Horseshoes and the Ukraine War

David Thornton

David Thornton is a freelance writer and professional pilot who has also lived in Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. He is a graduate of the University of Georgia and Emmanuel College. He is Christian conservative/libertarian who was fortunate enough to have seen Ronald Reagan in person during his formative years. A former contributor to The Resurgent, David now writes for the Racket News with fellow Resurgent alum, Steve Berman, and his personal blog, CaptainKudzu. He currently lives with his wife and daughter near Columbus, Georgia. His son is serving in the US Air Force. You can find him on Twitter @CaptainKudzu and Facebook.

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42 Responses

  1. Greg In Ak says:

    One point. Nuland has become the center of a bunch of vicious conspiracies. Typically they point out that she has Jewish grandparents from Ukraine. Hint hint nudge nudge. They see her as a nefarious figure who has fomented war for years and is behind much of this. Gee never heard a jew being accused of acting as a shadowy figure manipulating all the good xtians to kill before. The pro invader side is steeped in a anti semitism. Not that the left side of the horseshoe cares about that. Or they are just fine with it.Report

    • Philip H in reply to Greg In Ak says:

      We do often care about it and we call it out, but dealing with it when, as you note, its wink wink stuff (as it always is) gets us nowhere. Even the “hey you are supporting dictatorial authoritarians who are anathema to the freedom you claim to love” approach gets us nowhere. Because they don’t care.Report

  2. InMD says:

    I believe that a lot of this is ripples from the fundamentally unjustified invasion of Iraq and to a lesser degree the long, pointless occupation of Afghanistan. You can probably also throw Libya and our various not not interventions in Syria. The basic principle that both the extreme left and the extreme right are expressing in this case is actually the right one, that being that no country including the US has the right to do this sort of thing and all such actions are inherently wrong and illegitimate. Where the blinders come in is that in the case of Ukraine it really is Russia doing the bad thing and none of it was justified by the various intrigues prior to the actual invasion. Maybe I’d feel differently had the Ukrainians just folded like everyone predicted but you can’t fake the kind of fight they’re putting up no matter how much Western tech and weapons we provide.

    Also that line about Israel-Palestine is just downright hilarious in light of what has happened there over the last few weeks. I have to assume the irony was intentional but fear that it wasn’t.Report

    • Jaybird in reply to InMD says:

      The fact that there aren’t troops or “advisors” over there allows for the relationship between Ukraine and Iraq/Afghanistan to not be 1:1.

      (I mean, there probably are advisors over there, but they’re three-letter and not draftees, so that’s fine.)

      When it comes to the aid we’re sending, I am 100% down with giving away the stuff we were just going to dispo in a year or so anyway. The Ukrainians can use it, we can see how it does, make the next version better after seeing it for-real-tested in the field, everybody’s happy.

      But it is pushing Russia and China closer together. It does seem to be making other risks (including a handful of existential ones) larger. And I don’t know what the end game is other than complete and total defeat of Russia.

      I suppose the elder advisors in charge of elderly advising leadership over here is old enough to remember Vietnam movies and they have a *LOT* of opinions about turnabout being fair play.

      I suppose we can look forward to a bunch of Russian “Ukraine” movies in the 2030s.

      Ya neschastnyy syn.Report

      • InMD in reply to Jaybird says:

        I’m convinced at this point that there is enough Ukranian nationalism that they’d be fighting the occupation with or without us, it just at some point might become an insurgency as opposed to a conventional war with the pre invasion Ukranian state still very much in the fight. I also see no downside at this point to giving them all kinds of weapons to defend themselves and retake their own territory, as long as no US soldiers set foot in Ukraine (or fly in their skies, etc.). My controversial take is I think it was legitimate for Iran to do the same thing against us with respect to insurgents in Iraq.

        In terms of the endgame I think we are probably very far away from one. It will almost certainly have go account for Russian security interests, but I don’t know that it has to reward them with territory.

