The Conservative Supreme Court Takes On The Right

David Thornton

David Thornton is a freelance writer and professional pilot who has also lived in Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. He is a graduate of the University of Georgia and Emmanuel College. He is Christian conservative/libertarian who was fortunate enough to have seen Ronald Reagan in person during his formative years. A former contributor to The Resurgent, David now writes for the Racket News with fellow Resurgent alum, Steve Berman, and his personal blog, CaptainKudzu. He currently lives with his wife and daughter near Columbus, Georgia. His son is serving in the US Air Force. You can find him on Twitter @CaptainKudzu and Facebook.

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22 Responses

  1. Pinky
    Ignored
    says:

    An article beginning “For instance”? Did this get posted correctly? (I mean, I have no problem with stylistic choices, but it looks odd.)Report

    • KenB in reply to Pinky
      Ignored
      says:

      Oh I just realized, the intro para is actually showing up as the subhed for the article on the front page.

      “ We’ve heard a lot of complaints about the Supreme Court over the past few months. Some of these complaints have been justified. Others not so much.”Report

  2. CJColucci
    Ignored
    says:

    The Presidential immunity case is thorny and complicated only because some of the Supremes decided to make it so. Philosopher-King manque Gorsuch openly aspires to write “an opinion for the ages,” which it can do only by gratuitously reaching out and deciding issues that are not in this case and may never come up. (He and Kavanaugh are prone to this.) Unless they are willing to rule that there is absolute Presidential immunity, even for shooting someone on Fifth Avenue, which I am almost certain they aren’t, they do not have to set out the metes and bounds of hypothetical cases where immunity might be appropriate. They can easily say that the conduct alleged here is not covered by any conceivable notion of Presidential immunity and leave it at that.
    Or they could have not taken the case, for the same reasons.Report

    • InMD in reply to CJColucci
      Ignored
      says:

      If this case is worthy of an opinion at all, it could be a single sentence. If some additional flourish is required, the sentence after the one where they say what Trump did doesn’t qualify it could be something like ‘We leave future determinations of applicability to the learned jurists who will follow in our footsteps, should such questions arise.’Report

    • DavidTC in reply to CJColucci
      Ignored
      says:

      They can easily say that the conduct alleged here is not covered by any conceivable notion of Presidential immunity and leave it at that.

      Or they could just say ‘No’. That should be the entire decision, ‘This premise is idiotic and obviously wrong’. There’s absolutely no reason that a president should enjoy immunity from _criminal acts_ committed while in office after he’s no longer in office. None. Zero.

      There is absolutely no constitutional justification for that that can possibly exist, in fact, there’s _negative_ constitutional justification for that, because we have an impeachment clause only allows the President to be punished be removing and barring from office, and the implication is that, at that point, actual criminal trials could commence.

      This isn’t like the complicated question of criminally charging the president _while in office_, which also isn’t explicitly constitutionally justified but could possibly be implied by things.Report

    • Burt Likko in reply to CJColucci
      Ignored
      says:

      To “write a case for the ages” implies that the case will be celebrated in years to come. But Gorsuch, more than any of his colleagues, knows that the bare meaning of the phrase simply is that it’s a case that will be remembered for the duration of American law, a case that will make it into Constitutional Law textbooks.

      So Dred Scott v. Sanford was a decision for the ages, just as much as Brown v. Board fo Education was. Korematsu v. United States was a decision for the ages too, and it hasn’t even been overruled yet either by case or Constitutional amendment.

      I’m sure Justice Gorsuch will have an opportunity to write a case for the ages. But until he realizes that the reason some cases are celebrated and other cases are condemned is that some expand liberties, and others diminish them, he seems to be fated to write a case that will be remembered for the ages the same way that cases like Bowers v. Hardwick or Lochner v. New York are.Report

  3. DavidTC
    Ignored
    says:

    Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases. These precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber. As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence at the founding. Rather, it ‘extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence.’ By that same logic, the Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to muskets and sabers.

    Compare to the actual decision of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen:

    After reviewing the Anglo-American history of public carry, the Court concludes that respondents have not met their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause requirement. Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense. Nor have they generally required law-abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community” to carry arms in public.

