I shall respond....it just may be a few days. But for starters, it's worth noting that perhaps even more than rent control, a belief in the badness of protectionism is as close to a universally held belief amongst economists as you will find. One other thing I would note is that it is certainly possible that protectionism can benefit a nation's industry in the short run (as I said the other day, Krugman's work on new trade would seem to imply this); however, in doing so, it often has an absolutely terrible effect on other nations. In terms of Africa and developing nations, I think a more likely cause of problems isn't so much their adoption of free trade policies as it is their inability to compete with the forms of protectionism that remain in the developed world (especially the absolutely insane agricultural protectionism of both the US and Europe).
Roque:
Thanks for the really excellent comment, which raises a whole host of other questions and issues. Too many, in fact, for me to properly address in even a long-form response post, though I'm certainly going to try to address what I can (if and when I get the time, which is a precious commodity these days).
But one follow-up item for right now: how can and should President Obama re-brand the War on Terror (and for that matter, how should President Bush have branded it) such that it does not reinforce the perception that we are fighting a religion rather than the politicization of a religion?
Branding it as a fight against Islamism specifically seems to me fraught with peril because it requires the listener to understand a form of nuance that is highly unlikely, especially, I would imagine, when translated into other languages.
And, again, part of the problem here is that so many of the advocates of going after Islamism don't even attempt to distinguish it from Islam more generally (see, e.g., the way in which so many on the political Right joyfully called the family that was removed from the AirTran flight but cleared by the FBI "jihadis").
In the case of Israel, the issue of terrorism and/or Islamism is definitely an existential threat, or at the very minimum is justifiably perceived as such. However, I'm not so sure that this holds true in terms of the US. In my own experience, having lived within sight and within walking distance of the Pentagon on 9/11 (and thus experiencing terrorism in a way that Middle America simply cannot understand), I found that over the course of time, the effect of our response to terrorism was having such a tremendous effect on me as to cease to justify the marginally lowered risk of a terrorist attack.
But that's not your point, which I take as being more that Islamism must be viewed in much the same way that we viewed the threat of Communism during the Cold War. That strikes me as a legitimate argument, although I don't think Islamism has achieved nearly enough power to yet present the kind of existential threat once posed by the Soviet Union. But if it were to spread sufficiently, it certainly could eventually come to do so.
One of the things that I try to make clear above (admittedly, this is not my most coherent piece of writing ever) is that the great problem with our current foreign policy thinking is that it does not seem to have any unified primary goal. In many ways, I think that simply uniting behind any primary goal, even one with which I don't necessarily agree, would be preferable to the current status quo of sort of trying to do all things at once.
So then the question becomes whether deterring the spread of Islamism could be that primary goal. I think this would be a hard sell. First, much of the rhetoric of those who most intensely advocate for this view would treat (or at least appears to treat) all Muslims as enemies. This creates a visceral backlash amongst other groups who justifiably are opposed to stereotyping such a large percentage of the world's population. Worse is the fact that many of those (not you, I fully acknowledge) who are most vociferous in their attacks on Islamism are themselves fairly open advocates of mixing church and state here at home, which destroys their argument's credibility.
All this, of course, leaves the issue of how best to deter the spread of Islamism once we have achieved some form of consensus that should be the primary goal of our foreign policy. That is obviously another issue altogether.
I don't think anyone is saying that there aren't a bunch of protectionist trade restrictions around the globe, only that we don't think those restrictions to be a good thing. It's certainly true that in certain instances, protectionism can work to bolster a country's industry, which as I understand it is one of the conclusions that comes out of Krugman's new trade theories. But in doing so, just about any economist (of any political stripe) will tell you that the net effect of such policies is negative on the global economy as a whole. Indeed, protectionism of Western agriculture is often viewed a major contributing factor in Africa's failures to achieve economic development.
Will: I totally understand. This subject is probably the single most maddening subject for me to get a hold of, if only because it's so damn difficult to articulate a vision with which I can be even remotely comfortable. I do know that trying to impose liberal democracy by force has a pretty bad track record; but even there, I can't discount the possibility that it can work in certain situations or even that it can work in most situations if the larger nation is willing to invest a really, really large amount of resources over a really, really long period of time in order to nurture the seedlings necessary for a successful liberal democracy where few such seedlings exist.