        There was an interesting interview the other day with Fiona Hill that got into some of that.

        https://unherd.com/2023/02/absolute-victory-over-russia-isnt-possible/Report

      • Damon in reply to Jaybird says:

        “The fact that there aren’t troops or “advisors” over there allows for the relationship between Ukraine and Iraq/Afghanistan to not be 1:1.” Dude, if you REALLY think that there are not non Ukraine troops fighting Russian, I got a bridge in NYC to sell ya. They are called “mercenaries”. You take off 1 patch, and put on another. Just because they get paid (either by Ukraine-via $ transferred by the CIA or some other method) doesn’t mean there aren’t non natives there doing “war” with the tacit approval of the western powers.Report

        • Jaybird in reply to Damon says:

          I mean “not US troops over there”.

          If a regular guy wants to buy a plane ticket to Prague and hitchhike to Ukraine and shoot people, hey.

          It’s a free country.Report

          • Damon in reply to Jaybird says:

            Dude, you REALLY think there are no US military there?

            Note, I’m including military trained CIA guys, regular military guys who “left” the service and are over there either on the CIA payroll, or being paid by Ukraine, or being paid by Ukraine with money from western countries, guys with technical skills to show them how to use the weapons we gave them, etc. Just because they may not cross the legal definitions, you damn well know those people would not be there without tacit western/us support/concurrence/endorsement.Report

            • North in reply to Damon says:

              None of the guys you listed would qualify as US Military either legally or in terms of political opinion. It’s harsh to say but the cynical truth is that if every American like the ones you described got blown up in Ukraine over the course of a weekend it’d make nary a ripple in the political considerations here (other than a lot of curiosity as to how the Russians managed it).Report

              • Damon in reply to North says:

                “None of the guys you listed would qualify as US Military either legally or in terms of political opinion.”

                Exactly. However, the Russians don’t care about legal technicalities, and frankly, I don’t either.Report

              • InMD in reply to Damon says:

                Yea, but it’s hardly unprecedented. Soviet pilots flew in Korea and Vietnam under the flags of the communist belligerents. Caution is of course always warranted but the distinction between the proxy and the country supporting it has a pretty well established history. At the very least it isn’t like it’s some hair splitting thing we’re pulling out of our ass for convenience.Report

              • Damon in reply to InMD says:

                “Yea, but it’s hardly unprecedented.”

                But it’s important for people to understand that when somebody in the administration says “there are no US troops in Ukraine” or “we’re only giving them material aide” it’s BS. Even if it’s covert, there are likely american boots on the ground being paid, in one way or another with your tax money.Report

              • North in reply to Damon says:

                It’s not BS because they aren’t being forced to go. They aren’t even volunteer US servicefolk being ordered to go. They’re mercenaries (if they exist at all) which puts them in an entirely different category both politically and legally than actual US troops.Report

            • Jaybird in reply to Damon says:

              There’s nobody over there who would count as counting toward a “grim milestone” if Bush were in office.Report

      • Slade the Leveller in reply to Jaybird says:

        I suppose we can look forward to a bunch of Russian “Ukraine” movies in the 2030s.

        Looking forward to The Beast 2!Report

  3. Marchmaine says:

    “The Russo-Ukraine war is going to end in one of two ways. Either Russia is going to conquer Ukraine or Ukraine is going to be free”

    I appreciate the sentiment, but that’s just not accurate. I could end one of a hundred unknowable ways.

    But it’s the right vector of question: what should the exit strategy be?

    As a certain sort of hawk/realist I’m generally pleased with Biden’s approach (from what I can see). Providing aid and materiel of some types but not others is prudent.

    What concerns me, however, is that despite providing arms/materiel Ukraine might lose, or win, or other events might overtake Ukraine, or we overplay our hand and unexpected outcomes ensue. Plus, there are other actors… Belarus, Poland, ALL the Baltic states (some of whom are a little drunk on NATO juice), Moldova(!), Turkey/Syria and last of all China and Taiwan. And, to be fair to fate in human affairs: anywhere else in the world.

