The Unforgiving Sea: OceanGate, Titan, and Unforgiven Hubris
“Then all collapsed, and the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago.” – Herman Melville
This week’s drama of the Oceangate submersible Titan ended the way I think most of us knew it would:
A vast multinational search for five people who had descended to view the wreckage of the sunken R.M.S. Titanic ended on Thursday after pieces of the privately owned submersible vessel that had carried them were found on the ocean floor, evidence of a “catastrophic implosion” with no survivors, according to the U.S. Coast Guard.
The dramatic search effort, in a remote area of the North Atlantic 900 miles off Cape Cod, Mass., had mesmerized people worldwide for days after the 22-foot watercraft, called Titan, lost contact with its parent ship less than two hours into its voyage on Sunday. The grim discovery, by a remotely operated vehicle scouring the sea bottom, also trained attention on high-risk, high-cost adventure tourism, raising questions about the safety protocols followed by companies that run such expeditions.
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Stockton Rush, 61, the chief executive of OceanGate Expeditions, the company that owned Titan, was piloting the submersible and among those presumed dead. Others on board were Hamish Harding, 58, a British explorer; Paul-Henri Nargeolet, 77, a French maritime expert who had made more than 35 dives to the Titanic; Shahzada Dawood, 48, a British businessman; and his 19-year-old son, Suleman Dawood, a university student.
On the scale of things, the deaths of five people would seem to be minor stuff. What caused this to vault into public consciousness was the horror at the idea of these people slowly running out of oxygen at the bottom of the sea, the race against time before that happened and, to be honest, the ongoing romance we attach to the Titanic and her watery grave. There has also been some schadenfreude over people paying enormous amounts of money to cram into a tin can that resulted in their deaths. But I temper that with knowing that five people were killed, including a teenager who had his entire life ahead of him.
A lot of people have drawn unfavorable comparisons to the coverage of the sinking of the Andriana, which sank in Greek waters, likely drowning several hundred migrants. And while I see their point, I don’t think the two incidents are comparable, other than both involving ships. Andriana was massively overloaded and apparently sank when she turned too fast while trying to evade the Greek Coast Guard. The crew abandoned their charges and had, in fact, locked many passengers below decks, dooming them. There was no days-long drama, only hours to pull people from the water before the sea claimed them. And the Greek Coast Guard did what they could on such short notice, pulling more than a hundred people to safety. Yes, the press coverage was wildly different — at least in the United States. But by the time the press got the word, the event was over, mostly for the worse.
Returning to the Titan, a lot is coming out about the OceanGate company. How they seemed to cut corners on safety, how their now-deceased owner railed against government regulation, how whistleblowers tried to raise the alarm on the design and specs. Doubtless there will be investigations as to what went wrong here, along with lawsuits and perhaps criminal charges.
As to how the accident itself happened, we may never for sure. But my suspicion is that the cause of the accident was a material fatigue (which this OceanGate submersible design had problems with before).
Let me back up a few decades. In the early days of commercial aviation, the first commercial jetliner was the deHavilland Comet. Within a year, it became obvious that something was going terribly wrong as two planes came apart in midair. The investigation that unravelled the mystery was when a Comet fuselage was placed in tank and repeatedly pumped full of water. Eventually, it burst. Examination showed that the repeated pressurization caused microscopic cracks in the material — metal fatigue. Eventually, the cracks spontaneously lined up until the structure failed. This is why modern airplanes are routinely examined for metal fatigue and fatigued parts are replaced.
The Titan was built from a carbon-fiber composite with titanium endcaps and a large window. The point of structural failure could be literally anywhere. But I would be surprised if this was not determined to be the ultimate cause of this tragedy.
But fundamentally, exploring the deep ocean is not something you do on a wing and a prayer. Below is a link to a documentary on James Cameron’s expedition to the Challenger Deep — the deepest trench in the ocean. And while Cameron pushes his people and, in the end, left a potential safety system behind, there is an enormous amount of work, care, testing, retesting and development involved in constructing his submersible.
The thing about exploring the depths of the ocean is that it is a lot like exploring space: the environment is brutally unforgiving of error and hubris. This isn’t like barnstorming with an airplane; it’s pushing technology and science to its limits. As Cameron points out in an interview embedded below, submersible exploration has actually had an excellent safety record because of the enormous care people put into it. We’ve just gotten a horrifying demonstration of what can happen when people don’t.
‘Titanic’ director James Cameron on the ‘catastrophic implosion’ of Titan submersible: “I’m struck by the similarity of the Titanic disaster itself, where the captain was repeatedly warned about ice ahead of his ship and yet he steamed at full speed into an ice field.” pic.twitter.com/vO8JkCXS5f
— ABC News (@ABC) June 22, 2023
“submersible exploration has actually had an excellent safety record because of the enormous care people put into it. We’ve just gotten a horrifying demonstration of what can happen when people don’t.”
Exactly. Deep water and Space are, as you said, unforgiving. At least one guy, who’s video I posted elsewhere, had the sense to not go….Report
Been a minute, I know…
Comet: Fatigue, yes, but also crack propagation and sharp corners (Ever wonder why airlines have oval windows? The comet has square windows.).