    In other words, ‘You can in fact do new gun regulations, but there is some magical threshold that we will not explain that is _too much_ new regulation. And we are pretending that this is some real constitutional test we have clearly stated, not just opinions of ours about how different laws are or how often we’ve had laws like that.’.

    Fun fact: American governments simply did not regulate the ownership of automatic weapons before automatic weapons existed. But now they _do_, does that somehow make those regulations okay?

    Does it matter that that such a things were new when regulated? Well, you could argue that, except there they are, talking about how the Second Amendment applies to all bearable arms, and bearable arms were not regulated in how often they fired based on a single trigger pull…_until they were_.

    How the hell are new rules supposed to work and get ‘broad acceptance’ or ‘generally require’ things to create an ‘American tradition’ if those laws immediately get struck down?

    What sort of utter gibberish is this?

    This is almost the same gibberish as the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ line, in that if you strike down ‘unusual punishments’ you can’t ever add punishments because all punishments are unusual until they aren’t, except a) that requires something to be both cruel _and_ unusual, which mostly just means we can’t invent _new_ horrific punishments, and are stuck with only the old horrific ones…and any new good ones we come up with. I.e., that part of the constitution is kinda stupid, but it’s kinda stupid in a _good_ way, it stops us from legalizing torture as punishment. (We probably should just ban cruel punishment, period, but way too much of what we traditionally do is overtly cruel.)

    But how the hell can that sort of logic work with gun laws: ‘You can create new gun laws, as long as they have long history of existing and working. But we promise isn’t possible to create them.’

    And this ignores the fact we actually _do_ have a history of creating laws restricting carry, which they just pretend didn’t exist because they weren’t particularly common. In addition, the vast majority of the statutes that respondents
    invoke come from the Western Territories. The bare existence of these localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of an otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry.

    So let me see if I’ve pieced this together: If gun laws are challenged in court, they should be struck down unless there is a history of such laws prevailing in court. If no such laws have been challenged, they should be struck down.

    Hmm.Report

    • Burt Likko in reply to DavidTC
      Ignored
      says:

      I think the real turn comes in the next paragraph of Roberts’ majority opinion:

      As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition. 597 U. S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Discerning and developing the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge.” Id., at 28.

      Two things that I take away from this:

      1. The Chief is coming all the way around the jurisprudential horseshoe to living constitutionalism here. Once an originalist concedes that there are principles that underlie the limits and balances of powers allocated in the Constitution, and it’s the Court’s job to apply those principles to modern laws addressing modern problems, the whole game is given away. The moose has got the muffin. The slope has begun to slip. There’s no stopping it — you’re soon enough going to be “breathing life” into the words of the Constitution and holy crap you’ve just transmogrified yourself into William Brennan. Oh, no, Toto, I don’t think we’re in 1791 anymore!

      2. That last line is… facially true and simultaneously risible. It’s very easy to justify, or criticize, a given law by way of reference to some larger principle. It’s very hard to get other lawyers to agree with you that you’ve done so in a proper and intellectually honest way, particularly when it happens that those abstract principles somehow always wind up favoring your client’s preferred interpretation of the specific modern law. In particular, getting nine unelected mandarins to agree that a given contemporary articulation of a timeless Constitutional principle applies in this or that way as regards a given statute will probably prove a good deal less simple than the “commonplace” of which Chief Justice Roberts writes — just as it did in this very case.

      My last thought on Rahimi is that the plaintiff here is a poster boy for “Dudes Who Obviously Ought Not Have Guns.” You knew he was going to wind up losing this case when the Court spent so long detailing the criminally dangerous things he had done with weapons in a [checks back to the opinion] twelve-month period culminating in firing a handgun in a fast food restaurant to resolve a dispute about a declined credit card.Report

      • DavidTC in reply to Burt Likko
        Ignored
        says:

        I think it’s pretty clear that you can’t articulate any sort of plausible constitutional principles based on history if you cannot hypothetically rewind time and play it forward under those constitutional principles and come to the same conclusion.

        Just the basic ‘Was it permissable, under the logic of this decision, to ban fully automatic weapons in 1986 if the question had been raised in 1986?’

        Because otherwise all you’re saying is ‘grandfather clause’ and trying to thread a needle in a way that sure as hell cannot be originalism, and you don’t get to pretend it is.Report

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