But as I say, my inclination is towards Freddie's general non-interventionism, so for me the burden necessary for intervention is extremely high. The best I can do is to say that a long-term military intervention that will require nation-building is probably only appropriate where the threat it seeks to prevent is, in fact, existential. For lesser threats or for human rights-based interventions, I'd say that intervention needs to be limited to actions that can be achieved within relatively short time horizons with little collateral damage, and only after there is sufficient evidence that the basis for the intervention is essentially proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But I'm even deeply uncomfortable with this formulation.
I of course disagree with you on issues of trade protectionism thanks to the small part of my background that has a basis in economics.
One thing that is important to note here is that often economic sanctions have relatively little practical effect because they are not implemented by all or even most of the world. But they nonetheless permit the objects of those sanctions to scapegoat the sanctioning country for a whole host of problems, and thereby strengthen their position in the world. Even where the sanctions are implemented globally (or near-globally), it will create a pretty substantial black market that results in the wealthiest members of the sanctioned country (usually the dictator and his cronies themselves) left perfectly able to get what they need to still live comfortably while, again, scapegoating the rest of the world for their nation's problems.
Chris:
Fair points. I think part of the issue here is that when one publicizes their religious beliefs (or non-beliefs, as the case may be), they open those beliefs up to evaluation and thus to evaluation of their own capacity for thinking. Beyond that, your points deserve a lengthier more detailed response. Unfortunately, the real world beckons so I don't have time right now to put that response together, which means that response is going to have to join the queue of other items that the real world is currently delaying me from discussing.
Jerry: If you think I am directing the "please, be reasonable" directive solely at angry atheists, then I think you misread the post. While they may be the primary focus of this post, that is because atheism is the focus of this particular dialogue.
As for the issue of rational argument vs. angry argument, I simply disagree. In my view, angry arguments are far less likely to persuade those who disagree with you than rational arguments, although they may be more likely to mobilize those who are predisposed to support you. But that is a subject for another day.
I'm somewhat hesitant to get back into this debate (even though I wrote the post), because it seems to be getting back into the typical cycle of arguments that I was trying to avoid.
But I think there's an important problem to identify here, which seems to be typical of these cyclical arguments. That is that on the one hand, ED is talking about religion when it is held as a purely personal belief, while on the other hand, Chris seems to be talking about religion when it is applied by the religious person towards others (whether or not the 'others' are also members of that person's religion). The fact is, I don't think anyone would disagree that the maintenance of religious views as a purely personal affair is at the very least harmless (and I would probably argue that it is actively healthy). I also don't think anyone here would disagree that the attempt to force one's own religion on another (to sometimes include persons who are nominally of the same faith) is actively harmful. The trouble is, ultimately, where to draw the line where church, science, and state must be separated. My post was an attempt to draw such a line, although it's certainly possible it didn't do a good job of doing so.
Will - good job finding that link! That Long piece, despite some slight disagreements with it, was one of my favorite posts from AOTP. It's good to know someone managed to syndicate it before AOTP closed down. And yes, the shut down of AOTP made the C11 shut down doubly painful for me.
"The free market is a better tool than government intervention even culturally."
A point that bears much, much more emphasis. Sanctions in my mind have about the worst track record imaginable in fostering liberalism in other nations. In many ways, they usually seem to strengthen existing regimes by giving them a scapegoat for all of the country's problems even as the profit opportunities inherent in black markets give the sanctions a sieve-like quality even when they are globally enforced (and I can't imagine anything more purely symbolic than unilateral sanctions). I suppose you could argue that they were eventually successful with respect to Libya, but I'm really skeptical of that argument. And even if you grant that argument, the failures outnumber the successes by a massive margin.
Andrew: I don't know if you saw my last response to you above. But I think I understand where you're coming from, and fundamentally I tend to agree with it.
There is something in your points that is particularly important, though, and which maybe can help you understand my point in this post a bit better.
You talk, correctly, about the problems of "fake science," and argue, also probably correctly, that religion has been the most frequent (though by no means exclusive) purveyor of such.
