Why Putin Has Already Lost His War in Ukraine, Even If He Wins It.
(A Ukrainian artillery crew in action in the Kharkiv region, image courtesy of the BBC)
NOTE : This article was originally written and published in May of 2022, at an earlier stage in the War in Ukraine. Even so, the author believes that circumstances have not changed to the effect that the views provided within would be considered invalid. In fact, Russian offensives have still largely stalled and Ukraine has been launching counteroffensives. Hence, the author believes that the message of the article still stands.
The Current Russian invasion of Ukraine, or as they call it the “special military operation,” has surprised many both with it’s inception and with the slow and disorganized conduct of the war, and Ukraine’s dogged resistance to the war which has caused a slow campaign for Russia bordering on a stalemate. What most expected to be a quick Russian rollover of Ukraine has in fact become a drawn out war with the Ukrainian forces putting up a stiff defense, and the Russians suffering from morale, logistics and technological as well as tactical issues. It is likely that just like everyone else, the Russian administration is also quite surprised with the turn of events. It is definitely not what they were hoping or intending for to happen. Russia’s invasion was a multi directional combined arms effort, intending to rapidly take over the country in a little blitzkrieg. It’s also possible they were hoping for assistance from Ukrainians who were Russian speakers, or dissatisfied with Zelenskyy’s rule, or both, in the manner which they received from Russian speakers in Donetsk and Luhansk. This did not materialize, at least not at the level they had hoped, with the majority of Ukraine digging in to fight the foreign invasion.
There have been many different theories as to why Putin decided to change his plans from the Hybrid-Warfare and policy of promoting instability, secession, and chaos in Ukraine, to a conventional military invasion that would come at a major cost. Some attribute it to ideological reasons related to creating a new Soviet or Russian empire which encompasses former Russian territories like Ukraine, while others have theorized it as a response to rampant NATO expansion and to prevent said expansion into Ukraine. For Putin himself, his aims when initiating the special military operation were to “Demilitarize and Denazify” Ukraine and to protect the Russian speaking minority in Ukraine which he believed was being oppressed by the regime in Kiev. His initial war goal was to take over all of Ukraine and replace its regime with one that was more well disposed to Russian interests, thereby preventing Ukraine from joining NATO or the West. This would also create a better position for the separatists in Donbass, who could possibly be integrated into Russia like Crimea at a later stage. This meant that the invasion started as a conventional major military action, aimed at capturing and occupying all of Ukraine from multiple directions and especially aimed at capturing Kyiv.
Looking at this as the original war goal, Russia’s war has not at all been going well. The Ukrainian army has kept a hold on most of the territory it could, and Russian troops have suffered heavy casualties and logistical issues. Russia has not been able to capture Kyiv even after multiple attempts, and they currently hold few major cities outside Crimea or Donbass. Russian troops have not been able to advance much further from their original bases in Crimea and the separatist areas of Ukraine, and have in around two and a half months have only been able to take small areas in the East and South-East, including the city of Kherson. They have not been able to take the larger more economically and politically vital cities in the west such as Odessa, Kyiv, and Lviv with even Mariupol in the East not completely taken. Russia’s attempted blitzkrieg has struggled heavily to such an extent that Putin had after a month of the operation to backtrack, pulling back from Western Ukraine and replacing his goal of regime change in Kyiv to, at least for now, the “liberation of Donbass.” Considering that this area was already heavily dominated by separatist forces which are allied to Russia and the proximity to Russian border bases of operation, this war-goal is much simpler and achievable for Putin at the current point, with Russia holding most of the Donbass already and most of its major cities as well.
The problem for Russia with this goal is while it gives them a much more easily achievable and quicker small tactical victory, from the perspective of Russian grand strategy or the long run, it will be a hollow or worse Pyrrhic victory. The fundamental doctrinal reasons for Russia’s war in Ukraine dictated a takeover of Ukraine and complete removal of its hostile government and its replacement with a friendly regime. The material conditions at the time of the start of the invasion and ever since vis à vis sanctions and the reaction of the rest of the world, especially the West, dictated that the war had to be over quickly without it becoming a long, drawn out scene. If Russia could not resolve together these two needs, then it would face problems.
