a sort of accelerant. IIRC, he argues that the result of this was the abandonment of critical aspects of liberalism even as the moniker "liberal" was kept. He's quite explicit that he views this abandonment as highly illiberal and IIRC is quite insistent that part of his goal in writing the book was to.....reclaim the word "liberal" to again describe something equivalent to what we would now view as a socially liberal form of libertarianism.
The meaning of a "liberal" has changed quite a bit over the years, and in some ways has become more classically "liberal" than it was back then - for the most part (though by no means entirely), the types of economic interventionism advocated by American liberals in recent years is nowhere near the type of interventionism that most concerned Hayek. On the other hand, I think there are some other areas where the American left has become less classically liberal in more recent years - and those are actually on issues that aren't really economic issues, but instead are probably best described as social issues, to wit: a weaker position on freedom of religion, and a weaker commitment to free speech.
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Embedded links?
On “Remarkably Unremarkable: Rand Paul Foreign Policy Speech”
Performance art.
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A question on the ISIS campaign - at this point, it doesn't seem we're doing much more than bombing them, but so far it looks like that's largely working, slowly perhaps, but still largely working. ISIS is still strong, but it seems like particularly in Iraq their advance has stalled and has even started to be reversed ever so slightly, while they're having a much more difficult time in Kobani than was generally expected, and may even wind up losing there.
I'm very much thinking aloud here, but in Syria, is it also possible that the convoluted situation makes ground forces less useful? It seems like it would make it harder to get them in and out in any kind of significant numbers, and would potentially serve as a rallying point that could unite ISIS, al-Nusra, and even Assad. By more or less sticking with an air campaign, it seems to me like we're maybe better positioned to limit our mission to just "stop fishing around with the Kurds, but kill each other all you want."
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For starters, though, he could certainly re-nominate Hagel. Also, I've long gotten the impression that there is a surprisingly large contingent of people in the uniformed services and perhaps even some elements of the CIA and diplomatic corps that pretty much subscribes to these views.
On “On Purity taboos and the Profane (Updated 27/10)”
@alan-scott Not at all. First, it's theoretically possible that any unconstitutional portions can be severable from the rest of the statute. Second, there's a general rule of construction that requires that courts interpret statutes in a manner that would avoid a constitutional conflict if it is at all possible to do so, and it's not difficult at all to interpret "sincere religious belief" as referring only to the individual's sincerity rather than the religious propriety. Third, it's absolutely essential to remember that the RFRA standard is an explicit attempt to restore pretty much verbatim the Sherbert test, which of course was a preexisting Court doctrine that the courts themselves had long interpreted in more or less this manner, so I think it's hard to argue that Congress intended the sincere religious belief language to have a different meaning.
Finally, any constitutional problems with inquiring into sincerity of belief would probably be "as applied" problems rather than facial problems. If the government accepts the sincerity of belief without question and grants a given exemption, no problem of constitutionality ever arises. The problem only arises if the government refuses to grant the exemption and, when challenged in court, then insists on challenging the sincerity of belief, and specifically insists on doing so by purporting to show an inconsistency with some sort of official church doctrine.
On “Ebola, Risk Management, and the Case for Principled Pragmatism”
@kim I'm just ambivalent about the notion of a limited quarantine - not supportive, but not passionately opposed either. Additionally, the problem isn't about what they do while they're asymptomatic. The problem is about where they are if they do become symptomatic. The NY doctor was not symptomatic when he went to the bowling alley, but he became symptomatic the next day, right? Well, what if he had become symptomatic a few hours earlier, while he was at the bowling alley?
Sure, the risk of transmission at that time would be incredibly small, which is why I'm not really supportive of this, but can we really say that it would be zero?
Again, MSF's protocol itself indicates that returning volunteers should not go back to work within the incubation period, which means that if they follow the protocol, they're time away from work is the same either way. And I'm sure everyone here is fully in favor of ensuring that they get reimbursed for that time away.
While it may not be the best policy, requiring that they stay at home for that period strikes me as being far from outrageous.
On “Remarkably Unremarkable: Rand Paul Foreign Policy Speech”
But beyond that, what @jaybird said.
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It seems worth mentioning that Sen. Paul is actually trying to expand voting rights: http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/rand-paul-voting-rights-ex-felons-108156.html
So there's that.
There's also this: http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/rand-pauls-civil-rights-pitch
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Thanks for this, Nob! I need to digest, but in my own way, I'm not sure I disagree very strongly with anything you've written here. My only critique would be that I think you probably underestimate the potential import of this vision for steering the GOP towards a sane foreign policy. While a lot of the criticism of the Administration does seem to be on optics, I don't have any problem with that given that his intended audience was Republicans, and it would be very difficult to attempt to move the GOP without differentiating himself from Obama.
But beyond that, I think I pretty much agree.
On “Ebola, Risk Management, and the Case for Principled Pragmatism”
I don't have much of a problem with mandating a limited quarantine for health workers returning after having treated Ebola patients in Africa - indeed, it seems worth mentioning that MSF itself discourages its staff from returning to work within the 21 day period even though they take issue with the need for a complete quarantine. Where I take serious umbrage is the insistence that they essentially be arrested upon setting foot in the US and forced to go to a hospital. Especially given what we know about the epidemiology, why not allow them to at least stay at home and see family members provided that they be subjected to mandatory monitoring?
On “The Line Between Policy and Personal Freedom”
I'm pretty much with you, here, Mike, to the point that I'm unlikely to have any criticism of Notre Dame at all if they act in a manner consistent with their policy here. I might find Notre Dame's restrictions on sex to be prudish and puritanical, but they're a private university, there's plenty of other universities to choose from out there, and I don't think it my place to criticize a religiously-affiliated entity for its beliefs about what is and is not moral conduct for individuals to engage in. Where I draw the line is where the punishments for allegedly immoral, but otherwise largely victimless, acts would seek to do real, longlasting harm to the alleged perpetrator.
But that's not what's going to happen here, at least not unless Brent has a really extensive disciplinary record. As ND's policies read, having consensual sex is not amongst the list of offenses that will "call into question a student’s continued full participation in the University community." In other words, it's not something for which suspension or expulsion is deemed an appropriate punishment. Punishments short of suspension or expulsion at ND seem pretty reasonable - things like mandatory workshops, apologies, etc. The most severe punishments are just loss of extra-curricular privileges (a big deal for a football player, but athletes can lose those privileges for far more trivial "violations of team rules," ie, contempt of coach), as well as bans from particular areas of campus and bans from university housing, neither of which seem like it is going to be particularly applicable here and both of which are probably punishments that constitute a reduction of the student's "full participation in the University community."
The types of things that ND says will trigger the potential for the more severe punishments are entirely understandable and appropriate - they're all things that either involve serious harm or threat of harm to others or academic dishonesty.
Where I would have a problem would be if ND took the approach that BYU takes (used to take?), where it had no problem expelling students for these types of violations, but in the case of a certain former QB for the Chicago Bears, only after the student's eligibility had been used up and he was just a few months from graduation.
On “Lax Regulation: It’s not just for Republicans”
Good post, Vikram. I think this does a great job of showing how little politics often has to do with principle and how much instead it has to do with serving the narrowly defined interests of constituent interest groups even as we deceive ourselves into thinking and talking as if we're really serving a set of broad, coherent, and universal ideals.