    What’s our response to either success… a Russian rout, or failure, Russians in Kyiv or maybe just crossing the Dnieper? We talk about deprecating Russian materiel. Very true. What if China is deprecating our reserves? Or, perhaps more accurately, if our reserves are deprecated unexpectedly it changes the calculus on Taiwan. Who’s using whom?

    Blank checks are bad; and the baseline of good policy is knowing when the sunk costs are sunk; which isn’t to say, sinking the costs was a bad thing just that at some point the ROI is gone, the risk calculus too great, or the outcome doesn’t satisfy the gain. This is the real meaning of spheres of influence… at some point the ROI/Risk Calculus are asymmetrical for the broader coalition(s). Those tipping points are difficult to manage. This goes for Ukrainian success as well as failure.

    Ukraine isn’t existential to the US, or even Europe for that matter. I’m still trying to decide how existential Taiwan is to the US. But one thing I notice among a certain sort of American opinion haver is that all things are deemed existential one way or another. And that’s the other side of realism where I think realists are right. There has to be a line where existential threats are defended against, and non-existential threats are defended against contingently. How do you let down your team when the contingency is satisfied? Never?

    Which, by the way is the basis for opposing NATO expansion… much preferred would be NATO plus regional security pacts. Expanding NATO weakened the existential determination dangerously… and ironically, made coordinating a regional response for Ukraine harder.

    But I digress. To sum up. Wars are unpredictable, other actors have the ability to act; we don’t control them. Mapping exit strategies is a bare minimum requirement for engaging in foreign affairs. There’s never a binary answer to what the exit might be. Good statesmanship navigates less good outcomes before they become terrible outcomes or outcomes that are impossible to influence.

    I’m not in the least bit privy to Biden’s (and his team’s) thoughts on how they’ve mapped exit strategies… I’m hopeful, despite the usual bad rhetoric on war, that they have.Report

    • North in reply to Marchmaine says:

      I think much of this analysis is pretty spot on but I think you are off the mark vis a vis China. To wit the assets the west has expended in Ukraine are almost universally assets that’d be of little to no value in a Taiwanese conflict.

      What the west has given Ukraine was overwhelmingly old surplus Soviet era arms and ammo which the Taiwanese (a modern military with no Soviet background) would have utterly no use for. The balance of the equipment has been our third or second string artillery; anti-aircraft & anti-tank missile systems and, recently, a smattering of armor. None of these systems or munitions with the modest exception of some of the anti-aircraft equipment would be at all relevant to the Taiwanese in a conflict with China. So in essence China isn’t running down any of our reserves that’d be relevant to them.Report

      • Chip Daniels in reply to North says:

        And by the same token, seeing the willingness of the West to unite again an obvious imperial aggression makes any invasion of Taiwan that much more risky a gamble.

        About the only angle I can see for China is a “Lets you and him fight” where both the NATO powers and Russia become weakened and distracted, allowing China to pursue its other global interests.Report

        • North in reply to Chip Daniels says:

          Agreed, I can’t imagine the Chinese- watching the events in Ukraine, have felt encouraged to move forward on a Taiwanese invasion. Though, if they’re clever, they might move forward on a detailed audit of their actual military capabilities.Report

          • InMD in reply to North says:

            The word out there on Taiwan is that they haven’t spent their resources nearly as well or modernized their command structure to optimize chances of holding out. Reports are that the US has been pushing them to adapt but change is slow, and fighter jets look way cooler than anti aircraft, anti ship missiles, and mines. Presumably they’d also need supplies and civil readiness to outlast a blockade.

            The good news though is that it really would be a different kind of fight than the big land war Ukraine is dealing with.Report

            • North in reply to InMD says:

              Yeah I’ve read about Taiwanese problems on defense. It is hair raising. If it was a peninsula instead of an island I imagine Taiwan would be gone already. But hoo boy would that invasion ever be a pickle to pull off- a mass amphibious landing on a mountainous fortified coastline with a navy that’s never done any such operation before? It might be easier for China to fill the Taiwan Strait with their soldiers corpses and just walk across.Report

              • Michael Cain in reply to North says:

                I have long maintained here and elsewhere that China’s best approach to a Taiwan “invasion” is an effective blockade plus bombardment. No fuel or munitions in. No manufactured goods out. Dare the US military to try to guarantee safe passage. Every substation, refinery, and natural gas processing plant gets several hundred kg high explosive love taps every few days. Dare Taiwan to strike at the mainland.