To elaborate more on this, we need to look at what it has cost Russia to just initiate and carry out this war. In previous operations such as the Russo-Georgian War (2008), the takeover of Crimea (2014) and the War in Donbass (2014-onwards), the repercussions or cost to Russia for these actions was either relatively low or at the least tolerable for the Russian government. The Putin regime was able to weather relatively calmly the heavy sanctions for their actions in 2014, but the current sanctions and response they have received from the West are much more intense than the aforementioned ones. Western economic sanctions have caused the rouble to tank, reaching as low as 110 per dollar. This has caused major shocks to the Russian economy. Many multinationals such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola have pulled out of Russia along with retail shops from foreign brands like Puma or IKEA getting closed. Tech giants such as Samsung and Sony have suspended shipments, and many oil firms have also pulled out. Western finance giants like Visa and MasterCard have also pulled out. This has resulted in Russia getting isolated and cut off financially from the world, creating major financial issues. The sanctions have reduced their sale of oil and created issues for it, resulting in a situation which is not sustainable. Russia is cut-off from the rest of the world, both domestically and export-wise, and cannot keep relying on oil or their foreign exchange reserves for too long.
The war has been costly for Russia even though for the time being they can afford to fight it. Russia has faced losses in manpower and, more importantly, technology such as planes and tanks which have pricked it even more financially. The above mentioned sanctions and financial setbacks have created major issues for Russia’s economy, with inflation rates reaching a 20-year record. These economic woes for Russia will last as long as the war does, and their aftershocks will last even more. The longer the war drags on, these will only get worse. Hence the invasion has for Russia been extremely costly, and has gotten more and more costly as the war drags on. Russia’s reduction of their war-goals can be seen as a response to this.
The invasion was a costly idea from the beginning, as any invasion usually is. But it seems Putin miscalculated both the Western response and the conduct of the military campaign required to take Ukraine. Both have been very different from previous responses to and circumstances for Russian actions. It’s possible, based on Russia’s ability to weather previous situations and NATO’s mute response in late 2021 and early 2022, that he expected the invasion to be quick and to face no serious repercussions for it. But that is not what has happened. There has been a major cost for the invasion.
If we look at Russian foreign and security policy doctrine, it has, until 2022, heavily emphasized low-cost and low-risk actions. The Russian doctrine has been heavily influenced by the ideas of Yvginiy Primakov, the former prime minister and foreign minister of Russia. He has heavily influenced Putin and the current Russian leadership, as Putin himself has admitted many times. One of the major ideas of his that Russia has until recent times stuck to, has been calculated low-cost and low-risk operations to further their policy goals. The current invasion simply does not fit this bill. It has been a move off their beaten path. Their invasion of Georgia, intervention in Syria and support of rebels in eastern Ukraine were all actions which were either pre-calculated to make sure they were affordable, or were inherently low-cost, as in the latter two instances. Compared to those, the current invasion was a major risk and gamble, like the takeover of Crimea. The West let the former slide but not this. It is that miscalculation that is the start of problems for Russia.
But even then, if Russia would have managed to finish their war quickly and efficiently and could bring about a conclusion before it would become a global scene, or before the sanctions could do major harm, they would have succeeded in keeping their victory. But now, with the time that has passed and the sanctions only making it worse for Russia, the cost to start and fight this war, has outweighed the benefits, especially after Russia has decided to focus only on Donbass. Even if they completely take the Donbass the damage to their economy and social fabric is done, it has taken long enough that they will also be international pariahs for quite a while. The aftershocks and results of sanctions and economic crises in Russia will keep coming even after taking Donbass and it is likely a victory in Donbass won’t be enough to placate the Russian people after such trumpet blaring at the start about taking Kiev and removing the “Nazis” within it. Integrating the Donbass into Russia will also not bring economic benefits for a while at least and also will involve it’s own cost. Hence winning that war goal will result in a Pyrrhic victory due to the reasons we’ve talked about previously.