To me, though, the issue of "fake science" is the exact same issue of "falsifying the unfalsifiable," just stated in a different manner. The manner in which you use the term "fake science" seems to be that "fake science" occurs when science or, more often, pseudo-science, is used as a moral justification for a particular activity or system of belief.
This, in my mind, exactly identifies the same problem I'm trying to identify in this post; the difference in this case, at least in my view, seems to be that many (though by no means all) of those who are using science as a moral justification for their belief system are themselves scientists. In its own way, as Chris points out, atheism is itself a form of faith, and scientific attempts to justify atheism run into the exact same problems as scientific (or pseudo-scientific) attempts to justify any other form of faith.
So, yes, the abuse or denial of science has long been primarily the domain of theism (of course, the world has long been primarily the domain of theism, but that's a different issue altogether). But that fact, as you clearly acknowledge, does not mean that science cannot be used equally improperly to justify atheism.
All that said, as between atheist misuse of science and theist misuse of science, I have little doubt that the latter is by far the greatest threat, at least in the United States....and it's not even close. But in many ways, that is why I wrote this post - it angers me that atheist misuse of science only adds fuel to the fire that seeks to justify theist misuse of science. It is thus counterproductive to what you and I both seem to agree is the real, important cause for concern.
Matoko:
Who do you mean "you"? Stop trying to attribute beliefs that we've never claimed to hold. Again, you have no idea what my personal religious beliefs are, and it is getting really frustrating to have you continue to assume that you do.
Andrew:
I understand you concern. Hell, I share it. But I think that when science gets involved in the types of issues I identify here, it helps to contribute (inadvertently) to the strengthening of those who seek to undermine legitimate science.
You note that many theists of less literalist varieties do not get sufficiently involved in these issues; is it possible that part of the explanation for this is a feeling that the forces with which they mostly agree seem bent on promoting the denial of the very basis for their faith in addition to promoting science?
And then there is the other issue, which is true of political questions more generally: political debates are dominated by those who have the greatest perceived interest in those debates, in this case scientists and Biblical literalists.
Matoko:
I remind you that we do have a commenting policy. As for "reinforcing your stereotypes," I find that quite amusing as you have absolutely no idea as to any of my personal religious beliefs, so I'm not really sure what "stereotype" I could be reinforcing.
If you don't accept my argument that attempts to scientifically prove the non-existence of God are a detriment to science, that is your prerogative; but the fact is that I wrote this essay out of a profound respect for science and a desire to prevent it from hurting itself by getting involved in debates that it is not intended to get involved with.
Matoko: The Discovery Institute has a budget of a whopping $4 million per year. It is also, as you implicitly acknowledge, the primary vehicle for the push to teach ID in schools. While you may think $4 million is a lot of money, the fact is that this is a relatively small budget for such a prominent organization, and it thus requires only a handful of large donors for its funding. So to say that the Discovery Institute is representative of a huge swath of Christendom outside of a handful of areas is utterly devoid of evidence.
Matoko: Who started it seems to me to be an irrelevant question (as it is in most debates) since both sides will just point the finger at each other as a means of justifying their behavior. Again, both sides, by seeking to attack on the other side's turf, just wind up demeaning themselves.
Matoko: On the grounds where you advocate mocking, I largely agree with you. But the problem with things like the God Delusion, or Myers' desecration of the Communion wafer, is that they go above and beyond defending religious encroachments on scientific turf, and go instead to attacking religion on its own turf.
Andrew: the problem you are talking about here is not a problem that is a necessary result of a belief in God. Instead, it is a necessary result of the entanglement of church and state, an issue over which I think it's safe to say all seven us would agree with you. Indeed, that is the specific problem to which I am alluding in this post. At most, the problems you identify are problems with specific organized religions, but they are not problems with a generalized belief in god. Wicca, for example, would not seem to fall into the traps you identify (yes, I'm aware I'm using as an example a religion that is far from widespread, but that's not really the point). Moreover, there's a chicken or the egg problem here: did religions create the prejudices against women and gays or did they merely enshrine pre-existing prejudices?