                Keep in mind that Taiwan is comparable in size to Crimea, not the entirely of Ukraine.Report

              • North in reply to Michael Cain says:

                Long run that strategy works pretty much guaranteed. Question is what happens first: Taiwan caputulates or China implodes due to interrupted trade. Ultimately it’s a question of civil resilience. How much do the Taiwanese genuinely care about their independence?Report

              • Brent F in reply to Michael Cain says:

                There’s a huge downside to that strategy. You let the US Navy surge for mass action getting all the ships in maintenance ready and drawing every ship from its station around the globe. So when the big naval fight happens you’re facing 9 carrier groups massed together, whereas you might only be facing 1 or 2 in an invasion you choose the time and place for.Report

            • Dark Matter in reply to InMD says:

              I watched a couple of videos on what an invasion of Taiwan would look like, and the geography seriously does not favor the invader. Few beaches, high cliffs, hostile weather, and amphibious assaults aren’t easy in the best of situations.

              Add to that a hostile population that has had decades to prepare and it would be a very hard, very ugly, very large job.

              It’s highly questionable whether the Chinese are even able to do this even if they have no Russian style problems.Report

              • InMD in reply to Dark Matter says:

                If the Chinese want to fight like we would then they’d blockade the island and spend weeks, maybe months softening it up with naval bombardment, missiles, and air power before trying to land anything. That’s why Taiwan’s first priority needs to be air and sea defenses to prevent that so that the forces on the ground are sufficiently in tact to make a landing difficult or impossible. You don’t do that by back ordering fighter jets that would be overwhelmed even if you had them.

                What the people and politicians would do is anyone’s guess. I give Ukraine better odds than others because I just don’t think they’ll allow themselves to be occupied at this point. No one knows what the Taiwanese would do or if they’ve really prepared the population to resist. One of the things that probably helped Ukraine in the regard is having a low intensity conflict stage to harden attitudes and make the situation real rather than hypothetical.Report

              • Dark Matter in reply to InMD says:

                If the Chinese want to fight like we would then they’d blockade the island and spend weeks, maybe months softening it up with naval bombardment, missiles, and air power before trying to land anything

                The US counters by blockading China. Not all of it, just the trade ports. So no oil, food, or import/exports.

                20% of their GDP is exports. Two thirds of their oil is imports. These numbers don’t come close to describing how much pain their system would be in because it’s just raw numbers and the supply chain disruption would be much worse.Report

      • Marchmaine in reply to North says:

        Thanks. But no, it is incorrect to imagine that what we’re providing are mothballed Soviet era stuff. If we were, we’d actually run out and Ukraine would be f*cked. Its true that we’re not sending, say, the latest platform versions… and I fully expect that an audit of breakage and malfunctions in Ukraine would be unacceptably high for US combat standards.

        But, it’s widely reported that munitions expended in Ukraine are far outstripping production… which is fine in the short run (I’m not saying we’ve strategically erred in our own defense), but the clear implication is that we’re going to have to ‘increase’ spending on production which will alter the costs calculations as there are new costs just to bring production online.

        Here’s the Sec-Gen of Nato ‘socializing’ this fact in major news outlets:

        “The war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles,” Stoltenberg said. “The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”

        https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nato-chief-ukraines-ammunition-outstripping-supply-97082610

        Now, take anything a BAE executive says in public with a grain of salt… but just this Sunday they were making the rounds saying that they were more than 3-yrs behind on projections to replace previous stockpiles and that number was going to grow exponentially at current rates of use in the Ukraine war.

        My point about China isn’t that there are second order costs we have to factor to make sure that we can keep up in Ukraine and provide support for Taiwan. Google how far we are behind in delivering already promised Materiel to Taiwan. It’s a lot.