If Russia decides after taking Donbass to take Kiev, it can possibly do so, but this will mean the war stretches out for even longer and costs even more. Even after a military victory, pacifying Ukraine will be hell for Russia and hence this will cost more and take longer. Along with this, the longer Russia leaves the West of Ukraine away, the longer it gives those in Kiev to regroup, restrengthen and create more hurdles for Russia. With the full might of Russia’s armed forces they can reasonably take over all of Ukraine, but this will take time and cost a lot of men and tanks. Even fixing the current tactical issues that Russia has faced in Ukraine will require time and money. Both which Russia will soon run out of as they can’t keep going on with this war for too long. This is not the middle-ages where the common-folk will tolerate a hundred-year war. Of course that is hyperbole, but the point stands that Russia has finite time to finish the war.
There are very few possibilities where Russia could take all of Ukraine fast enough and finish major military operations quickly enough in order to still be able to salvage any positive out of this. If they only take the Donbass, they still have a hostile half-Ukraine next to them which will fight, and a half-victory which their people might not accept. If they take all of Ukraine it will be too long, too late, and too costly, meaning that Russia will have to deal with it’s own domestic and financial problems even with a friendly Ukraine.
There is some irony in this situation which can draw a few parallels with the Soviet Union’s Invasion of Afghanistan. Both conflicts are very different but the position Russia is in is somewhat similar. They cannot leave without a full victory, but a full victory will be costly and take time which will cause domestic problems. The Ukraine war will get done sooner than the nine year Afghanistan war, but in the 21st century where wars end in days and weeks, and where upsetting the international opinion has grave consequences, it just might not be soon enough. Russia has gone past the period which could ensure a quick and stable victory, and now whatever their military victory is, it will cost them too much to be worth it.
Putin has lost his war, even if he goes on to win it.
References :
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-goals.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589
https://www.rferl.org/a/putins-godfather/27100746.html
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254
There was what I thought a pretty interesting story in the post back in August on the Russian intelligence failure:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/
Now seeing as how this is the post I think the whole series needs to be read with an grain of salt and assumption that the sources include various CIA and Blob triumphalists and influence peddling of limited credibility. But even giving them as little credit as possible I think it’s probable that the Russians completely misread the commitment of their proxies in Ukraine. It’s one thing to take money, advocate for Russian interests, and obstruct various Ukrainian nationalist projects and/or Western influence. It’s another entirely to be willing to die for someone else’s ideology when the shooting starts. And that’s where I do think you have to give the Zelensky government a lot of credit for having the nerve to stay in those early days. Once it became clear that there was not going to be the complete defection the Russians anticipated they found themselves in an actual war they weren’t prepared for.Report
One of the things we did at Leaguefest was visit the International Spy Museum.
It was a fun little trip. One of the exhibits I remember was about George Warshington Himself. There was a section devoted to how he was also a spymaster and it contained this line:
I think that there’s another thing going on, though… Putin refused to believe things that were true even after seeing proof. It ain’t hard to out-spy a guy who does not believe things that are demonstrably true because he prefers his theories.Report
Humans are very much motivated reason-ers, and I think that has been the story of early 21st century warfare. And that’s kind of where my caveat about the Post and its sources comes in. At least as far as the official record goes our own intelligence agreed with Putin’s assessment. Otherwise there’s no way we would have believed that Ukraine would fall in a few days, purely based on the numbers of Russian forces committed.Report
One of the reasons Washington was successful with intelligence was he encouraged his officers to foster their own spying operations/networks so long as they shared with him the intelligence. Decentralized ops, encouraging individual initiative are successful American features of war.
But the British lost for a lot of other reasons, including not having enough men to pacify the colonies, alienating non-affiliate Americans by their occupation, particularly the Hessian mercenaries, and performing poorly in a war of movement (which can be attributed to hostile natives and poor intelligence).Report
Soldiers hate to admit they were out fought. The brits were out fought by us and even worse by the French. Easy to blame tricksy spies. A classic variation of the stabbed in the back story losers love to tell themselves.Report
Institutionally, Putin can’t make decisions based on reality.
Putin’s ideology includes the state will define what “truth” is. So the Russian military is thought to be very strong simply because anyone who reports problems or anything other than the official “truth” has serious problems. “Problems” can include being arrested or even murdered.
Up and down the entire chain of command, no one is willing to talk about problems they see, everyone tells their superiors what they want to hear.