Titan: Oh, so much. I suspect that will be a subject of engineering classes for decades to come, and why engineering safety standards are not the same as bureaucratic red tape. I suspect it in the end, the carbon fiber will be the failure point, probably where it joined the titanium caps. At those pressures and temperatures (water is cold down there), it will be susceptible to embrittlement and delamination, and if they weren’t running a scan of the hull after every dive, they’d never have known.Report
Good to see you sirReport
Hi Andrew!Report
This is precisely my thought. In Cameron’s video, they made a single sphere of steel so that it was uniform and a perfect shape for resisting pressure. Once you start mixing materials … it changes.Report
great quote from Cameron on CNN: “Now we have a wreck beside the wreck, and for the same damn reason”Report
it annoys me that this guy actually has an aerospace engineering degree from Princeton, and still thought the laws of nature didn’t apply to him.Report
Oh, you can have an aerospace engineering degree and still know very little. When I first graduated, I was really good at solving PDEs but basically knew nothing about actually designing things.
There’s a term, “black aluminum”, for when someone just throws carbon-fiber composite into a design and assumes it works just like metal only with a higher stiffness-to-density ratio.Report
Black Aluminum: See also Boeing & the 787Report
What I hope people take from this is that we ought to teach undergrad engineers more about CTE than that it exists, and to teach them more about designing for it than “it’s bad, mmmkay?”Report
CTE? Construction Testing & Evaluation?Report
Coefficient of Thermal Expansion. You can make a carbon-fiber structure strong enough to handle whatever load, but if it gets cold it shrinks, and if the metal fittings shrink at a different rate than the rest of the structure they’ll crack it to pieces.Report
Odd, discussions about thermal expansion were very much a part of my training, and I wasn’t even doing a lot of design work (mostly analysis).
In my circles, we’ve been talking about how they clearly weren’t doing any CFD or FEA, or if they were, it was very idealistic analysis, with unrealistic variables.Report
Wait wait wait wait.
It’s now sinking in: This sub has made this journey before, hasn’t it? Like, this was the 4th or 8th or 12th trip it made down there.
And the attitude was “well, it survived last time, it’ll survive this time”?Report
It had dived to the target depth twice before (IIRC).
Materials, when loaded to failure, have two key points of failure: Yield, and Fail.
Fail is when it is very obviously broken/deformed/shattered/cracked, etc.
Yield is when it’s loaded past the point when the material can return to it’s original shape and strength, but it’s not failed yet.
Think of a metal bar. The bar can bend when loaded, and then spring back to it’s original flat shape when unloaded. This is called ‘elastic deformation’.
But if you load that too much, it will yield, and suffer ‘plastic deformation’. It will have a permanent bend in it. Even if you bend it back to it’s flat shape, it’s lot a significant amount of strength, and can no longer carry the load it had before.*
All materials that are loaded past their yield strength can no longer be trusted, even if they look fine.
Oh, and temperature and pressure? Those can affect yield strength, a lot! Hot metals will bend sooner. Cold temperatures cause embrittlement, reducing the ability of the material to elastically deform. Hell, the cold and lack of pressure in space causes all sorts of strange material behavior (re: vacuum welding).
Different types of materials have different yield characteristics. Ductile metals deform/bend. Ceramics tend to crack.
Laminated composites don’t plastically deform like metals, or crack like ceramics. They de-laminate. The layers of fabric that are bonded together with resin, the resin cracks and the layers begin to separate. It’s a quiet failure, very little sound, and can start deep in the material, where it can only be seen with X-rays / MRI type imaging.
So sure, you go down once, twice. During those trips, the cold, and the pressures, and the different rates at which the composite and the metal expand & contract against each other cause the CF to begin de-laminating, probably at the join of the end caps and the cylinder. Once it’s starts failing, it’s only a matter of time, and if they aren’t scanning the hull after every dive, they’ll never know.
And any decent engineering school should have their students taking materials science courses, and more than one (I had 4 by the time I had my BS).Report
Oh, and as an added feature, I heard that the guy had built the sub using expired pre-preg aerospace CF.
Pre-preg CF is carbon fiber that comes pre-impregnanted with resin from the manufacturers. It’s easy to work with and the user doesn’t need to mess with mixing resins and applying them, just wrap your shape and shove it in the autoclave.
But pre-preg has a use-by date. The resin begins curing right away, although very slowly at room temp and normal atmospheric pressure. But still, past a certain date, the resin is partially cured enough that the advertised strength is not possible. So places like Boeing will sell it cheap to hobbyists and smaller manufacturers, who use it to make bikes / kayaks / guitars / custom body panels for a car / anything that doesn’t need to really worry about having the stuff at full strength.
Diving deep – you want full strength.Report
“I heard that the guy had built the sub using expired pre-preg aerospace CF.”
wut dot jpeg
ok so obviously the guy is beyond man’s justice but I think that the people who actually built the thing need to answer some hard questions here, because they were knowingly creating a hazard to human life! This isn’t just “well we’re sure he’s going to get the certification wait what do you mean he didn’t”, this is obviously not good material!Report
Another scary bit from the NYT:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/20/us/oceangate-titanic-missing-submersible.htmlReport
“It’s now sinking in…”
I see what you did there.Report
As long as we keep giving this discourse oxygen, you can expect this sort of thing.Report
“discussions about thermal expansion were very much a part of my training…”
I mean, less “it exists” and more “here are the features you put in a design to deal with it”. That sort of thing I didn’t find out about until a few years into my career, and mostly it came from me asking “why is that designed the way it is”…Report
Yeah, since my program was analysis heavy, I have pretty shallow knowledge as to how you design for it, but we sure as hell factored it into the analysis (part A will expand faster than B, causing these stresses to build up in the parts unless you deal with it; how to deal with it is an exercise for the mechanical/civil engineers).
Still, I too didn’t learn HOW such things are done until after I got into industry. So yeah, the schools aren’t always good about that.Report
Saw this from eigen and I winced and nodded sadly.
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