        In the end, it’s just logistics, money, and time – not magic… but that’s what I’m pointing out: the longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more the dynamics change of what we have to do to support it, what others might do to continue it, and what it does to our cost projections for other commitments.

        Which, as a final gloss is how we should interpret Blinken’s recent ‘warning’ to China not to provide Materials of War directly to Russia… if they don’t we can try to outproduce and ‘bankrupt’ Russian output on the cheap (or relatively cheap). But, if they do? Well, that’s going to change the calculus too.

        My caution here is in thinking that we’ve got this thing ‘under control’.Report

        • North in reply to Marchmaine says:

          We, as in the total alliance, started out pouring old munitions and equipment into Ukraine which was the stuff the Ukrainians knew how to use and needed. We, as in the US, did provide second tier stuff like HIMARS etc and we are indeed running low on all kinds of stocks for that kind of stuff, like javelins and the like. Taiwan, if it gets sacked, won’t be sacked due to lack of HIMARS and javelin shoulder mounted missiles. It certainly won’t get sacked due to a deficit of Soviet era munitions.

          Now, granted, money and industrial production are somewhat limited and money spent on Ukraine isn’t money spent on Taiwan etc… but China, likewise, cannot just mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan out of the blue. It’d have an enormously lengthy and very visible runup. I just am dubious that any of the stuff we’ve sent to Ukraine would be stuff we’ll be hurting for if we are duking it out with China over Taiwan. They’re almost opposite environments: Taiwan mostly in the sea and sky, Ukraine overwhelmingly on land.

          But certainly it’s in our interest for the war to be resolved. There’s just no way for us to compel it to be resolved in a manner that is favorable to us. We could pull the plug on Ukrainian aid or threaten to do so, in which case the war would resolve in Russia’s favor, or we can continue aid and hope that the Russians finally start talking about a realistic settlement. At the moment, though, the Russians are betting we’ll run out of patience before they run out of people.Report

        • InMD in reply to Marchmaine says:

          The x factor is the Europeans. There should be no economic reason they can’t pick up the slack on production and they even got a favor from mother nature with the mild winter. Question is whether they stick together.Report

          • Marchmaine in reply to InMD says:

            The EU is hedging with regards China’s counter-pressure… which is part of the x factor. Probably a good chance that internal military spending will increase, but I wouldn’t assume at this point that additional aid will keep pace with escalations in Ukraine over time.

            The y factor is that India and South America (and chunks of Africa) didn’t align with ‘the west’.

            All I’m pointing out is that we like to think that it’s still 1989 and we’ve got hegemonic dominance … we’re back to super-power dominance and despite our internal rhetoric, we’re not getting global compliance to our objectives.

            Rivals can and will take the opportunity to pursue their own objectives… unaligned/nominally aligned states will milk the uncertainty.Report

    • Slade the Leveller in reply to Marchmaine says:

      Dean Acheson famously excluded Korea from the American security perimeter in 1950, and to this day I cannot take a vacation to Pyongyang.

      Honestly, did we really expect to see a war of conquest in 2022?Report

    • Marchmaine in reply to Marchmaine says:

      “Ukraine is NOW existential to the US”

      No it isn’t. If anything Ukraine has exposed how little an existential threat Russia would be to 1955 Nato Germany/France/UK/Italy (Iceland! et al.) – assuming they (merely) pick-up their obligations to NATO.

      Thinking there’s an existential threat in Ukraine is precisely the bad rhetoric and thinking that will cloud our judgements of how to navigate the end to the war and our other strategic commitments.Report

      • Chip Daniels in reply to Marchmaine says:

        Maybe the entire concept of “existential threat” is flawed.

        Like, which nation or group of nations can be considered “existential” to the US?

        Even NATO isn’t “existential” in the sense that if part or even most of Europe were swallowed up by Russia, life in America could go on very easily.
        If China were to dominate or bully the entire Asian continent and bend it to its will as a series of vassal states, would that be “existential” to America, and why?

        As used by most politicians and laypeople, “existential” really just means “Things we are willing to spend blood and treasure on”.Report

        • Dark Matter in reply to Chip Daniels says:

          The amount of blood we are spending is zero.
          The amount of treasure we are spending is trivial.