In terms of the issue of the "young earth" question, I do not think it remotely disprove the existence of a particular god; instead, it refutes a literal interpretation of a particular story in a particular religious text, a story that several of its largest adherents (eg, most forms of Judaism and Catholicism, to name two) have accepted as being simply metaphorical.
But most important in all of this, to my mind, is that atheist attempts to disprove the existence of God, much like theist attempts to prove the existence of God, are doomed to failure because they attempt to turn something that is inherently unfalsifiable into something that is falsifiable. And, as I said above, this has the effect of science demeaning itself in much the same way as religion demeans itself when it seeks to prove the existence of god in scientific terms.
James:
Understood, and in that sense I do think that things like the FSM are pretty useful. But there are times - such as PZ Myer's little Communion wafer stunt, for example - where it seems like the New Atheists go beyond merely defending science/reason when faith tries to go stomping on their turf and instead counterattack by getting involved in purely philosophical questions.
Dave and Ryan:
No. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has argued that it follows that God exists because it is impossible to prove. Instead, I am merely explaining, as was Chris, I think, that the question of whether or not God exists is the wrong question to ask, and by seeking to answer it through pure reason, science reduces itself. But as importantly, religion reduces itself when it insists on getting involved in inherently scientific debates.
As for whether my reading of that Simpsons episode is self-serving, I think that's a pretty silly assertion since my point is that the episode's entire argument was that 1. religion should stay away from science, and 2. it is utterly worthless to seek to disprove through science that which others take as an article of faith. In other words, it's a pretty even-handed episode.
As for whether this series is condescending....well, that's your prerogative to think so, but methinks you misunderstand the entire purpose of this site.
On “Can The (Economic) Ladder Be Restored?”
I shall respond....it just may be a few days. But for starters, it's worth noting that perhaps even more than rent control, a belief in the badness of protectionism is as close to a universally held belief amongst economists as you will find. One other thing I would note is that it is certainly possible that protectionism can benefit a nation's industry in the short run (as I said the other day, Krugman's work on new trade would seem to imply this); however, in doing so, it often has an absolutely terrible effect on other nations. In terms of Africa and developing nations, I think a more likely cause of problems isn't so much their adoption of free trade policies as it is their inability to compete with the forms of protectionism that remain in the developed world (especially the absolutely insane agricultural protectionism of both the US and Europe).
On “Getting Our Priorities in Order”
Roque:
Thanks for the really excellent comment, which raises a whole host of other questions and issues. Too many, in fact, for me to properly address in even a long-form response post, though I'm certainly going to try to address what I can (if and when I get the time, which is a precious commodity these days).
But one follow-up item for right now: how can and should President Obama re-brand the War on Terror (and for that matter, how should President Bush have branded it) such that it does not reinforce the perception that we are fighting a religion rather than the politicization of a religion?
Branding it as a fight against Islamism specifically seems to me fraught with peril because it requires the listener to understand a form of nuance that is highly unlikely, especially, I would imagine, when translated into other languages.
And, again, part of the problem here is that so many of the advocates of going after Islamism don't even attempt to distinguish it from Islam more generally (see, e.g., the way in which so many on the political Right joyfully called the family that was removed from the AirTran flight but cleared by the FBI "jihadis").
"
Roque:
In the case of Israel, the issue of terrorism and/or Islamism is definitely an existential threat, or at the very minimum is justifiably perceived as such. However, I'm not so sure that this holds true in terms of the US. In my own experience, having lived within sight and within walking distance of the Pentagon on 9/11 (and thus experiencing terrorism in a way that Middle America simply cannot understand), I found that over the course of time, the effect of our response to terrorism was having such a tremendous effect on me as to cease to justify the marginally lowered risk of a terrorist attack.
But that's not your point, which I take as being more that Islamism must be viewed in much the same way that we viewed the threat of Communism during the Cold War. That strikes me as a legitimate argument, although I don't think Islamism has achieved nearly enough power to yet present the kind of existential threat once posed by the Soviet Union. But if it were to spread sufficiently, it certainly could eventually come to do so.
