The 1930s and the Perils of a Failed Europe

Museovirasto, Historian kuvakokoelma, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

The war between Russia and Ukraine has escalated once again in recent days. On October 8, Ukraine blew up the only vehicular and rail transit bridge into Crimea from Russia. Russia responded by firing missiles into the Ukrainian capital. The back-and-forth threatens to increase civilian casualties while also reflecting Russia’s increasingly untenable position in the conflict. Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization has done little to turn the tide. He has resorted to nuclear threats and sham annexations, but there seems to be little expectation that these are more than bluffs and saber-rattling.

Observers believe that these developments point to an eventual Ukrainian success. The Russian government seems unlikely to be able to launch a full mobilization of its people, given their vehement opposition to a partial draft. Every takeover of Ukrainian land is soon repulsed by the Ukrainian army. Russia has had to resort to buying ammunition from North Korea, and there is always the chance of an end to its vital relationship with China. In short, Russia does not seem to have a clear path to victory in this protracted conflict.

But these disadvantages for Russia are complicated by the caveat of Russia’s size and massive army. Russia may not be performing well in the war so far. But there is no reason to think that it will give in anytime soon. There are still millions of soldiers in the Russian army. Russia has lost between 5,000 and 45,000 soldiers as of late August, a high amount for the 21st century but a small percentage of the nation’s armed forces. Some observers believe Ukraine can win the war, but they think it may take years. In a span of five years, anything can happen to change the calculus and improve Russia’s fortunes.

The remainder of the war depends on Europe’s commitment to the Ukrainian cause. The United States may withdraw at least some of their funding in 2023 if Republicans take back the House of Representatives. But European nations border Ukraine and can provide weapons and logistical support more efficiently. This support will evaporate, however, if European countries cannot cope with the soaring energy costs that have resulted from the withdrawal of Russian natural gas. There are already cracks showing in the ruling coalitions of Germany and England, while Italy’s new government is friendlier to Russia than most others on the continent.

A clear analogue to the threats facing Europe is the experience of the continent during the 1930s. Instead of a natural gas shortage, the insurmountable obstacle of that decade was the Great Depression. Europe’s national governments simply could not overcome the high unemployment and mass poverty created by the crisis. Their efforts resulted in strikes, riots, and failed elections.

France famously went through 23 prime ministers between 1930 and 1940 after having only 26 in the previous two decades. The utter inability to combat the Depression led to several countries falling to fascism, such as Germany and Spain. It also left the continent’s other countries greatly weakened and unable to deal with the fascist threat. As Marc Bloch wrote in his history of France’s defeat in 1940, “it was entirely owing to our ministers and our assemblies that we were so ill prepared for war.”

The governments of Europe will face a test reminiscent of the 1930s. This challenge could doom their governments, leading to the election of poor leaders whose only mandates are to make peace with Russia and restart the flow of natural gas. In order to overcome the threat of populist politics, European nations must tackle the problem of gas shortages without tanking their own economies or threatening global stability. Governments must fight the crisis with all of the ingenuity they can muster. The future of their relationships with Russia and the continent overall may be at stake.