          A lot of the gear we’ve sent Ukraine has been “army surplus” from our previous wars. Ergo although it’s reported as a “big number”, it was just sitting in a warehouse and was never going to be used in the field again.

          Ukraine wants stuff they can use (i.e. that they’ve been trained on) right now. They were Warsaw pack. The various ex-Warsaw pack members of Nato send them their stuff and will have to buy Nato standard stuff in the future.

          If we ignore both of those issues, it’s still pretty trivial in terms of costs.
          Putin has gone full Hit.ler and is intent on Genocide (that’s in addition to all his other war crimes). Arming Ukraine enough to defend itself and defeat our regional rival is fine thing. Putin and his 19th century empire have no lower limit.Report

          • Chip Daniels in reply to Dark Matter says:

            I agree, but I’m mostly challenging the use of the term “existential” as a helpful metric.

            Both because for the examplesi lilsted above, there is an argument for why they in fact are existential.

            There is almost no foreign policy scenario where the existence of the US would be in question, up to and including a wholesale conquest of Mexico and Canada by a hostile power.

            This is because acquiescence is always an option, leaving the US in existence.

            But the counter argument is that our existence, as we know it and prefer it, depends on having a large number of friendly allies and trading partners. It doesn’t rely upon any one, but on the totality of our standing and relationships.

            If those allies get picked off one by one, at some point yes, our existence would be changed so radically that it would be worse than had we not acted, even if those actions were unpleasant and had negative consequences at the time.

            The difficulty of course is that these things can best be seen only in hindsight. The argument I just gave wasn’t coined by me, it was the argument made by proponents of the Vietnam war.

            The “Existential” threat argument is sort of the inverse of the Domino theory, in this regard.Report

            • Dark Matter in reply to Chip Daniels says:

              Canada and Mexico simultaneously invading can have only a few results.

              #1 They spend the next 20-40 years rebuilding their shattered economies.

              #2 They spend the next 100+ years rebuilding their shattered civilizations.

              Which of those results they get will depend on how pissed and how forgiving the Americans are.

              Now the bottom of the “bad results” doesn’t have to stop at #2. There’s also “turn parts of Mexico + Canada into American States” (see also: History of Texas and New Mexico).Report

              • Dark Matter in reply to Dark Matter says:

                The US is sitting on the most productive farm land in the world, wastes as much as we consume, exports an absurd amount of food, and is the richest country in the world.

                It’s very hard to see how we have problems with food at all, and if we do we can out bid for the remaining fertilizer that still exists.

                Now granted, we may actually see famine in other parts of the world because of the Ukraine war. However we’ll be fine. See also “vaccine inequality” for how these things work out.

                And with all of that, we still shatter Canada and Mexico if they invade. We spend twenty plus times what they do, combined, on the military. With that 20x comes a lot of other advantages.Report

  4. Burt Likko says:

    First and foremost for these pages: congratulations on the apparently successful surgery! We are all thrilled to hear your good news. Moving on now to the subject of the OP.

    At the risk of violating Godwin’s law: peace of course sounds great when presented in a vacuum, and we all want peace if it’s available. But when we look at history, we don’t admire Neville Chamberlain. We admire Winston Churchill. It’s not that Chamberlain liked the Nazis particularly, and it’s not like Churchill was a fan of war for war’s sake. It’s that Churchill understood that the price of peace with a man like Hitler was submission to autocracy, and acted on that understanding.

    I tell my students and my clients and my colleagues that you have to close the circle because there are people out there who just don’t get metaphors, but I also trust that readers here are intelligent enough to do exactly that. So, I’ll compromise and point out that it isn’t hard to map out the metaphor here.

    I’m not saying Putin is literally exactly like Hitler. I have no information suggesting that Putin is addicted to meth, after all. Also, Hitler actually captured Paris.Report

  5. . I’m not sure that there was much difference in the life of someone living under either regime

    If you were Jewish, one made your life much shorter.Report