One of the things that I try to make clear above (admittedly, this is not my most coherent piece of writing ever) is that the great problem with our current foreign policy thinking is that it does not seem to have any unified primary goal. In many ways, I think that simply uniting behind any primary goal, even one with which I don't necessarily agree, would be preferable to the current status quo of sort of trying to do all things at once.
So then the question becomes whether deterring the spread of Islamism could be that primary goal. I think this would be a hard sell. First, much of the rhetoric of those who most intensely advocate for this view would treat (or at least appears to treat) all Muslims as enemies. This creates a visceral backlash amongst other groups who justifiably are opposed to stereotyping such a large percentage of the world's population. Worse is the fact that many of those (not you, I fully acknowledge) who are most vociferous in their attacks on Islamism are themselves fairly open advocates of mixing church and state here at home, which destroys their argument's credibility.
All this, of course, leaves the issue of how best to deter the spread of Islamism once we have achieved some form of consensus that should be the primary goal of our foreign policy. That is obviously another issue altogether.
On “Economic Interventionism”
I don't think anyone is saying that there aren't a bunch of protectionist trade restrictions around the globe, only that we don't think those restrictions to be a good thing. It's certainly true that in certain instances, protectionism can work to bolster a country's industry, which as I understand it is one of the conclusions that comes out of Krugman's new trade theories. But in doing so, just about any economist (of any political stripe) will tell you that the net effect of such policies is negative on the global economy as a whole. Indeed, protectionism of Western agriculture is often viewed a major contributing factor in Africa's failures to achieve economic development.
On “Getting Our Priorities in Order”
Will: I totally understand. This subject is probably the single most maddening subject for me to get a hold of, if only because it's so damn difficult to articulate a vision with which I can be even remotely comfortable. I do know that trying to impose liberal democracy by force has a pretty bad track record; but even there, I can't discount the possibility that it can work in certain situations or even that it can work in most situations if the larger nation is willing to invest a really, really large amount of resources over a really, really long period of time in order to nurture the seedlings necessary for a successful liberal democracy where few such seedlings exist.
But as I say, my inclination is towards Freddie's general non-interventionism, so for me the burden necessary for intervention is extremely high. The best I can do is to say that a long-term military intervention that will require nation-building is probably only appropriate where the threat it seeks to prevent is, in fact, existential. For lesser threats or for human rights-based interventions, I'd say that intervention needs to be limited to actions that can be achieved within relatively short time horizons with little collateral damage, and only after there is sufficient evidence that the basis for the intervention is essentially proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But I'm even deeply uncomfortable with this formulation.
On “Economic Interventionism”
I of course disagree with you on issues of trade protectionism thanks to the small part of my background that has a basis in economics.
One thing that is important to note here is that often economic sanctions have relatively little practical effect because they are not implemented by all or even most of the world. But they nonetheless permit the objects of those sanctions to scapegoat the sanctioning country for a whole host of problems, and thereby strengthen their position in the world. Even where the sanctions are implemented globally (or near-globally), it will create a pretty substantial black market that results in the wealthiest members of the sanctioned country (usually the dictator and his cronies themselves) left perfectly able to get what they need to still live comfortably while, again, scapegoating the rest of the world for their nation's problems.
On “Falsifying the Unfalsifiable”
Chris:
Fair points. I think part of the issue here is that when one publicizes their religious beliefs (or non-beliefs, as the case may be), they open those beliefs up to evaluation and thus to evaluation of their own capacity for thinking. Beyond that, your points deserve a lengthier more detailed response. Unfortunately, the real world beckons so I don't have time right now to put that response together, which means that response is going to have to join the queue of other items that the real world is currently delaying me from discussing.
"
Jerry: If you think I am directing the "please, be reasonable" directive solely at angry atheists, then I think you misread the post. While they may be the primary focus of this post, that is because atheism is the focus of this particular dialogue.
As for the issue of rational argument vs. angry argument, I simply disagree. In my view, angry arguments are far less likely to persuade those who disagree with you than rational arguments, although they may be more likely to mobilize those who are predisposed to support you. But that is a subject for another day.
"
I'm somewhat hesitant to get back into this debate (even though I wrote the post), because it seems to be getting back into the typical cycle of arguments that I was trying to avoid.