The Russians thought they were prepared for the war. They’d roll over everything and set up “reeducation” camps and all the nasty aspects of Soviet Empire. The West would weakly stand by and watch this happen.
They not only didn’t know how strong they were or how much Ukraine would resist, but they couldn’t know it because it wasn’t the Truth the state wanted to exist.
Edit: And presumably this is still a problem. Putin may STILL have people telling him the Ukraine will fold, probably in the Winter. The troops don’t have moral problems. The various supply issues have been resolved.Report
It also shows the drawbacks of a kleptocracy. All the institutions in Russia are run by corrupt oligarchs, and surprise, every effort is crippled by skimming and graft.
From what I’ve read, part of the low morale among Russian soldiers is that their pay and bonuses are getting skimmed by the commanders.Report
I think it’s a little more complicated and a little less Putin-specific. We had similar fundamental problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference is that we’re way richer, our actual brass isn’t corrupt (at least not to the point it’s willing to sell or tolerate the selling of the tires on their trucks anyway), and our military industrial complex is dedicated to making our technology work most of the time in exchange for its perpetual siphoning under limited quality controls. But I’m not sure that, say, Donald Rumsfeld, was leaps and bounds ahead of Putin in any qualitative way.Report
Gummibear737 has a very interesting thread on twitter here:
I’ll use the threadreader app to share the whole thing in case it disappears:
And he links to his deepdive:
Report
Russia is in Europe and thus the War is in Europe. Further members of the EU have been getting close to Russia as though it were a normal country in spite of the US pointing out that it’s not. As expensive as the US winning could/will be, it’s no where near as bad as Russia winning.
Putin is trying to put Russia’s empire of fear and brutality back together. The choices are stopping him or not stopping him.Report
This is a good summation of May 2022, and, as you note, holds up through Sept. I’m reminded, though, how kinetic military actions, special military operations and even wars have longer horizons than our twitter feeds can handle. Ukraine fending off the blitzkrieg was indeed impressive. A nod to realist notions that nuclear umbrellas should be reserved for existential threats, and conventional balancing of interoperable arms more important for local threats. Knowing the difference is the lost art.
But, back to the present moment, I just don’t know if we’re witnessing the collapse of the Russian regime or merely the first phase of the war… we could go back and look at the Battle of the Marne in 1914 and remember how it was all going to be over by Christmas. The Entente (well, the French anyway) had cutoff the Allied overextension and, well, all downhill from there.
I’m not entirely sure what the Ukraine and Zelensky govt have as ‘acceptable terms’ in their minds… could be the complete removal of all Russian nationals from Donbas/Crimea – a sort of Greece/Turkey 1922 swap of populations… could be some sort of negotiated settlement that trades territory for hardened boarders and third party guarantees plus military aid… which they’ve signaled in the past. I suspect the latter more than the former; but we shall see.
The thing about exit strategies during war (or special military operations or kinetic actions) is that both sides want the ‘upper hand’ during negotiations… but hands change over time, and the lower hand has incentive to double down to become the upper at a later phase. In any event, I doubt Russia entertains negotiations prior to seeing what father winter brings to the table in terms of hand-shaping-events. But, who knows, maybe China has alternate notions.
And, from Ukraine’s perspective, gaining an upper hand works against the notion of crafting an exit strategy – why do so with victory obviously immanent? Nevertheless, as noted above, I doubt there’s a negotiation strategy prior to winter… absent a strategic breakthrough or Russian internal change (or Chinese notions).
Which is all to say… war is unpredictable; a rolling of the dice. Knowing when to pick-up the dice is the art of statecraft.Report
I’m a bit more optimistic for the Ukrainians, and way more than I was a few months ago. My belief is that if the war stays conventional, the Western arms and money spigot stays on, and Russia doesn’t mobilize, then Ukraine will eventually outright defeat Russian forces, at least back to roughly the lines on February 23. The question is how and whether Russia will (can?) react to that eventuality. That’s where I think we are completely in the dark, no matter how many meltdowns there are in Russian milblogs or tv.Report
I’m less sanguine about non-negotiated return to status quo ante … it’s certainly possible; but Russian retrenching around a greater Donbas position that’s less convex and has fewer salients is more likely.
Military optimism for me would be retaking Kherson and holding the Dnieper in the south and folding back the Karkiv salient in the North East as a possible end to offensive operations by Russia (for now).
But that’s where I think your point about greater Russian mobilization (schroedinger’s mobilization?) also kicks in… abandoning the Kyiv Blitz strategy and doggedly holding a greater Donbas/Crimea is a realistic option.
Not sure if that’s really an optimistic strategic outcome, though…Report
Yea, I certainly get uncomfortable about making any predictions that seem to rely on the dynamics of internal Russian politics.Report
The Zaporizhzhia Oblast’s coast looks a lot more vulnerable to a counterattack today than it did two weeks ago. Its terrible defensive terrain where there’s been a lot of reports of partisan activity and the flanks and rear of any thrust southward are no longer threatened by Russians in Izium.Report
The diplomacy will only start in earnest once both sides see some form of settlement as being preferable to the war itself continuing. The Russians are too deluded and have too much strength to really want to negotiate yet and the Ukrainians have very realistic expectations that they can succeed in driving the Russians back and a population that is too supportive of pushing for total victory to feel very incented to settle at this point.
In the autumn the big question is how if/how much the Ukrainians can roll back the Russians and if/how much the Russians can institutionally sustain those losses. Once we get to winter the true test will fall on Europe- when the energy shortage really starts to bite hard how will the masses respond to the inevitable sharp recession? Russia is gambling that the angry European masses will oust supportive Governments in favor of Governments that’ll push the Ukrainians to settle or (best case from the Russian pov) all out riots in Europe over energy. If Europe stiff-upper-lips through to the spring then Russia is going to be up the creek without a paddle.Report
I largely agree; mildly disagree about the creek and paddle though. More likely: if the Russian winter gambit fails to tip the hand decisively in their favor then they negotiate a smaller truce… how small? Depends on the next 1-3 months.Report
Russia was only supposed to start losing over the long haul. They’d run out of weapons/troops/etc and their economy would be damaged.
Given how badly Russia has been losing this week, the long haul may already be here. This may not last until the winter.Report
If you aren’t going to pay your soldiers at some point they will stop wanting to be shot at.Report
Lack of pay is only one issue. They’ve been told they’re winning, fighting Nazis, and will be welcomed by the locals. Their equipment and training are both non-existent to terrible.
Their best solders have already been used. Their median soldier is unmotivated unequipped cannon fodder. Presumably Putin doesn’t know this. Their leadership will try to brutality their way through this.
The West’s supply lines are longer but can’t be disrupted and should be fully stocked by now. Russia is already being pushed back, and it’s only going to get harder for them.Report
From your lips to God(ess?)’s ears. I can only presume the Russians will reset their lines. The Ukrainians aren’t still romping around in the north now as far as I know. I don’t have a reliable place to get daily updates on Ukraine and I don’t sift through twitter. I’ve found Farley’s posts over at LGM pretty good though.Report
Adam Silverman at Balloon Juice is also a good source.Report
I follow the ISW/Critical Threats Updates.Report
On the Northern front the Russians don’t have a good point to reanchor the line and don’t have good logistics hub close to the front line, so they’re likely to lose more before things stabilize. However, even in the event of continued total Ukranian success, I doubt they venture far into northern Luhansk because
1. There’s not a lot worth very much there
2. It pushes them into an unfavourably exposed salient.Report
One irreversible victory achieved by Ukraine is to demolish the myth of superiority of the fascists like Putin and Orban.
One of the biggest features which drew the admiration of Western fascists was the aura of them being some invincible juggernaut, and their victory inevitable by virtue of their intrinsic (and here you can pick and choose your attributes) masculinity, traditional cultural values, discipline, or Christianity.
Remember all those American fascists having a man crush on the shirtless Putin on horseback? Or the way they compared the manly men of the Russian army to the “woke” girly boys of the Americans? How they cheered for Orban at CPAC?
That myth is laughable as we see Russian troops dropping the guns and fleeing in terror from advancing Ukrainian troops, some 20% of whom are women.
Their weakness combined with the widespread reports of torture and war crimes in the areas they control shows us what the world of the fascists and their supporters looks like.Report