But I think there's an important problem to identify here, which seems to be typical of these cyclical arguments. That is that on the one hand, ED is talking about religion when it is held as a purely personal belief, while on the other hand, Chris seems to be talking about religion when it is applied by the religious person towards others (whether or not the 'others' are also members of that person's religion). The fact is, I don't think anyone would disagree that the maintenance of religious views as a purely personal affair is at the very least harmless (and I would probably argue that it is actively healthy). I also don't think anyone here would disagree that the attempt to force one's own religion on another (to sometimes include persons who are nominally of the same faith) is actively harmful. The trouble is, ultimately, where to draw the line where church, science, and state must be separated. My post was an attempt to draw such a line, although it's certainly possible it didn't do a good job of doing so.
On “Madrick on Case for Big Gov’t”
Will - good job finding that link! That Long piece, despite some slight disagreements with it, was one of my favorite posts from AOTP. It's good to know someone managed to syndicate it before AOTP closed down. And yes, the shut down of AOTP made the C11 shut down doubly painful for me.
On “the inevitability dodge”
"The free market is a better tool than government intervention even culturally."
A point that bears much, much more emphasis. Sanctions in my mind have about the worst track record imaginable in fostering liberalism in other nations. In many ways, they usually seem to strengthen existing regimes by giving them a scapegoat for all of the country's problems even as the profit opportunities inherent in black markets give the sanctions a sieve-like quality even when they are globally enforced (and I can't imagine anything more purely symbolic than unilateral sanctions). I suppose you could argue that they were eventually successful with respect to Libya, but I'm really skeptical of that argument. And even if you grant that argument, the failures outnumber the successes by a massive margin.
On “A Quick Note on A Rigged Game”
It may well be a topic deserving of its own thread. It's also a thread that you can expect me to start.
"
Crap. Now I'm going to have to put together the post I've been saving on this for a few weeks.
On “A Happy BAD Day”
Thanks, Chris. I just wish I had time to add a few more. Indeed, I'd say feel free to update this post with links of your own if you wish.
On “Falsifying the Unfalsifiable”
Andrew: I don't know if you saw my last response to you above. But I think I understand where you're coming from, and fundamentally I tend to agree with it.
There is something in your points that is particularly important, though, and which maybe can help you understand my point in this post a bit better.
You talk, correctly, about the problems of "fake science," and argue, also probably correctly, that religion has been the most frequent (though by no means exclusive) purveyor of such.
To me, though, the issue of "fake science" is the exact same issue of "falsifying the unfalsifiable," just stated in a different manner. The manner in which you use the term "fake science" seems to be that "fake science" occurs when science or, more often, pseudo-science, is used as a moral justification for a particular activity or system of belief.
This, in my mind, exactly identifies the same problem I'm trying to identify in this post; the difference in this case, at least in my view, seems to be that many (though by no means all) of those who are using science as a moral justification for their belief system are themselves scientists. In its own way, as Chris points out, atheism is itself a form of faith, and scientific attempts to justify atheism run into the exact same problems as scientific (or pseudo-scientific) attempts to justify any other form of faith.
So, yes, the abuse or denial of science has long been primarily the domain of theism (of course, the world has long been primarily the domain of theism, but that's a different issue altogether). But that fact, as you clearly acknowledge, does not mean that science cannot be used equally improperly to justify atheism.
All that said, as between atheist misuse of science and theist misuse of science, I have little doubt that the latter is by far the greatest threat, at least in the United States....and it's not even close. But in many ways, that is why I wrote this post - it angers me that atheist misuse of science only adds fuel to the fire that seeks to justify theist misuse of science. It is thus counterproductive to what you and I both seem to agree is the real, important cause for concern.
"
Matoko:
Who do you mean "you"? Stop trying to attribute beliefs that we've never claimed to hold. Again, you have no idea what my personal religious beliefs are, and it is getting really frustrating to have you continue to assume that you do.
"
Andrew:
I understand you concern. Hell, I share it. But I think that when science gets involved in the types of issues I identify here, it helps to contribute (inadvertently) to the strengthening of those who seek to undermine legitimate science.
You note that many theists of less literalist varieties do not get sufficiently involved in these issues; is it possible that part of the explanation for this is a feeling that the forces with which they mostly agree seem bent on promoting the denial of the very basis for their faith in addition to promoting science?
And then there is the other issue, which is true of political questions more generally: political debates are dominated by those who have the greatest perceived interest in those debates, in this case scientists and Biblical literalists.
"
Matoko:
I remind you that we do have a commenting policy. As for "reinforcing your stereotypes," I find that quite amusing as you have absolutely no idea as to any of my personal religious beliefs, so I'm not really sure what "stereotype" I could be reinforcing.
If you don't accept my argument that attempts to scientifically prove the non-existence of God are a detriment to science, that is your prerogative; but the fact is that I wrote this essay out of a profound respect for science and a desire to prevent it from hurting itself by getting involved in debates that it is not intended to get involved with.
"
Matoko: The Discovery Institute has a budget of a whopping $4 million per year. It is also, as you implicitly acknowledge, the primary vehicle for the push to teach ID in schools. While you may think $4 million is a lot of money, the fact is that this is a relatively small budget for such a prominent organization, and it thus requires only a handful of large donors for its funding. So to say that the Discovery Institute is representative of a huge swath of Christendom outside of a handful of areas is utterly devoid of evidence.
"
Matoko: Who started it seems to me to be an irrelevant question (as it is in most debates) since both sides will just point the finger at each other as a means of justifying their behavior. Again, both sides, by seeking to attack on the other side's turf, just wind up demeaning themselves.
"
Matoko: On the grounds where you advocate mocking, I largely agree with you. But the problem with things like the God Delusion, or Myers' desecration of the Communion wafer, is that they go above and beyond defending religious encroachments on scientific turf, and go instead to attacking religion on its own turf.
"
Andrew: the problem you are talking about here is not a problem that is a necessary result of a belief in God. Instead, it is a necessary result of the entanglement of church and state, an issue over which I think it's safe to say all seven us would agree with you. Indeed, that is the specific problem to which I am alluding in this post. At most, the problems you identify are problems with specific organized religions, but they are not problems with a generalized belief in god. Wicca, for example, would not seem to fall into the traps you identify (yes, I'm aware I'm using as an example a religion that is far from widespread, but that's not really the point). Moreover, there's a chicken or the egg problem here: did religions create the prejudices against women and gays or did they merely enshrine pre-existing prejudices?
In terms of the issue of the "young earth" question, I do not think it remotely disprove the existence of a particular god; instead, it refutes a literal interpretation of a particular story in a particular religious text, a story that several of its largest adherents (eg, most forms of Judaism and Catholicism, to name two) have accepted as being simply metaphorical.
But most important in all of this, to my mind, is that atheist attempts to disprove the existence of God, much like theist attempts to prove the existence of God, are doomed to failure because they attempt to turn something that is inherently unfalsifiable into something that is falsifiable. And, as I said above, this has the effect of science demeaning itself in much the same way as religion demeans itself when it seeks to prove the existence of god in scientific terms.
"
E.D. : Thanks. And exactly.
"
James:
Understood, and in that sense I do think that things like the FSM are pretty useful. But there are times - such as PZ Myer's little Communion wafer stunt, for example - where it seems like the New Atheists go beyond merely defending science/reason when faith tries to go stomping on their turf and instead counterattack by getting involved in purely philosophical questions.
"
Dave and Ryan:
No. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has argued that it follows that God exists because it is impossible to prove. Instead, I am merely explaining, as was Chris, I think, that the question of whether or not God exists is the wrong question to ask, and by seeking to answer it through pure reason, science reduces itself. But as importantly, religion reduces itself when it insists on getting involved in inherently scientific debates.
As for whether my reading of that Simpsons episode is self-serving, I think that's a pretty silly assertion since my point is that the episode's entire argument was that 1. religion should stay away from science, and 2. it is utterly worthless to seek to disprove through science that which others take as an article of faith. In other words, it's a pretty even-handed episode.
As for whether this series is condescending....well, that's your prerogative to think so, but methinks you misunderstand the entire purpose of this site.